

PAKISTAN'S NON-KINETIC RESPONSES TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM

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Abstract

Pakistan's Counter-Terrorism mix represents a fine combination of kinetic and non-kinetic means. Besides the use of military, intelligence and police force, the state has also employed de-radicalization, rehabilitation and counter-narrative campaigns to counter extremism in its violent and non-violent manifestations. But a significant decline in accumulative number of terrorist incidents from 2014 onward has led the authorities to slash efforts and resources on soft counter-terrorism front. Using "Three Levels of Analysis" this paper seeks to provide a brief overview of the soft measures adopted by Pakistan during last two decades of its counter-terrorism campaign and argues that quantitative decline in the incidents of terrorism from 2014 onwards must not lead to counter-terror triumphalism. Terrorism in Pakistan has certainly declined but extremism persists, with certain new characteristics. To respond to these challenges there is a strong need to sustain the non-kinetic Counter Terrorism (CT) initiatives through institutionalized arrangements.

Keywords: Extremism, Terrorism, Deradicalization, Rehabilitation, Counter-Narrative.

Introduction

Terrorism is a bi-product of extremism. According to Schmid, extremism is "*a process characterised by increased commitment to and use of violent means and strategies in political conflicts.*" While extremism is characterised by commitment to violent means and strategies, terrorism consists of actually committing violent acts in pursuit of ends in political conflicts. Keeping this distinction in view, extremism transforms into terrorism (violent extremism) through the process of radicalisation. Radicalisation can be defined as "*a process*

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of moving away from equilibrium thinking."¹¹ This brings us to the question of what equilibrium is and who defines it?

Equilibrium is a concept from mechanical or physical sciences (physics) which represents "a state of rest or balance due to the equal action of opposing forces, an equal balance between any powers, influences, etc." Disturbance of any constituting object (forces, powers, influences etc.) in such a state disturbs the whole equilibrium. As in physics, there are also states of equilibrium in other spheres, e.g. human, social, legal, political etc. The equilibrium thinking in the process of extremism is significantly impacted by human equilibrium in society. A discussion of human equilibrium delves us into the philosophical debate of monism and dualism.

Monism is the school of philosophy that believes that everything related to human experience is rooted in one universal attribute. That universal attribute may be material (body) or immaterial (mind), but all human experience will be derived from that one (mono) attribute only. In contrast, dualism is the school that believes that everything related to human experience is rooted in two contrasting attributes of body and mind. Where body deals with physical and material experience of reality e.g. sensations, function of organs, and physical activities etc. And the mind deals with immaterial experience of reality e.g. thought process, emotions, ideas and ideals etc. Western philosophy has been dominated by dualism since Plato and continues to reflect the dualist ideals of Plato and Descartes in modern philosophy of life. Therefore, any human equilibrium has to balance between mind and body according to Western ideals.

In religious and theocratic philosophical systems, there is a third attribute of human experience i.e. spirit. This view is prevalent across different religions of the world, both biblical and non-biblical. It emphasises that there must be an equilibrium among all three attributes, i.e. body, mind, and spirit, to achieve equilibrium in human experience. This can also be called a religious pluralist view, according to which equilibrium is a dynamic state of human experience wherein an individual's physical, mental and spiritual aspects are in synergy. And it is in this pluralist view that we will examine human equilibrium and its relation with extremism and radicalisation.

Coming back to the concept of radicalisation in context of the above discussion, equilibrium thinking can be defined as collective consensus on issues

relating to religion, politics, society and law etc. Any deviation or digression from the collective consensus will be considered as radicalisation.² For example, the peaceful coexistence of different sects with differing theological stances is a collective consensus. Any person digressing from the consensus is considered a radical. Likewise, the Constitution of Pakistan is an agreed-upon collective political consensus. Any digression, beyond constitutional means, from that will be regarded as an act of radicalism. In similar light, national unity is an equilibrium, and whosoever challenges national unity on the basis of ethnicity or religion can be considered radical. This radicalisation, when it turns violent, transforms into terrorism.

Conceptual Framework

Pakistan's Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) campaign has been driven by a multi-level analysis of the problem, which entails that motivation for violent extremism or terrorism can occur at three different levels, i.e. at the level of individuals, organisations, and the environment. Different approaches to the study of terrorism focus on different levels. However, the multi-level approach towards the analysis of terrorism takes into account all three levels. It suggests that factors driving an individual to resort to terrorism differ significantly from the factors that motivate terrorist organisations. And these factors are also influenced by the environment, including political, socio-cultural, economic aspects. For instance, in Pakistan individuals committing acts of terror are usually driven by misinterpretation of Islam and sense of vengeance, but the terrorist organizations employ this method because of its efficacy vis-à-vis non-violent methods.

Multi-level analysis is extracted from Moghadam's seminal work on suicide terrorism.³ He uses the distinction in three "images" or levels of analysis introduced by Kenneth Waltz in his book *Man, the State and War* in 1954. Waltz's division of three levels of analysis to understand the causes of war through analysis at individual, state, and international system levels introduced multi-level analysis in understanding international relations. Moghadam adopts Waltz's three levels of analysis and modifies it for developing a framework for understanding causes of (suicide) terrorism.

The first level of analysis in the framework remains similar to that of Waltz, i.e. individual level. State-level in Waltz's approach is replaced by the organization, which is responsible for planning and executing the strategy of violent extremism. And the international system is replaced with the

environment, representing different aspects of society like cultural, economic, and political etc., within which individuals and terrorist organizations exist and interact. Taking all these levels into account for a multi-level analysis can best explain the various factors affecting terrorism.


At the first level, i.e. the individual level, the prevalence of tendencies for violent extremism are examined by investigating psychological motivations for terrorism. There may be different sets of motivations for a radicalized individual to get involved in violent activities. Even though a general view regarding violent extremism, particularly in hardcore forms like suicide terrorism, may suggest that terrorists are mentally ill. However, scientifically there is not much evidence to suggest that terrorists are necessarily mentally ill.⁴ Apart from this, a range of motivations exist for individuals to carry out terrorism, ranging from a misinterpretation of religion, need for vengeance, a distorted sense of identity, seeking a sense of glory, or even financial incentives. However, individual motivations are still only one aspect of terrorism. Terrorist acts are rarely carried out in isolation and are usually manipulated and applied on a larger scale by terrorist networks and organizations.⁵

This brings us to the second level of analysis, i.e. organizational. The general motivation for terrorist organizations is that their political goals can be more efficiently achieved using violence. According to Crenshaw, terrorist organizations usually resort to violence when they are convinced against the legitimacy of their adversary, and carrying of violence has become morally justified.⁶ Once legitimized, the terrorist organizations may perpetrate violence for various goals, including gaining recognition, damaging the adversary physically and morally, gaining popularity among its audience, creating discipline and fear within its own ranks, etc.

These goals and motivations for carrying out terrorism are also affected by political, cultural, religious and economic factors, which bring us to the third level of analysis, i.e. environmental. The environment in which terrorist organizations and individuals operate is also one of the key factors affecting whether violence will be adopted or not. For instance, political domination of one group over the other may motivate the adoption of violence as a method to fight against the delegitimized adversary, as in the case of LTTE against the Sri Lankan government. There might also be various cultural motivations for terrorism, for instance the glorification of martyrdom in both religious and secular cultures.⁷

Likewise, perpetration of terrorism as a religious obligation may also motivate the adoption of violence, as in the case of ISIS. At the same time, some groups may carry out terrorism for economic incentives or due to feeling of impoverishment. Applying multi-causal analysis on terrorism in Pakistan, most fighters appear to be driven by a sense of vengeance and misinterpretation of Islam. However, terrorist organizations use this tactic (terrorism) because it is more effective than other means (democratic struggle, social penetration, etc.) to implement their perceived goal of establishing *Shariah*. Similarly, few segments of Pakistani society subscribing to the extremists' worldview may be driven by an entirely different set of motives.⁸

Moghadam also designed a feedback loop for the description of a multi-causal approach towards (suicide) terrorism. The loop describes how three levels interact to motivate terrorism, whose effects are responded to by relevant actors, creating a feedback loop that may increase or decrease the further likelihood of terrorism. The individual and organizational motives for terrorism overlap with environmental factors, which result in the recruitment and commitment of terrorism by the radicalized individuals. This prompts a response from the government, media, and even external actors at times. The reaction may then either reinforce the environment to become more conducive for motivating terrorism or change the environment in favor of discouraging both organizations and individuals from resorting to violence. Due to this reason, an effective counter-terrorism strategy is essential in fighting terrorism and will be discussed in the coming part.



1 Assaf Moghadam's model for multi-causal analysis of suicide terrorism⁹

Responding to Violent Extremism at Three Levels

Any Counter-Terrorism (CT) strategy is divided into two major components, i.e. hard counter-terrorism and soft counter-terrorism. Whereas hard CT deals with killing and capturing terrorists, soft CT mainly relies on identifying, preventing and pre-empting violent extremism through non-coercive means. Some scholars have also dissected this distinction between hard and soft approaches towards counter-terrorism on tactical, operational and strategic level. According to Rohan Gunaratna, hard CT includes countering terrorism on tactical and operational level. In contrast, soft CT includes countering terrorism on strategic level by using deradicalization and CVE programmes.¹⁰

Hard counter-terrorism includes adopting kinetic measures like killing and capturing terrorists in military and law enforcement operations. Even though using kinetic measures can disrupt the operational capabilities of terrorist groups, yet it fails to provide a lasting solution. This can be observed by the fact that the terrorism by Al-Qaeda increased after the invasion of Afghanistan, and coercive detention facilities like Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib and Bagram provided recruiting ground for terrorists belonging to Al-Qaeda, and later for ISIS.

Studies establish that counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism is 20 percent military (hard) and 80 percent political (soft).¹¹ Political, non-coercive and non-kinetic measures, including deradicalization, rehabilitation, transformation and counter-narrative, fall under the broader category of political or soft CT component.

As discussed earlier, radicalization is a process of moving away from equilibrium thinking. Inversely thus, deradicalization is a process of bringing an individual back towards equilibrium thinking in harmony with the collective consensus of society. Many a time, deradicalization is carried out in confined spaces like rehabilitation centers, under custody or supervision. For this reason, rehabilitation is generally defined as reversing of radicalization in custody.¹²

Terrorist organizational transformation is the process of transforming goals and means of terrorist and violent extremist groups. It usually involves taking a combination of soft measures like rehabilitation, facilitation and mainstreaming to transform the organization from adopting violent activities as convenient means or ends.

Counter-narrative is another crucial component of soft counter-terrorism. It refers to any effort by the counter-terrorist actors that seek to deconstruct the militants' ideology and effectively challenge it with an aim to create an environment that counteracts to militants' narrative.¹³

Once terrorism is identified as a multi-causal phenomenon, it also demands a multi-level approach to counter-terrorism that dissects root causes and recommends remedies specifically tailored for each level. Thus different but interrelated measures are needed to be taken on each level to effectively counter terrorism, particularly in case of soft CT. These approaches include rehabilitation on individual level, organizational transformation on organizational level, and building a counter-narrative on environmental level. In the coming section, Pakistan's soft counter-terrorism efforts are examined on all three levels to curb the menace of terrorism and violent extremism.

Individual Level – Rehabilitation

Rehabilitation efforts have been carried out in Pakistan in order to deal with terrorism using soft approach on the individual level. Pakistan's first Deradicalization and Emancipation Program (DREP) started after 2009 in the aftermath of Operation Rah-e-Rast in Swat. Initially the program contained a number of initiatives including Mishal, Sabaoon and Rastoon, Feast, and Sparlay, in collaboration between military and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). However, later, only Mishal was retained as the permanent DREP managed exclusively by the military.¹⁴ Another major program was the Punjab Rehabilitation Programme, managed by the Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) of Punjab Police and Technical Education & Vocational Training Authority (TEVTA), Government of Punjab. In erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), there were two separate DREPs under the name of Navi Sahar in Bajaur Agency and Khyber Programme in Khyber Agency, also being operated by the military.¹⁵

Pakistan Army has also created terrorist deradicalization and rehabilitation centres to deal with ethno-nationalist insurgents in Balochistan. Prominent programme include "Darpesh" (initially named as "Umeed-e-Nau) at EME Center Quetta and a separate program at FC Public School in Kohlu. Established in 2018, "Darpesh", a Balochi word that literally translates into "light" was a brainchild of Lieutenant General (Retired) Asim Saleem Bajwa. The programme established in December 2018, has thus far deradicalized

approximately 178 Baloch militants in two batches, with each batch lasting for three months.

All above-mentioned programmes draw significantly from Saudi Arabia's rehabilitation model. The model adopts counselling on both psychological and religious level in order to balance the extremist views of those under rehabilitation. It is then followed by providing social support through education and family counselling.¹⁶ Once the mainstream education is complete, the individual is released, and a course of post-release counselling is initiated. Beneficiaries are also provided with financial assistance to help them make a decent living through setting up businesses around skills imparted to them during rehabilitation process. An examination of Pakistan's DREPs shows how this model has been applied in Pakistan.

At the Mishal DREP in Swat, first of all the former militants are selected for the program. The project only takes those militants who do not have "blood on hands," i.e. they have not killed anybody and have only performed mid-tier jobs in the terrorist organization.¹⁷ This is similar to the Saudi rehabilitation program, where anyone with "blood on hands" would not be released even if they completed rehabilitation. Once someone is taken in custody for rehabilitation, they undergo collective religious education and counselling. This phase includes lectures by *khateeb*s and former militants to the participants. After counselling, vocational training is also imparted to the participants to make them self-sufficient in living. The rehabilitation process ends with an assessment interview where it is decided if the participant is ready to leave, or will stay for another term in the rehabilitation center. The post-release period starts once the participant leaves center. Family members and community elders are advised on supporting the individual and are obliged to meet the Mishal administration weekly for the first three months. Later on, the participant is required to report once a month for six months before being considered completely rehabilitated.¹⁸

A detailed in-person study on Mishal centre found multiple factors on the individual level in motivating the radicals to adopt terrorism. Some common factors included: low socio-economic status, large families, history of physical abuse, strict and negligent behavior of elders, and lack of education. Lack of critical thinking, emotional instability, and revenge-seeking and authority seeking behavior was also observed among the former terrorists interviewed.¹⁹ This shows a number of motivating factors for adopting violence on the individual level, and

how a comprehensive rehabilitation program can help overcome these multiple factors altogether.

The Punjab Rehabilitation Programme, initiated in 2011 and managed by CTD and TEVTA, also adopted a prevention, rehabilitation, and aftercare strategy, like the Swat DREP. The Punjab government allocated Rs. 9.33 million during fiscal year 2012-13 for the programme. It provided the militants an opportunity to undergo technical and vocational education and receive a loan of up to Rs. 30,000 in order to start their own business. After this rehabilitation, the militant and his family would undergo regular meetings and counselling for three months and follow-up meetings for six months. By 2016, three batches of 311 participants were trained and rehabilitated under the programme.²⁰

In 2012 two rehabilitation centres were also opened in Bajaur and Khyber districts of erstwhile FATA. These centres also focused on combining religious and ideological training along with vocational training. The rehabilitation centre in Bajaur was run jointly by Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps. The centre would offer a 12-week rehabilitation program to the participants. In 2013, the fourth batch of 47 participants was passed out from the centre.²¹ While the programme in Khyber comprised of three learning centres with 400 participants. The distinguishing feature of the Khyber programme was that it also included feedback from militants regarding their stay at the programme.²²

These three distinct programmes comprise Pakistan's overall deradicalization efforts. These focused on dealing with the causes and motivations of terrorism on the individual level. The non-kinetic approach of rehabilitation as a reaction to terrorism prevents a negative feedback loop which could otherwise provide a conducive environment and encourage further terrorism. However, the non-kinetic approach in Pakistan is also applied cautiously, as evident from the "no blood on hand" policy in the Mishal programme.

Organizational Level – Transformation

Still the threat of terrorism cannot be dealt entirely on an individual level. Different terrorist organizations have different goals and motivations to get involved in terrorism. To deal with terrorism on organizational level, it is essential to bring about organizational transformation or change as well.

In Pakistan different terrorist organizations can be broadly divided into four groups with each group having distinct goals and motivations for terrorism. Those are: Neo-Jihadists, Sectarian, Ethno-Nationalist, and Religious Nationalist.²³ Neo-jihadists are those groups which believe in the idea of a global jihad, and abhor the concept of nation-states. This ideology was pioneered by Al-Qaeda and was later adopted by Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), its breakaway factions, and ISIS in Pakistan. Sectarian terrorists are those groups who are motivated by their goal to target other sects or groups in the same community. In Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) is a sunni sectarian terrorist organization, while Sipah-e-Muhammad (SeM) and Zainabiyoon are shia sectarian terrorist organisations that rose in reaction to sunni sectarian terrorists. Ethno-nationalist terrorists include organisations formed on sub-nationalist and separatist lines. In Pakistan major ethno-nationalist organisations include Baloch Republican Army, Baloch Liberation Army, Baloch Liberation Front, Sindhu Desh Liberation Army, and Sindhu Desh Liberation Front. While religious nationalist terrorist groups stand in contrast to neo-jihadists, and affirm the idea of nation-states but believe in primacy of religion for their cause. This leads to religious nationalist groups in Pakistan like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) to denounce anti-Pakistan attacks by neo-jihadists.

In case of Pakistan, terrorist organisational transformation through mainstreaming and rehabilitation was witnessed in case of religious nationalist organisation Jamat-ud-Dawa (JuD), affiliated with LeT. In addition to the rehabilitation of militants, the organization also attempted mainstreaming itself. The leaders of organisation announced forming a political party in 2017 by the name of Milli Muslim League (MML). The announcement was met with considerable criticism both internally and externally, despite the fact that organisational mainstreaming is a common phenomenon in dealing with terrorist organisations. The intent of mainstreaming effort by JuD might have also been influenced by the factor of constraints that terrorist organisations faced due to sanctions applied after 9/11. Nevertheless, the mainstreaming effort faced difficulty due to various reasons.

Firstly, the JuD did not take into account any stakeholders or actors at internal and external level in its attempt at mainstreaming. However, one of key principles in Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) is that all major actors involved in such a programme must have a shared vision regarding the outcomes. Consequently, no political party came to support JuD in its

mainstreaming process. Ministry of Interior also advised the Election Commission not to register MML.²⁴ The United States saw it as an effort by LeT to circumvent sanctions applied on them. Thus the project of transforming into a political party remained incomplete for the JuD.

Proponents of the attempted transformation argued that the mainstreaming will render the JuD obsolete, as religious political parties have never performed well in Pakistan. Another rationale is that once the parties enter mainstream political process, they will be forced to change their stance from radical to moderate in order to appeal to greater audience for securing votes. Therefore, the best way of dealing with such religious nationalist terrorist organisations is to let them enter the mainstream politics and allow the nation to decide their fate.

Even though the transformation of JuD never concluded and came to an abrupt halt. The party was not registered in general elections, and their endorsed candidates faced humiliating defeat. Ever since, the MML disappeared from public and media discourse. However it made a few things clear. One was that only willingness of a terrorist organisation for mainstreaming may not lead to a conclusive organisational transformation. All the actors and stakeholders need to have a clear image of purpose and outcome of transformation in order to facilitate the process. Furthermore, merely adopting the status of a political party or joining electoral process does not ensure the complete transformation of terrorist organisation. In order to convince all stakeholders and actors as well as the general populace, they must also denounce violence and adopt a moderate public stance.

Environmental Level – Counter Narrative

There are three key types in narratives i.e. collective, ontological, and public narratives. Collective narratives are those which evolve organically in a society with the passage of time, without any author or messenger. Ontological narratives are those told by ordinary people. Ontological narratives have an author, and only become collective narrative in society if they are widely accepted. While the public narratives are those which are specifically constructed by any actor (governments, media, clergy, organisations etc.). Public narratives built upon collective narratives have more chances to be accepted widely.²⁵

As stated earlier, counter narrative is any narrative created by actors to counteract violent terrorists' narrative. In that regard, counter narratives are usually public narratives created and endorsed by the state. Counter narratives also act against terrorism on all levels, however its impact is most prominently seen on the environmental level. Thus counter narrative is an imperative measure to deal with environment conducive for terrorism.

The case study of counter narrative building by Egypt can be regarded as an ideal model. Immediately after 9/11, Egypt sought to create a counter narrative to keep the influence of violent organisations like Al-Qaeda and Al-Jihad away from Egypt. For that purpose, they endorsed and patronised former terrorist leaders who spoke against committing the acts of terrorism. Two key figures in Egypt's counter narrative were Imam Shareef and Yusuf Qaradawi. Their works "Rationalising Jihad in Egypt and the World" and "Fiqa-e-Jihad" respectively were landmarks in transforming the aggressive minds in society from radicalisation to social synchronisation.²⁶ The counter narrative in Egypt shook foundations of violent extremist groups in Egypt and decreased incidences of terrorism. Despite the fact that their internal environment (economic, political, social) was as much trouble-ridden.

In similar light, Pakistan also started constructing a counter narrative against terrorism with extremists as its target audience after the realisation that post-9/11 hard counter-terrorist methods have not been able to effectively eradicate violent extremism. The public narrative before general audience was constructed through media and songs highlighting the efforts of armed forces. Most of such narrative was constructed and led by Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), the media wing of Pakistan's military. According to Iqbal et al., there are 35 different dramas, movies, songs, and documentaries made and released by ISPR until 2019 to counter the extremist narrative.²⁷ However, these were not all well received as the target audience saw military patronised media with suspicion.

The religious clergy also supported efforts in building counter narrative against terrorism in Pakistan. In 2010, Dr. Tahir ul Qadri wrote a 600 page long document in which he denounced violent extremism carried out by different groups in the name of Islam. Later in 2016, the Pakistan Ulema Council (PUC), led by Hafiz Tahir Ashrafi, issued a fatwa (religious ruling) declaring a number of organisations like ISIS and Hezbollah as terrorist. However both these narratives

also did not popularise, as both the persons leading these initiatives had questionable and partisan character in the public eye.²⁸

Perhaps the most comprehensive narrative building was carried out in Paigham-e-Pakistan (PeP), a fatwa written and endorsed by religious scholars from all sects of Pakistan and approved by the President of Pakistan. It logically refuted the violent terrorism, clarified the term jihad, and emphasised upon concepts like social harmony, spirit of forgiveness, and maintenance of social order. The document also represented consensus of all sects that the constitution and state of Pakistan were not in contradiction to Islam. Thus any "jihad" against Pakistan and its citizens was invalidated. It had all the necessary features to formulate an effective counter narrative. The only drawback was that its outreach towards its targeted audience i.e. militants and violent extremists, was not as much as it should have been. Thus this is one domain where the state needs to work upon for effective counter narrative.

Conclusively, in the formative phase, the counter narrative efforts in Pakistan did not meet the true purpose of substantially altering environment motivating terrorism due to various reasons. First the messengers or actors constructing the public narrative were questionable for the intended audience. Secondly the message, even if correct, could not effectively reach the intended audience i.e. violent extremists and terrorists. Lastly any counter narrative effort has also to be accompanied with actual development of material means in order to alter the environment on economic, political, and social level as well. Thus, successful counter narratives need to consist of authentic messengers with appeal for the audience, acceptable and understandable medium, and identification of the correct audience to deliver the narrative.

Conclusion

Pakistan's non-kinetic responses to violent extremism have certainly complimented the state's kinetic response. Military operations, followed by Intelligence-Based Operations (IBOs) and subsequent deployment of various CT bodies paved the way for the government's soft interventions. This led to significant decline of incidents of terrorism in the country. According to various independent think-tanks and research centres annual number of terror attacks dropped from nearly 2,000 in 2009 to fewer than 319 in 2020.²⁹ However, the war is far from over. Possible withdrawal of the US forces from Afghanistan by September 2021 is likely to transform the militant landscape of the country.

Multiple militant organizations including Afghan Taliban, Al-Qaeda, Pakistani Taliban have previously sought legitimacy from the US presence in Afghanistan, using it as a *raison d'être* to justify their existence and actions.³⁰ Those who followed ethno-nationalist agenda including Baloch and Sindh separatists also benefited directly or indirectly from the presence of extra-regional forces in the neighboring Afghanistan. Failure to manage the fallout of American withdrawal could potentially reverse Pakistani gains against violent extremist groups of various hue and colors.

Therefore, the state needs to sustain its non-kinetic interventions rigorously. Deradicalization centres in erstwhile FATA, Swat, South Punjab and Balochistan must be supported with all legal, financial and logistical means. An external audit of these facilities by subject matter experts can add value and transparency to these initiatives. On transformation of JuD, Islamabad may consider learning from global best practices in DDR domain, by involving key stakeholders such as the UN, US, China and Saudi Arabia. Efforts to counter militants' narrative must go beyond "Paigham-e-Pakistan" by encouraging healthy scholarly debate on the document.

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