

FOREIGN POLICY – DEFINITION FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION THEORY AND PRACTICE IN PAKISTAN

Ambassador (Retired) Najmuddin A. Shaikh^{}*

Abstract

Foreign policy, except where the protection of territorial integrity and sovereignty is involved, is the handmaiden of domestic policy. Domestic policy determines national interest and its advancement is the principal goal. Diplomacy is the tool of Foreign policy. Kissinger using the example of Cardinal Richelieu states that the first indispensable element of a successful foreign policy is a long-term strategic concept based on a careful analysis of all relevant factors. Kissinger notes that Palmerston as PM of Great Britain stated that “When people ask me ... for what is called a policy, the only answer is that we mean to do what may seem to be best, upon each occasion as it arises, making the Interests of Our Country one’s guiding principle.” Domestic policy if realistically framed has to take account of the country’s natural resource base and to assess what resources are needed from abroad and to determine the price that may need to be paid to obtain them. The price may mean adjusting foreign policy including modifications in goals otherwise important for foreign policy.

Keywords: Foreign Policy, Domestic Policy, Theory and Practice, Diplomacy, National Interest.

Introduction

There are many definitions of foreign policy and what it should seek to achieve. One says “the goals the nation's officials seek to attain abroad, the values that give rise to those objectives, and the means or instruments used to pursue them.”¹

The Encyclopedia Britannica in its 2009 edition defines it as “General objectives that guide the activities and relationships of one state in its interactions with other states.

^{*}Najmuddin A. Shaikh is former Pakistan's ambassador to Canada, West Germany, United States and Iran. He also served as Foreign Secretary from 1994 to 1997. The author's email address is shaikh28@gmail.com.

Another more succinct definition is “Foreign policy is the key element in the process by which a state translates its broadly conceived goals and interests into concrete courses of action to attain these objectives and promote its interests.”²

Yet another older but perhaps clearer definition is from Hugh Gibson who says “a well-rounded, comprehensive plan, based on knowledge and experience, for conducting the business of government with the rest of the world. It is aimed at promoting and protecting the interests of the nation. This calls for a clear understanding of what, those interests are and how far we can help to go with the means at our disposal. Anything less than this falls short of being a national foreign policy.”³

In a more general survey of the available literature it would appear most analysts agree that foreign policy is influenced by domestic considerations, the policies or behaviour of other states, or plans to advance specific geopolitical designs. Some analysts emphasise the primacy of geography and external threats in shaping foreign policy, while others emphasise the domestic factor as the determinant. All agree that the principal goal is the protection and advancement of national interest.

One should also perhaps define the tool for implementing foreign policy. The generally accepted would be “Diplomacy is the tool of foreign policy, and war, alliances, and international trade may all be manifestations of it”.

How is diplomacy used? A good illustration is one used by Kissinger who credits Cardinal Richelieu, with being the “father of the modern nation-state. He was, according to Kissinger the man who used foreign policy most effectively to advance the interest of the French monarchy. According to his study, Richelieu believed that the first indispensable element of a successful foreign policy is a long-term strategic concept based on a careful analysis of all relevant factors. This vision must be distilled by analysing and shaping an array of ambiguous, often conflicting pressures, into a coherent and purposeful direction. He (or she) must know where this strategy is leading and why. And lastly, he must act at the outer edge of the possible, bridging the gap between his society’s experiences and its aspirations.”⁴

Lord Palmerston, the British Prime Minister in the 19th Century defined the basic principle governing foreign policy as being “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.....And if I might be allowed to express in one sentence the principle which I think ought to guide an English Minister, I would adopt the expression of Canning, and say that with every British Minister the interests of England ought to be the shibboleth of his policy.”⁵ Asked to define these interests more specifically in the form of an official “foreign policy,” Palmerston said, “When people ask me for what is called a policy, the only answer is that we mean to do what may seem to be best, upon each occasion as it arises, making the Interests of Our Country one’s guiding principle.”⁶

What are interests for a state and how have analysts defined them. Hans Morgenthau one of the most influential thinkers of the “realist” school says “The idea of interest is indeed of the essence of politics and is unaffected by the circumstances of time and place”. This means that in foreign policy formulation one looks for common interests as driving alliances-whether termed as such or not. From Ancient Greece we have the Thucydides' statement, that "identity of interests is the surest of bonds whether between states or individuals". In the nineteenth century Lord Salisbury's endorsed this dictum in another way stating, "the only bond of union that endures" among nations is "the absence of all clashing interests."⁷

Many people referred derisively to the British as a nation of shopkeepers. While the British may take offense, it does point to the fact that the “interests of our country” which Palmerston described as the guiding principle of foreign policy meant the economic interests of its people and therefore of the nation. In today’s world this is even truer than it was in the days when the British Empire was being created and managed to further British economic interests.

As is evident from the foregoing, the interests that foreign policy, and its tool diplomacy, must promote are in large measure the goals set by domestic policy. Foreign policy is the handmaiden of domestic policy. If in domestic policy there is a certain ideological thrust and there is a determination that our relations with other countries will be pursued bearing this ideology in mind despite the costs that it may entail then foreign policy, will veer towards establishing close relations with the countries that share this ideology. The task is then of formulating a foreign policy that allows an advance towards this goal without

putting at risk other relationships that are of greater importance in political and economic terms.

Domestic policy and its formulations has to take account of the elements of national power and that includes a realistic assessment of what its geographical location means.

With a population of 220 million Pakistan is the 6th most populous country in the world. Were it located in Africa it would be the largest country of the continent having about 25 million more people than Nigeria and being almost three times the size of South Africa. But in its present location Pakistan is dwarfed by two neighbours China and India the world's most heavily populated countries at 1.44 billion and 1.39 billion respectively.

With an area of 796,000 square kilometers, a coast line of 1046 kilometers and an exclusive Economic Zone in the Arabian Sea of almost 240,000 square kilometers Pakistan ranks as the 36th largest country in the world but again it is surrounded by neighbours who dwarf it in size with China being 9.6 million square kilometers, India being 3.3 million square kilometers, and Iran being 1.6 million square kilometers.

With the exception of Afghanistan therefore it would appear that Pakistan has as neighbours countries that are bigger in size and population like India and China or richer in resources like Iran. The influence that size and resources normally confers on countries vis-a-vis its neighbours is not one of the benefits that Pakistan enjoys.

Having such large neighbours, being at the juncture of different regions and having a coastline that can provide outlets for landlocked states can however confer advantages. It can be the ideal transit country for overland trade between the large markets that these countries represent. Pakistan's location makes it an ideal transit point for trade between South Asia and the Middle East, between Central Asia and South Asia and for providing Central Asia access to the Sea trade routes. It would be a mistake, a mistake we often make, to suggest that the advantage of Pakistan's location is geo-strategic or geo-political. These if they exist are peripheral. The true advantage is geo-economic.

Domestic policy, if realistically framed, has also to take account of the country's natural resource base. What is the level of human resource development as reflected in the standards of education and health it has achieved? What is the extent of its cultivable land resource and what is the availability of water, advanced technology, land ownership patterns that can maximise productivity? Are there underground mineral or fossil fuel reserves that can be exploited? Can we undertake their exploitation ourselves or do we need assistance to develop our human resource, optimise the use of our land resource and extract the mineral and fossil fuel reserves under our soil?

If domestic policy recognizes that the resources the country can generate internally are not sufficient to fulfil the economic development requirements of the country and that it needs greater access to foreign markets, large amounts of foreign assistance and foreign investment etc. foreign policy must then be formulated with these objectives in mind. Clearly in advancing these objectives there will be domestic policy trade-offs in terms of the reciprocal opening of our own domestic market to foreign exporters, granting of concessions to foreign investors, accepting economic conditionalities for foreign assistance etc. but concessions may also have to be made in foreign policy terms.

There is however one overriding foreign policy goal that cannot be subservient to domestic policy and that is, in fact, the one area in which domestic policy must bend to the requirements of foreign policy. This goal is the protection of the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of the country. The extent to which this goal becomes the determinant of foreign policy will vary from country to country. In our own case this has been paramount from the start because of the circumstances in which Pakistan came into being.

How would one determine the formulation of foreign policy in the context of an external threat to national security? Firstly the country's leaders have to use all the means at their disposal to determine the existing or potential external threats to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country. Second they have to determine whether these threats are such as can be met by the nation's own capabilities or by capabilities that it can afford to acquire. Third they have to determine whether these threats can be mitigated by diplomatic efforts directed at the source of the threat or by diplomatic efforts to build alliances with other nations that share the same threat perception or for other reasons can help offset these threats. Fourth they have to determine the maximum and the

minimum concessions that the country would be prepared to make or that the sovereign authority believes it can offer to blunt the source of the threat or to build alliances or to acquire the where withal to mitigate or offset the threat.

Further the policy that is devised vis-à-vis the source of the threat must be such as would follow from a deep and thorough study of:

- The potential adversary country's strengths and weaknesses.
- The inimical elements in that country, the rationale, if any for their adversarial posture, the degree of influence they enjoy in decision making, and the steps that can be taken to mitigate the hostility.
- The friendly elements in that country, the reasons they have for seeking friendship, the degree of influence they enjoy in decision making and what steps can be taken to increase this influence.
- The identification and the highlighting of interests that are served by friendly rather than hostile relations and finding ways of making these common interests known to the masses in both countries with a view to building public opinion in favour of friendship rather than hostility.

In seeking support from other countries, the policy devised would be one that takes account of the prospective ally's own needs and its political system. It would be sensitive to the aspirations of the groups or individuals who would need to be influenced. It would seek to establish as far as possible the geo-political compulsions, which would make such support helpful if not essential for the prospective ally. It would stress the affinities between the peoples of the two countries and the advantages that an alliance would bring in terms of promoting trade and economic relations on favourable terms etc. Finally, it would include what could be offered as a quid pro quo for such support.

The foregoing list of determinants, by no means comprehensive, would show that information in a number of areas would have to be gathered and this task would of necessity require primarily the employment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the embassies it maintains in foreign countries but a number of other agencies including the defence and economic ministries and the intelligence agencies would also need to contribute.

For example, determining the magnitude of the threat will require not only information on the publicly known facts about the size of the potential adversary's armed forces and about the quality of its weaponry but also less well publicized or even secret information about the leadership qualities of the military commanders, about the relations these commanders have with the political leadership, about their ability to deploy rapidly, about their indigenous capability to manufacture military hardware and a whole host of other such information. Such information, obtained through overt or covert sources would then need to be assessed primarily by military experts before it becomes an input in the policy making process.

Similarly identifying inimical and friendly elements in the potential enemy country and the degree of influence they enjoy would primarily be the function of the ministry of foreign affairs and the envoys it deploys but these efforts could be usefully supplemented by information obtained covertly by intelligence agencies using tools that are not available to the personnel of the Foreign Office. Other organs of the government such as commerce, economic affairs, finance would have the expertise to gauge the commercial and economic interests of the country in question and identify the degree to which such interests could coincide or clash with ours. Outside of formal government organs officially sponsored or privately financed Think Tanks and the researchers they employ could supplement the information and analysis flow.

In other words, intelligence agencies and other organs of the government have an important role to play in gathering the information needed, particularly in the context of external security, for the formulation of a coherent foreign policy. The government would be failing in its duty if it relied solely on the ministry of foreign affairs for this purpose even while recognising that the primary responsibility for advising the government on foreign policy must rest with this ministry.

Theoretically it is the ministry of foreign affairs that will be the recipient of foreign policy related information from the intelligence and other agencies of the government and will incorporate it, after analysis, in its recommendations to the government on how Pakistan's security and other interests could best be safeguarded. In practice however the situation has been to say the least, very different.

Pakistan has found itself, forced by the perceived threat to its security from the time it came into being, to devote a larger part of its limited resources to defence and as a necessary corollary to give the military a greater role in the political life of the fledgling democracy.

This has also meant however that the military and the intelligence agencies have had a much greater role to play in determining the policies to be adopted and equally importantly the measures to be taken on the ground through overt and covert operations to tackle these security threats or to pursue Pakistan's perceived national interests. It has also meant that both the intelligence agencies belonging to the armed forces and those theoretically under civilian authority view their function as going beyond the collection of information.

There is a general impression, and one cannot regard it as inaccurate, that on vital foreign policy issues the government's policy formulations are based on the conceptual frameworks and the information and analysis provided by the intelligence agencies and it is these agencies that are given primary responsibility for their implementation. There is also the general impression that these conceptual frameworks lay an inordinately heavy emphasis on the military facets of security and downplay the other facets that contribute, as much if not more, to genuine national security.

Of course, it is not in Pakistan alone that intelligence agencies play a role in policy formulation that goes beyond the provision of raw information obtained overtly or covertly. In the United States where much emphasis has been laid on the fact that in making his policies the President relies most heavily on his principal foreign policy adviser, and that is the Secretary of State, there have been periods when the director of the CIA, has been the dominant voice in policy making. During the period of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the CIA, by and large, dictated American policies in Afghanistan. It had a larger presence in Afghanistan and perhaps in Pakistan than the State Department and many of the most delicate negotiations with Pakistan were conducted through the heads of the intelligence agencies of the two countries.

There is no doubt that all over the world on questions of security the intelligence agencies tend to go beyond the narrow mandate of providing raw information or neutral analysis for their political masters. This is as it should be. Intelligence gathering, 90% of which lies in the public realm, has to be done, if it

is to be done effectively, by educated and trained personnel and it is almost inevitable that these persons will draw conclusions from such information and wish to share such conclusions along with the information. The question is whether such conclusions or recommendations should by themselves become the basis of policy.

Most intelligence agencies have both an information gathering and analysis capability and an operational capability. Good intelligence agencies try and ensure that the two functions are insulated one from the other. But this is clearly difficult. There is then a strong temptation to tailor the analysis of the information gathered to the needs of the operational branch.

Secondly while intelligence agencies can develop tremendous capacities for information gathering there are inevitably lacunae and, equally importantly, there are large bodies of information the analysis of which needs capabilities and experience that rest elsewhere in the government structure.

Thirdly, foreign policy is not a one-way street. The viability or otherwise of policy options may depend on the reactions and needs of other countries. Gauging these accurately needs contact with decision makers in these countries and that is the task of the ambassadors and embassies.

It would therefore be right and proper that the role of the intelligence agencies should be limited to providing as fully as possible the information that they are able to gather, along, if necessary, with their own analysis of what this information could mean to the one body that is institutionally responsible for assisting the leadership in formulating foreign policy and that body of course is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

This ministry's recommendations, once accepted by the government, should, in a democracy, be subject to deliberation and debate either in open session or, if the subject is sensitive, in camera by the relevant committees of Parliament and become the basis of policy only after they have been approved.

It is a sad fact that in the relatively short periods for which democracy has prevailed in our country our legislators have paid little attention to this area even while recognizing its importance. For some of them it is a subject of such enormous complexity and delicacy that it is best left to the experts. More cynically

others have chosen to ignore it because there is no real constituent pressure to take an interest in this area nor does specialization in this field create the sort of influence that the legislator can use to advance his political ambitions or to solve the day-to-day problems of his constituents.

The fact however is that in any democracy Parliament has a crucial role to play in foreign policy formulation and implementation. They not only adopt legislation needed domestically to give effect to foreign policy decisions but also in many countries to ratify any agreements that the government in power reaches with other countries or groups of countries or international organisations.

Currently in Pakistan the power to ratify agreements lies with the Cabinet and not directly with the Parliament but there should be no mistake that in such ratification the Cabinet is, at least theoretically reflecting the will of the parliament and that when these agreements are of consequence such ratification would normally be preceded by a discussion in parliament or at the very least in the Foreign Affairs committee of both the National Assembly and the Senate. As our democracy matures we may well come to the stage where all international agreements will be the subject of discussion and scrutiny not only by the Cabinet but by Parliament and the Parliament's consent will be needed to ratify such agreements.

The Parliament also controls the purse strings. It is for the Parliament to determine what funds are made available for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to the other agencies that play a part in advising the government on foreign policy issues. In so doing it can determine the role the Ministry and the other agencies can play in helping the government to formulate foreign policy and thereafter, what resources the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as the principal instrument of the government for implementation, will have to put these policies into effect.

The successful politician will rely on the professional diplomat to give him a sense of the perceived and real strengths and weaknesses of foreign countries, of the domestic compulsions of the leaders of these countries and, where necessary, an estimate of the ideological or other considerations that guide decision making in those countries. Where multilateral negotiations are involved, he may also want advice on how best his country's case can be projected at the bar of international public opinion.

The policy must be decided upon by the government drawing upon the recommendations that the Ministry of Foreign affairs provides based on its own information and inputs from other agencies. This is particularly so in a democracy where governments change and with them policies but the experience and expertise must remain available to implement the new government's policies with the same enthusiasm and professionalism. The room for policy changes may be limited but this choice must be made by the sovereign authority.

Turning to another determinant of policy, Article 40 of our Constitution states "The State shall endeavour to preserve and strengthen fraternal relations among Muslim countries based on Islamic unity, support the common interests of the people of Asia Africa and Latin America, promote international peace and security, foster goodwill and friendly relations among all nations and encourage the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means".

These foreign policy guidelines in the Constitution are a reflection of no more than the natural affinity that the people of Pakistan feel with their co-religionists and with the peoples who have suffered the same ravages under colonial rule.

But policy makers sought to become part of a Pan-Islamic movement to find allies against the threat from our eastern neighbour, only to discover that in the fragmented Islamic world there was no preparedness to participate in an anti-Indian alliance nor was there a preparedness to accept Pakistan's Middle East moorings. Not only did the Arabs reject these overtures but more importantly Pakistanis believed that Pakistan was essentially a South Asian nation. Perhaps the Arab response to Pakistan's efforts to find Middle East moorings was best illustrated by the highly derogatory and unfair comment acid by King Farook of Egypt who said that from the way Pakistan was behaving it seemed that Islam had only come into being on 14th August 1947.⁸

This should not detract from the fact that Pakistan was the articulate spokesperson for the struggle waged in international councils for the liberation of Muslim countries from the colonial yoke. Pakistan punched well above its weight in the UN and other international bodies because it was recognised to be the voice of moderate tolerant Islam and because its advocacy of decolonisation was conducted skilfully and with far greater understanding of the dynamics of the international situation than Arab friends then possessed.

Pakistan's relations with the Muslim countries registered a quantum jump after the Arab-Israeli War of 1973. The successes achieved by our pilots while serving in the Jordanian and Syrian air forces—the only bright spots for the Arabs in these wars won us popular support. President Bhutto's subsequent tour of the Middle Eastern countries and his liberalisation of passport issuance made possible the large scale movement of Pakistani workers to the Gulf countries as they used their higher oil revenues to engage in large scale construction and development.

In the context of Pakistan's relations with the Muslim world there was a time around 1987-88, when in discussing Pak-US relations in the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan the author could suggest that Pakistan, given its relations with the Gulf countries, be identified as the bastion of stability that could irradiate such stability in the event of unrest in the Gulf Sheikdoms. This was a common Pakistani and US interest. The American response was not encouraging because by this time they were developing their own relation with the gulf countries, at that time it appeared to be a reasonable proposition but now seems very divorced from reality.

One other facet of relations with the Muslim world needs to be mentioned. Our relations with the Gulf countries—Saudi Arabia and the UAE in particular have been extensive and have included a large military component. It had been made clear from the start that Pakistan would not take sides in any intra-Arab or intra Muslim conflict. During the Iran-Iraq war Pakistan carefully eschewed taking sides but offered to mediate. The stationing of troops in Saudi Arabia during the first Gulf war was subject to the clear understanding that the contingent would ensure internal defence but not participate in any conflict with Iraq. Pakistan's decision not to join the Saudi-led coalition in their war against the Houthis in Yemen was in accord with this policy, a policy faithfully followed in the past and which Pakistan will hopefully continue to follow in the future. It has caused umbrage and some effects of this policy are being felt in the economic sphere.

This episode of course highlights the fact that to be able to follow diplomatic and political policies that are in the best interests of the country we must by mustering our own resources and reduce our vulnerability to external economic pressures.

Again a reflection of the fact that foreign policy initiatives can be pursued only if internal polity is seen to be strong and in accord with the initiatives Pakistan seeks to advance.

To return to the main theme of this article, our quest for security and our perceived need to strengthen our defence capabilities pushed us into abandoning our earlier policy of non-alignment and to choose sides in the “Cold War”. Pakistan joined SEATO in 1954 and in 1955 joined the Baghdad Pact both alliances designed to “contain” China on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other. Pakistan understood that before approaching Pakistani leaders the USA first tried to woo Nehru’s India into these alliances and turned to Pakistan only after Nehru rebuffed these overtures. Pakistan had no real quarrel with the Soviet Union though it was apprehensive of the relations the Soviet Union was developing with Afghanistan. Pakistan nevertheless proceeded to condemn the “Godless” communists and talked of the fear that the Soviets would seek to move toward the warm waters of the Arabian Sea through Afghanistan and Pakistan’s Baluchistan. So the Americans allied with Pakistan to contain the Soviet Union and to prevent the spread of the communist ideology. Pakistan entered the alliance to build defence capabilities and to benefit from economic assistance. Thus the Pakistan-USA alliance was based on what the author terms a “contrived commonality of interests”.

All military aid and even military sales were stopped after war broke out between India and Pakistan and military aid was not resumed until 1982 when Pakistan’s assistance was needed to reverse the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Again, Pakistan and the USA had very different goals when they cooperated to reverse the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The USA wanted to inflict upon the Soviet Union the same sort of defeat as the Americans had suffered in Vietnam in the 70s. Pakistan on the other hand was concerned that the consolidation of the Soviet control over Afghanistan would inevitably lead to the Soviet Union moving further to occupy Pakistan’s Baluchistan and secure access to the warm waters of the Arabian Sea.

From the American perspective, this cooperation succeeded beyond the West’s wildest dreams. It was the catalyst for the disintegration of the Soviet Union and consequently the emergence of the USA as the sole super power.

For Pakistan however the consequences were very different. The USA could and did walk away leaving Pakistan to cope with the detritus of that war which included the deterioration of law and order, unrestricted smuggling, the conversion of Karachi into the most weaponised city in South Asia and the growth of fundamentalist Islam.

Much of this detritus was the doing of the leadership. Pakistan could have confined Afghan refugees in camps as Iran did, could have prevented them from being the shock troopers of our religious parties, could have prevented the growth of the evil of sectarianism, could have made a greater effort to throw out foreign fighters who used Pakistan as the base for the fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan. There is no doubt however that America's abandonment of the region compounded the difficulties we faced.

All aid was then stopped in 1990 when President Bush failed to certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device. State Department lawyers testifying before a Congressional committee had said that possession of all the components of a nuclear device amounted to possession of a nuclear device. The nuclear programme remained a subject of discussion through the period of our anti-Soviet alliance but for the US it was politic to ignore our acquisition of nuclear weapon capability. Some steps were taken to limit our access to required nuclear material but there was no break in the relationship since Pakistan was the key to achieving the objective of expelling the Soviet Union from Afghanistan.

The next phase of the relationship started after 9/11 but it cannot be recalled that in 2001, just before 9/11 the US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage who had primary responsibility in the State Department for South Asia said that in the past US Pakistan relations had always been based on being against something-be it India or the Soviet Union and proposed that now the US should frame a relationship based on something positive and that, he said, could be assisting Pakistan to prevent its Talibanisation.⁹ This proposition, good as it sounded of course lost momentum once 9/11 happened and Pakistan was faced with the choice of being "with us or against us"

Without going further into the history of the Global War on Terror and the ambiguous nature of Pakistan's cooperation with the anti-terror alliance the circumstances appeared to be such that the author of this article at a US-Pakistan think tank meeting in 2008 could say, "Now after a period of uncertainty and lack

of clarity both in Pakistan and the United States there is for the first time in the chequered history of the last 60 years a relationship based on a genuine “commonality of interest”- the global threat of terrorism which will probably remain the principal determinant of American foreign policy for some time to come and the threat terrorism and extremism pose to the survival of Pakistan as a moderate tolerant democratic Islamic state. This “common interest” will to my mind be the determinant of the US-Pak relationship for at least the next decade because the “common problem or threat” will take at least that long to be resolved.”

Why this lengthy if necessarily incomplete history of Pakistan’s past relations with the USA?

Primarily because they illustrate four elements in the formulation and implementation process of foreign policy. One you may create a contrived commonality of interest to get what you want and pay only an acceptable price for it. Two, you may form an alliance to pursue the same goal but for very different reasons. Three, there is little that happens in international relations based on favours done in the past. Four, governments feel compelled to maintain relations even while the public is opposed and even when the government itself encourages such adverse sentiments because domestic policy considerations so dictate.

While considering Foreign policy as a tool for advancing our national interest another reality must be borne in mind. In international relations perceptions matter and more often than not perceptions-perceptions created by reports of influential think tanks in the west- become the basis of policy for many countries. For this purpose, state institutions must pay more attention for image building of Pakistan.

In concluding this article’s focus on the means for formulation and implementing foreign policy 5 points some procedural and some more substantive need to be mentioned. First the Rules of Business have to be observed. They provide that with the exception of the Economic Affairs division and its discussions with foreign government representatives all other contact between government organs/officials must be conducted through the ministry of Foreign Affairs. No letters can be written to foreign governments directly by any official without consultation with the Foreign Office.

Second greater attention must be paid to give the Foreign Office the space it needs to be able to do the job it is required to do. The FO officers need to do their homework more thoroughly but they must then be allowed to present their point of view without being intimidated or being forced to give up the turf that rightly belongs to them.

Third and more substantive, as has been the recurrent theme of this essay, Pakistan's security paradigm must be examined in the light of not only narrowly defined external security issues but security as a whole. Decision makers have to determine how far the external security aspect has been changed by the demonstration of nuclear capability in 1998 and the creation of a robust and secure capacity to deter any potential adversary.

Fourth, equally if not more substantively, we must recognise that at this time, dangers to our security flow from our internal problems, chief among them the continued presence of extremist and terrorists which, brave statements notwithstanding, are making relations difficult with friends as much as with adversaries. The Americans say that of the 98 identified terrorist organisations 20 are in the AfPak region and further that 7 of them are based in Pakistan.¹⁰

Fifth, it is undoubtedly clear that for a variety of reasons, Pakistan is experiencing a virtual collapse of governance in every sphere be it the Federal Secretariat, the Provincial secretariats or the State owned enterprises. Yet this was a country which survived the difficult circumstances of its birth and the efforts to choke the "moth eaten state" at birth because dedicated leaders and civil servants made herculean efforts to imaginatively handle the problems of the fledgling state even while following the rules and eschewing the temptation of misusing their office for personal gain. Contrary to the general perception such civil servants exist even today and, though their number has shrunk, they can be the nucleus around which the civil administration is rebuilt.

What should this suggest for the future in terms of foreign policy goals? A focus should be on using all available resources to tackle the internal security threat and marshal foreign assistance for this purpose. Further, focus must be on building our national power primarily by providing the sort of good governance that will ensure the use of limited domestic resources and those that can be raised abroad by smart diplomacy to develop our human resource and to use optimally the other natural resources that we have. As we go about raising international

resources our smart diplomacy must consist of recognizing that there are no free lunches in international relations just as there are none in every day transactions but still managing to reduce the cost by stressing mutuality of interest where it really exists and creating one where it does not.

References

- ¹ The Oxford Companion to American Military History
- ² Norman J. Padelford and George A. Lincoln, "The Dynamics of International Politics," p. 1977
- ³ Hugh Gibson, "The Road of Foreign Policy", New York: Doubleday, 1944
- ⁴ Quoted by Henry Kissinger in "World Order"
- ⁵ Lord Palmerston Speech to the House of Commons (1 March 1848).
- ⁶ Quoted by Henry Kissinger in "World Order"
- ⁷ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Fifth Edition, Revised, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978, pp. 4-15
- ⁸ Yasser Latif Hamdani , Islam was not born on 14 August 1947, Daily Times, 13 July 2021, OP-ED, <https://dailytimes.com.pk/749347/islam-was-not-born-on-14-august-1947/>
- ⁹ In an earlier interview to The Hindu (18-06-01), Armitage had maintained that the so-called great (US-Pak) relationship of the past was, in fact, a false one because in the first instance "it was built against the Indo-Soviet axis and then latterly it was against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. So we did not have a policy for Pakistan, we had a policy with Pakistan directed against something else.... what we are desirous of is for our Pakistani friends to try and develop a relationship about Pakistan." In essence what Armitage was saying was that while in the past there had been "cold war" reasons for relations with Pakistan now the American interest was to use its relationship with Pakistan to help it become a moderate, stable, democratic state which could resist the pull of the Taliban ideology. (Newline Feb. 2003 State of the Union by Najmuddin A. Shaikh) accessed on 200517
- ¹⁰ Department of Defense Press Briefing by General Nicholson in the Pentagon Briefing Room, December 2, 2016) and Press Conference With General John Nicholson and Secretary of Defense Ash Carter;" General John Nicholson, Commander of International Forces in Afghanistan, Dec. 9, 2016, <http://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1026539/press-conference-with-general-john-nicholson>