

## PAKISTAN'S QUEST FOR SECURITY: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

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### **Abstract**

*Ever since its emergence in August 1947, Pakistan has been engaged in efforts to seek security against the threat from its Eastern neighbour India. This perennial quest for security led Pakistan to seek alignment with the US in the first two decades of its existence and after 1965 war with India led to its strategic alignment with China following the Sino-Indian war in 1962. After the debacle of 1971 war with India which led to Pakistan's dismemberment and defeat, Islamabad launched a policy of internal alignment by developing its nuclear weapon option. Pakistan faced the spectre of US sanctions as Washington opposed Pakistan's nuclear programme. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 forced a change in Washington's attitude and Pakistan emerged as a frontline state during the second cold war between Washington and Moscow. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 and the subsequent fall of communism in 1991 gave Pakistan short lived sense of victory. The 9/11 terrorist attacks brought new turbulence in Pakistan's security environment and Islamabad was forced to become ally of the US in the global war on terror for the next decade and half. Pakistan continues to suffer from the violent legacy of this war even today.*

**Keywords:** Security, Nuclear Weapons, War in Afghanistan, War on Terror, Sino-Pakistan and Pak-US Ties.

### **Introduction**

**A** country's security policy is shaped by its threat perceptions and the capabilities required in coping with the perceived challenges. Pakistani threat perceptions have been shaped by what former foreign minister Abdul Sattar has aptly characterized as the *crucible of objective realities* manifested in "threats to its existence (from a hostile India) and the tyranny of imbalance of power."<sup>1</sup> In addition to having to deal with a hostile India in the east, Pakistan had to contend

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with an *irredentist* Afghanistan in the west. These realities created a security environment in which “strategic options open to Pakistan never were extremely attractive..... increasingly risky, and limited in number.”<sup>2</sup>

Although born as a *garrison state*,<sup>3</sup> Pakistan did not have sufficient national resources to support military forces that would be capable of defending both wings of a country separated by a hostile neighbour, India. The dilapidated condition of Pakistan's armed forces<sup>4</sup> and concern for its borders in the face of territorial disputes with its neighbours', India and Afghanistan, forced Karachi<sup>5</sup> to turn away from South Asia for security assistance. Several other factors induced Karachi to look in the directions of the Western block, particularly the United States. First, Pakistan's ruling elite "hailing from the feudal and to some extent, commercial classes, the bureaucracy and the military" had a liking for the West due to its Western education and cultural outlook. The Quaid-i-Azam himself represented the best of Western education, cultural values and rationality. Secondly, Pakistan's economy was integrated with the West, particularly Britain, during the colonial era and it would not have been easy to transform it along the socialist lines. Pakistan "preferred to have trading partners in the West because they were in a position to supply consumer goods at very competitive prices for local requirements and provided almost assured markets for Pakistan's raw materials."<sup>6</sup> Thirdly, Pakistan expected strong Western diplomatic and political support from the United States and Great Britain in the settlement of its multiple disputes with India including accession of Kashmir. Finally, "the transfer of power by the British in the subcontinent to the Governments of India and Pakistan had not brought about any immediate change in the Soviet opinion and, since the Soviet Union had apprehensions about the role of the decolonized nations in the world affairs, its own attitude was somewhat cool."<sup>7</sup>

Barely two weeks after its inception, Pakistan's Finance Minister, Ghulam Mohammad, during his informal talks with the US Charge d' Affairs, Charles W. Lewis, Jr., sought capital and technical assistance for Pakistan on the ground that funds were needed to "meet the administrative approximately \$ 2 billion over a period of five years. Immediately thereafter Pakistan submitted to the State Department the following breakdown of Pakistan's requirement \$ 700 million for industrial development, \$ 700 million for agricultural development and \$ 510 million for building and equipping defence services. Further breakdown of the defence expenditure showed \$170 million for the Army, \$ 75 million for the Air Force, \$ 60 million for the Navy and \$205 million to meet the anticipated deficits in Pakistan's military budget."<sup>8</sup>

These Pakistani appeals for urgent financial aid from Washington were greeted with vague promises bordering on 'wait and see' attitude. Several considerations underpinned this American reluctance to assume the role of a military benefactor for Karachi. The first was a continuation of Washington's pre-independence desire to consult with London on matters of importance in South Asia. The second was Washington's insistence on talking a regional approach to the area that called for evenhanded approach vis-à-vis controversies between Pakistan and India. The third factor was the American preoccupation with the European affairs and the consequent denigration of South Asia as an important strategic region. It was not until after the fall of China to the Communists in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War a year later that the US began to pay any serious heed to the South Asian region in the context of its emergent global strategy of the containment of Communism.

Desperate for external aid and in search of a powerful patron to counter-balance India, Pakistan turned toward the United States, which needed regional allies "to build up positions of strength in areas such as the Middle East that were of crucial strategic value."<sup>9</sup> Pakistan signed a mutual security agreement with the United States in May 1954 and became the most *allied ally* of the US when it joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in September 1954 and the Baghdad Pact in February 1955. This effort to *balance* the strategic threat from India through military association with the United States not only allowed Pakistan to survive in a harsh security environment marked by active conflict with India over Kashmir and tensions with neighbouring Afghanistan over the status of the Durand Line, but it also provided tangible economic and military gains. Between 1954 and 1965, the United States provided Pakistan with US \$ 630 million in direct grant assistance and more than US \$ 670 million concessional sales and defense-support assistance." As a result the Pakistan army, air force and navy were "transformed into fairly modern, well-equipped fighting forces" well-versed in the "latest concepts in military organization and thinking."

While enabling Pakistan to successfully survive in a harsh security environment marked by active conflict with India over Kashmir and tensions with neighbouring Afghanistan over the question of *Pushtoonistan*, this alignment strategy also made the country overly dependent on the West for supply of arms and military equipment.

In the wake of the Sino-Indian war of 1962 in which India suffered a major defeat,<sup>10</sup> the United States shipped arms to India without advance notification to

Pakistan and ignored Pakistani apprehensions that these arms would be used against Pakistan.<sup>11</sup> To make things worse, the US urged President Ayub Khan to make a “positive gesture of sympathy and restraint”<sup>12</sup> toward India and advised Pakistan to put its “border talks with China on hold.”<sup>13</sup> Ayub did not take advantage of India’s vulnerability in its war with China but was disappointed that Pakistani inaction had not been rewarded with a serious negotiation leading to the settlement of the Kashmir dispute. The several rounds of Bhutto - Swaran Singh talks supported by US and British diplomats failed to produce any agreement on Kashmir because India had accused Pakistan of “unlawfully ceding two thousand square miles of “Indian territory” to China.

The limitations of this strategy of external reliance were sharply exposed during the 1965 India-Pakistan war in which the United States failed to come to the help of Pakistan. During the 1965 war, the United States decided to terminate its arms supply relationship with both India and Pakistan, a decision that caused “anger, bitterness, and disillusionment with the United States.”<sup>14</sup> A series of widespread anti-American demonstrations in Pakistan, including the stoning of the US embassy, the burning of United States Information Service library, and mob attacks on the US consulate in Lahore, provided stark testimony to the depth of anti-American sentiment in Pakistan.<sup>15</sup> The prestige and credibility of the United States fell to new depths in Pakistan.

Washington’s decision to cut off all American military assistance to India and Pakistan during the 1965 war affected the latter disproportionately, as over 80 percent of all military support to Pakistan came from the United States. Pakistan quickly realized the grave mistake it had made by putting all its security eggs in the American basket. The perils of single-source dependency on the United States were exacerbated by shifting American strategic priorities in South Asia that were summarized by Kennedy administration the then National Security Council (NSC) aide Robert Komer as, “If we must choose between Pakistan and India, the latter is far more important.”<sup>16</sup> Pakistan was compelled to search for new allies. To offset the loss of American diplomatic and material support, Pakistan turned toward China that was having its own difficulties with India due to Nehru’s *forward policy*.

The outbreak of Sino-Indian war in 1962 rang alarm bells in Washington. To help India “defend itself better should the Chinese Communists renew their attack at an early date,” Washington announced an Anglo-American emergency \$120 million military aid package for India in December 1962.<sup>17</sup> Overriding Pakistani pleas to link the supply of American military assistance to India to settlement of

the Kashmir issue, Kennedy sent a message to Ayub Khan which said the United States believed “the supply of arms to India should not be made contingent on a Kashmir settlement because” Chinese aggression posed “as grave an ultimate threat to Pakistan as to India.”<sup>18</sup> Pakistan refused to go along with such *disingenuous* logic. Pakistan’s unwillingness to cave-in to mounting American demands that “Pakistan should be very careful in dealing with the Chicomps” lest it “jeopardize the relations with the Western world” and cause a “very unfortunate reaction” in the United States, only widened the crisis of confidence between the two allies.<sup>19</sup> Pakistan justifiably felt betrayed by Washington.

During a “stiff” meeting with the American ambassador on September 29, Ayub “upbraided the United States for its revocation of solemn pledges regarding defense support; decried the lack of cooperation by the United States and the lack of appreciation for Pakistani efforts to moderate Chinese policies toward Vietnam; and accused the United States of bullying a friendly nation.”<sup>20</sup> Pakistan needed support, but it wanted friends, not masters. China offered itself as solid anchor, and Pakistani leaders embraced that offer with unmitigated enthusiasm.

Pakistan-United States relations became sharply acerbic during the Johnson administration. Viewing China as an *outlaw* state which had become a *near-demonic force* whose “aggressive, adventurist and unpredictable” behavior needed to be contained,” not courted, President Johnson decided to withdraw his invitation to the Pakistani President as a punishment for “greeting Mao, Zhou and their compatriots with open arms” and for “pledging lasting friendship and fruitful cooperation” between Pakistan and China.<sup>21</sup>

In his April 14, 1965 letter to President Ayub, Johnson said that Ayub’s proposed visit would “focus public attention on the differences between Pakistan and United States policy toward communist China and might gravely affect continued legislative support for Pakistan’s development and defense efforts.” Under the circumstances, Johnson concluded, “A postponement of the visit appeared the wisest course of action.”<sup>22</sup> Ayub expressed anger over the abrupt cancellation of the visit. Inflexible and unforgiving, Robert Komer, a top National Security Council official, defended the US decision and said, “Ayub got the signal, though we need to remind him,” and would be forced to “reflect on the moral that Uncle Sam should not be just regarded as a cornucopia of goodies regardless of what they do or say.”<sup>23</sup>

China offered itself as a crucial strategic counterweight to a much larger and overbearing India with which Pakistan had already fought a war over Kashmir. China had its own reasons to seek Pakistan's cooperation. The 1960s began with a Sino-Soviet split over ideological and strategic differences that erupted into the open in 1963, marking the beginning of the Coldest War in Asia. The American decision to ship arms to India exacerbated Chinese fear that the United States intended to contain China militarily. Hemmed in by these military and diplomatic pressures, China reached out to Pakistan because it saw both *defensive* and *offensive* possibilities. Defensively, a friendly Pakistan "could serve to impede Soviet, American, and Indian actions hostile" to China. Offensively, closer ties with Pakistan "would provide China an entrée into the Islamic world, would serve to improve China's image as a beneficent patron of Third World nations and, over the long term, would open the door for greater Chinese influence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean."<sup>24</sup>

Following the exchange of high level visits in 1964 and 1965, Pakistan and China agreed to common positions on several issues, including a call "for Peoples Republic of China (PRC) seating in the United Nations, support for Afro-Asian solidarity against imperialism and colonialism, consensus on nuclear disarmament, and the continuation of friendly cooperation between China and Pakistan."<sup>25</sup> Abandoning its former posture of neutrality, China publicly endorsed Pakistan's position on Kashmir. The joint statement issued on February 23, 1964, after Premier Zhou Enlai's visit to Pakistan, expressed hope that the Kashmir issue would be resolved "in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir as pledged to them by India and Pakistan."<sup>26</sup> The most tangible proof of China's appreciation of the security conundrum facing Pakistan came during the 1965 war when China expressed its readiness to intervene in the conflict by opening a second front "against Indian positions in the Himalayas to reduce the pressure on Pakistan if Pakistan requested such help."<sup>27</sup>

Ayub himself decided against asking China to make such a move because he "feared that both the United States and the Soviet Union would support India," and that "his country would find itself in the unenviable position of facing the hostility of both superpowers."<sup>28</sup>

After the war, Pakistan's elite and broader public had a much more favorable view of China. Chinese arms began to flow into Pakistan and were proudly displayed at the national day parade on March 23, 1966. During Liu Shao Qi's visit to Pakistan in March 1966, China offered a \$ 100 million grant to Pakistan

to purchase arms from the international market, thereby freeing the country “from overdependence on the West and allowing it to defend itself against India...”<sup>29</sup> In July of the same year, the two countries concluded an arms supply agreement worth \$ 120 million that included Chinese T-59 tanks, F-6 fighter jets, and IL-28 bombers.<sup>30</sup>

By 1970, Chinese weapons constituted 90 percent of Pakistan's modern fighter planes, one-quarter of Pakistan's tank force, one-third of its air force, and nearly two-thirds of its interceptor-bombers. One reason China was willing to provide this weaponry was to bolster Pakistan's capacity for self-defense, which had suffered because of the American arms embargo. A second factor influencing these Chinese decisions was the intensifying Sino-Soviet rivalry in Asia. After suppressing the reform movement known as the *Prague spring* in 1968 and enunciating the Brezhnev doctrine under which the Soviet Union arrogated to itself the right to intervene militarily in other socialist countries, Moscow launched its *Asian Collective Security Plan* in 1969 to contain China. Pakistan objected to the Plan because it excluded China and could only be construed as an anti-China alliance. A Pakistani official statement declared that Pakistan would “never join any security arrangement in Asia which may involve her in the Sino-Soviet confrontation.”<sup>31</sup>

In 1969, Soviet and Chinese troops clashed along the Ussuri River, provoking fears of nuclear war. Seeking to take advantage of the Sino-Soviet split and to extract the United States from the Vietnam War, the Nixon administration decided to improve relations with China. On August 1, 1969, Nixon visited Pakistan and, in a confidential one-to-one meeting with President Yahya Kahn, stated, “The US would welcome accommodation with Communist China and would appreciate it if President Yahya would let Zhou Enlai know this.”<sup>32</sup> The two Presidents also discussed China's view of the world. Yahya told Nixon that China felt surrounded by hostile forces and suggested a “dialogue with China to bring China back into the community of nations.”<sup>33</sup> Nixon responded, “Asia cannot move forward if a nation as large as China remains isolated.” He also said that the United States should not participate in “any arrangements designed to isolate China.”<sup>34</sup> Yahya arranged a meeting between Kissinger and Air Marshal Sher Ali Khan, who had visited China in July. When asked by Kissinger if there was any perceptible change in China's external behavior, the Air Marshal explained that Zhou maintained that the Soviets were “deliberately provoking” China by trying to extend their territory beyond recognized boundaries.<sup>35</sup> Pakistani officials confirmed that Beijing feared the Soviets might attempt a “preemptive attack on China.”<sup>36</sup> Yahya delivered Nixon's message to Zhou in November and Pakistan continued to play the crucial role of

*intermediary* by delivering secret messages between Washington and Beijing until July 1971 when Kissinger made his secret trip to Beijing.

Pakistan's decision to act as a *bridge* between the United States and China enraged Moscow.<sup>37</sup> To punish Pakistan for its crucial role in bringing China and United State closer, Moscow decided to throw its strategic weight behind India. Moscow and New Delhi concluded the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Peace in August 1971. The signing occurred while Pakistan's army was fighting a war for the survival of the country against the forces of secession in East Pakistan led by the Awami League, which had won the 1970 national elections on the basis of Sheikh Mujib's six points. Awami League was being fully backed by India. As the East Pakistan crisis deepened, former Pakistani Foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto traveled to China to seek military assistance.

Bhutto told his Chinese hosts, "in order to intimidate us, India has placed in battle position its armed forces, including heavy armor and artillery and aircraft on the borders of both wings of Pakistan. These feverish military activities lead to one conclusion only. That is, India is planning to achieve its objective against Pakistan through armed conflict."<sup>38</sup> Aware of the presence of nearly 40 divisions of Soviet troops on China's borders and the security clauses contained in the Indo-Soviet Treaty, Acting Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei was non-committal. Reiterating Peking's established position he said:

*Our Pakistani friends may rest assured that should Pakistan be subjected to foreign aggression, the Chinese government and people will, as always, resolutely support the Pakistani people in their struggle to defend their state sovereignty and national independence. The Chinese Government and people are greatly concerned over the present tension in the Subcontinent. We maintain that the internal affairs of any country must be handled by its own people. The East Pakistan question is the internal affair of Pakistan and a reasonable settlement should be sought by the Pakistani people themselves, and it is absolutely impermissible for any foreign country to carry out interference and subversion under any pretext.*<sup>39</sup>

With the outbreak of the third Indo-Pakistan war in 1971, the Chinese issued statements of outrage condemning the Indians and fully supporting Pakistan. In the first week of December 1971, the Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan tried to arrange a meeting between Mao Zedong and President Yahya Khan in Kashghar but the meeting could not take place due to latter's "negative response."<sup>40</sup> Beijing continued diplomatic support to Pakistan could not help avert Pakistan's military defeat and the dismemberment of the country. But after the creation of



Bangladesh, China used its first veto in the Security Council to block the entry of Bangladesh into the UN until the vexed issue of Pakistani *war crimes* in East Pakistan was resolved to the satisfaction of the truncated *new* Pakistan. The decision to veto Bangladesh entry into the world body was a difficult one for China because of its long-standing opposition to use of the veto and its well-known sympathies for the Bangladeshis. More importantly, it “defined the extent to which China could go to stand by Pakistan in a situation of crisis.”<sup>41</sup> China also voiced its support for the Simla Agreement (1972) which normalized relations between India and Pakistan, and the New Delhi Agreement (1973) which led to the release of over 93,000 Pakistani security personnel who had been taken as prisoners of war by India following Pakistan’s military defeat in 1971. After the East-Pakistan military debacle and the birth of Bangladesh in 1971, China took it upon itself to totally rehabilitate the Pakistani armed forces.<sup>42</sup> Between 1971 and 1978, China assisted Pakistan to build two defense-related mega projects, the Heavy Rebuild Factory for T-59 tanks, and the F-6 Aircraft Rebuild Factory.<sup>43</sup>

Despite this solid Chinese help and US diplomatic tilt toward Pakistan during the 1971, the very fact that Pakistan had been defeated and dismembered by India forced Pakistan to pursue a strategy of *internal balancing* with a view to meeting its national security needs. While forging closer ties with the Third World and the oil-rich Muslim states, Islamabad launched its bid for a nuclear weapons capability that became a matter of strategic necessity following the detonation of an underground nuclear device by India in May 1974. Because of its nuclear pursuits, Islamabad became the target of American coercive pressure. In 1977 all American economic aid to Pakistan was suspended and in April 1979 additional sanctions were imposed.

After India detonated its first nuclear device in May 1974, Beijing offered “firm and resolute support to Pakistan’s just struggle in defense of its national independence and sovereignty against foreign aggression and interference, including that against nuclear threat and nuclear blackmail.”<sup>44</sup> In 1976, Prime Minister Bhutto gained “China’s acquiescence in helping Pakistan develop a nuclear weapon, including the provision of uranium for a Pakistani enrichment facility.”<sup>45</sup>

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 marked the beginning of new Cold War and Washington, out of its strategic compulsions of fighting the *evil* Soviet empire, revived its security links with Islamabad by offering the latter a five-year, \$ 3.2 billion package in economic and military assistance. Islamabad was also granted a six-year waiver of Symington-Glenn sanctions. During

the Afghan war, Pakistan's nuclear programme gathered momentum while its conventional military capability significantly improved. With the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989, Pakistan's active nuclear programme once again became the focus of American punitive actions. In October 1990, all American aid to Islamabad was suspended and in August 1993, Washington imposed sanctions on both China and Pakistan for violating the missile technology guidelines. In April 1994, Washington offered to lift sanctions against Pakistan provided Islamabad agreed to a verifiable cap on its nuclear programme. Islamabad refused to accept the deal.

In January 1996, under the Brown Amendment, Washington agreed to ease some Pressler restrictions to permit delivery of \$368 million worth of Pakistan-owned military equipment and the resumption of economic aid, investment guarantees, and military training. Islamabad was not given the F-16s that it had paid for. Instead proceeds from their sale to a third party were to be reimbursed. The passage of the Brown Amendment and its subsequent implementation not only marked the failure of American punitive strategy and sanction-oriented approach towards Islamabad coupled with a tacit acceptance of Pakistan as a de facto nuclear weapon state but also signaled "the Clinton administration's desire to put relations with Pakistan on a friendlier footing."

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan also raised alarm bells in China. Chinese analysts raised special concerns about Soviet designs on Balochistan.<sup>46</sup> The seriousness with which Beijing viewed Moscow's military intervention in Afghanistan was reflected in a toughly worded government statement that **vigorously condemned** Moscow's **wanton violation** of all norms of international behavior and warned that its **hegemonistic action** posed a "grave threat to peace and security in Asia and whole world." The statement called the Soviet invasion "a grave step for a southward thrust to the Indian Ocean" and it warned that Moscow's extension of the Brezhnev doctrine of **limited sovereignty** to nonaligned and Islamic countries with which it had signed treaties of friendship and cooperation was an ominous portent.<sup>47</sup>

To contain the Soviet threat, Beijing developed wide-ranging cooperation with Pakistan and formed a quasi-alliance with the United States to roll back the Soviet military advance into Afghanistan. China, through Pakistan, "provided covert military supplies worth \$ 200 million to the Afghan resistance and agreed to provide the US with facilities to monitor Soviet activities in its Xinjiang province."<sup>48</sup>

Xinjiang was also used as a base for training Afghan Mujahedeen to fight the Soviet Union.<sup>49</sup>

As part of this trilateral strategic cooperation directed against the USSR, Beijing also provided critical help to Pakistan to strengthen its deterrent capability against India. Taking advantage of its role as a front-line state in the Afghan war, Pakistan intensified its quest for nuclear weapons capability. The lifting of US anti-proliferation sanctions against Islamabad gave Pakistan the necessary breathing space to pursue this quest. The United States turned a blind eye to this Pakistani effort because Washington needed Islamabad's cooperation to push the Soviets from Afghanistan. The acquisition of nuclear weapon capability by Pakistan gave rise to a situation of "non-weaponised deterrence in South Asia which enabled a smaller and conventionally weaker Pakistan avoids becoming victim of Indian nuclear black-mail. The logic of this existential deterrence was most forcefully demonstrated in 1990 when faced with a peril of nuclear escalation both sides "decided against colliding with each other over Kashmir." To a lesser degree the same thing happened in 1987 when confronted with unpredictable consequences of nuclear signaling by Islamabad, New Delhi had to call off its military exercise *Brass-tacks* which Islamabad had found threatening for its existence.

In May 1998 India and Pakistan conducted rival nuclear tests. These tests were followed by a limited War between India and Pakistan over Kargil in 1999 that was resolved through American diplomatic intervention. The Kargil conflict was widely seen as reckless adventure by Pakistan and congealed international perception of Pakistan as irresponsible nuclear-armed state. It also evoked a great deal of sympathy for India as Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee had taken the Lahore initiative to bury the hatchet between the two countries during his landmark visit to Lahore in February 1999. Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear weapon capability helped Pakistan resolve its traditional security dilemma vis-à-vis its hostile neighbour India. Nuclear weapons appear to have had three general effects on inter-state relations. First nuclear weapons provide the nuclear state with an "infrangible guarantee of its independence and physical security." Second, mutual deterrence among antagonistic nuclear states places a limitation on violence and in turn acts as a brake on total war. Third, by altering the *offense-defence* balance in favour of defence, nuclear weapons have made it possible for weaker states to 'defend themselves effectively against large powerful countries.'

Pakistan's elusive quest for security experienced new turbulence in the post-nuclear period. The 9/11 terrorist attack on the United States created new

security dilemmas for Pakistan. Faced with the coercive American pressure either to “be with America or with the terrorists” and in case the latter “be prepared to be bombed backed to the stone age,”<sup>50</sup> Islamabad not only jettisoned the Taliban regime in neighbouring Afghanistan but also agreed to provide vital logistical support for *Operation Enduring Freedom*. In its role as a frontline state against terrorism, Pakistan undertook an extensive set of efforts to counter the looming threat of religious militancy and overcome Al-Qaeda’s terrorist threat. These measures have included the following:

- Sharing of intelligence on terrorist activity with the United States and its allies;
- Ban on Jihadi organizations such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM), Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-Jafariya (TNFJ), Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM);
- Strengthening of the anti-terrorist law and setting up of anti-terrorist courts with the military’s participation;
- Condemnation at the highest level of acts of international terrorism performed by groups with societal links and roots in Pakistan;
- Ban on display and carrying of weapons;
- Freezing of the financial assets of the banned Jihadi groups;
- Freezing of bank accounts of more than 50 organizations suspected of links with sectarianism or international terrorism;
- The decision to incorporate the anti-terrorism recommendations of the inter-governmental Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering in Pakistani banking laws;<sup>51</sup>
- Arrest and trial of those involved in terrorist activity;
- Hunting down and arrest of remnants of Al-Qaeda network in Pakistan;
- Ban on “hate speech” during Friday prayers;
- Setting up of a special anti-terrorist task force.

The efforts made by the Pakistan government to control Al-Qaeda’s terrorist threat yielded some concrete results. Pakistan captured large number of terrorists.<sup>52</sup> Those captured by Pakistani authorities have included many prominent Al-Qaeda figures such as Abu Zubayda (March 2002 in Faisalabad), Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (March 2003 in Rawalpindi) and Abu Faraj al-Libbi (May 2005 in Mardan).<sup>53</sup> The focus of Pakistan’s anti-terrorist campaign since 2001 has remained Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)<sup>54</sup> which, because of its geographical

proximity with neighbouring Afghanistan, tribal codes offering protection to honored guests, reputation as a *lawless frontier*, and difficult terrain emerged as the main sanctuary for Al-Qaeda and Taliban elements. In an attempt to open up these fabled *No-Go Areas* especially the North and South Waziristan, to “prevent outflow of terrorists/miscreants and unwanted elements from entering into Pakistan,”<sup>55</sup> Pakistan military launched several military operations with mixed results. After the killing of Osama Bin Laden by US Special Forces in Abbottabad in May 2011, Pakistan, reacting to allegations of its complicity in harboring OBL, decided to take it fight against terrorism to its logical end. In June 2014, Pakistan military under General Raheel Sharif launched ground offensive Zarb-e-Azab in North Waziristan to destroy the infrastructure of terrorism. In the ongoing operation, over 2000 terrorist have been killed. As part of this campaign Pakistan has tried to improve its bilateral cooperation with Afghanistan. During President Ashraf Ghani’s visit to Pakistan in November 2014 both countries decided to coordinate and deepen their cooperation in jointly fighting the terrorists who pose a grave danger to both countries.

Following terrorist attack on Army Public School on December 16, 2014 in which 140 students were killed, Islamabad announced National Action Plan to fight violent extremism and combat terrorism with new vigor and resolve. Pakistan also appealed to Kabul to take action against Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) that had claimed responsibility for the APS attack.

The new army leadership led by General Qamar Javed Bajwa launched Raad Al Fasad in 2017 to fight against forces of sectarian and religious militancy across the country. The outbreak of “Panama”<sup>56</sup> corruption scandal and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s family’s involvement in it made it exceedingly difficult for Islamabad to pursue the fight against terrorism single-mindedly. Supreme Court of Pakistan removed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif from office in 2017 and Mr. Shahid Khaqan Abbasi as the interim Prime Minister replaced him. The 2018 General Elections led to the electoral victory of Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf led by former cricketer, Imran Khan.

The change in government in Islamabad coincided with the advent of Donald Trump’s rise to power in the White House. President Donald Trump like previous US governments asked to do more to Pakistan. Instead of accepting Pakistan’s sacrifice in global war on terrorism, he appreciated India’s role in the stability of Afghanistan. At a later stage, US administration decided to withdraw half of American troops from Afghanistan. For this purpose, President Trump

appointed veteran Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad as the State Department envoy on Afghanistan and tasked him to find a political settlement to the Afghan war by initiating direct contacts with the Taliban insurgents. Ambassador Khalilzad toured Pakistan, China Afghanistan and the Gulf countries to mobilize regional support for his peace initiative. Several rounds of direct talks between Ambassador Khalilzad and Afghan representatives have been held in Doha, Qatar where the Taliban have maintained their office. Pakistan has played a pivotal role in facilitating talks between the Taliban insurgents and Washington and Washington has publicly acknowledged this constructive role played by Islamabad.

As the above narrative suggests, the most serious security challenge facing Pakistan is the threat from religious Islamic militancy running rampant in its tribal areas. Pakistan's security environment will remain turbulent unless the country is able to contain, tame and ultimately defeat this menace, which has caused the death of over 50, 000 civilians including 7000 security personnel and losses worth 100 billion rupees to national exchequer. To effectively deal with this challenge, Pakistan has once again tried to revive its National Action Plan. In the wake of NAP's revival, Islamabad has launched a concerted drive against all Jihadi and militant groups operating in the country.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> Abdul Sattar, "Foreign Policy," Rafi Raza, Editor, *Pakistan in Perspective, 1947-1997* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 67.
- <sup>2</sup> Stephen P. Cohen, *The Pakistan Army* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p. 147.
- <sup>3</sup> Ishtiaq Ahmed, *Pakistan: The Garrison State: Origins, Evolution, Consequences: 1947- 2011* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013).
- <sup>4</sup> Mohammad Ayub Khan, the first Muslim Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army (1951-1958), and later Pakistan's president (1958-1969) recalled Pakistan's defence capability at the time in the following words:  
Our army was badly equipped and terribly disorganized. It was almost immediately engaged in escorting the refugees who streamed by the million into Pakistan; and not long after that it was also involved in the fighting in Kashmir. Throughout this period we had no properly organized units, no equipment, and hardly any ammunition. Our plight was indeed desperate. But from the moment Pakistan came into being I was certain of one thing: Pakistan's survival was vitally linked with the establishment of a well-trained, well-equipped, and well-led army. I was determined to create this type of military shield for my country.  
See Muhammad Ayub Khan, *Friends, Not Masters: A Political Autobiography*, New York, 1967, pp. 20-21.
- <sup>5</sup> Karachi was the Federal Capital of Pakistan from 1947 to 1958, after which Rawalpindi became the interim capital city and finally the foundation of a new capital territory was laid out next to Rawalpindi and the new Federal capital was named as Islamabad.
- <sup>6</sup> Mahboob A Popatia, *Pakistan's Relations with the Soviet Union 1947-49: constraints and Compulsions*, (Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1988) p. 29.
- <sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>8</sup> M.S. Venkataramani, *The American Role in Pakistan, 1947-1958*, Lahore, 1984, pp. 15, 19-20.
- <sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>10</sup> Panicked by the instant meltdown of his army, a desperate Nehru sent two letters to President Kennedy requesting American military help. On November 19, describing India's predicament as "really desperate," he requested the "immediate dispatch of twelve squadrons of all-weather US fighter aircraft and the prompt installation of a sophisticated radar network." In addition, he asked that US personnel not only operate the requested radar stations but also pilot the fighter jets. Robert J. McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India and Pakistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 292.
- <sup>11</sup> During Ayub Khan's visit to Washington in July 1961, President Kennedy assured the Pakistani President that "If a Sino-Soviet conflict ever erupted and India asked the United States for military aid, he would consult with Ayub before making any commitments." *Ibid.* p. 332.
- <sup>12</sup> Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001), p. 112.
- <sup>13</sup> Feroz Hassan Khan, *Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), p. 40.
- <sup>14</sup> Robert J McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, p. 332.
- <sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>16</sup> McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, p. 283.
- <sup>17</sup> *Ibid.* p. 296.
- <sup>18</sup> *Ibid.* p. 308.
- <sup>19</sup> *Ibid.* p. 296.
- <sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>21</sup> *Ibid.* p. 321.
- <sup>22</sup> *Ibid.* p. 322.
- <sup>23</sup> *Ibid.* p. 324.
- <sup>24</sup> Gill, *Chinese Arms Transfers*, p. 143. Pakistan has played a key role in shaping a positive image of China in the Muslim world. For example, after the July 2009 Xinjiang riots that resulted in at least 193 deaths due to Beijing's "strike hard" policy, Islamabad deployed its diplomatic skills to prevent the issue from being included on the agenda of the Organization of Islamic Conference annual meeting, thus sparing China a damaged image in the eyes of the Muslim states. See "Pakistan Saved China from Embarrassment on Xinjiang Violence: Chinese Ambassador," *Daily Times*, September 5, 2009.
- <sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>26</sup> K. M. Arif, Editor, *China-Pakistan Relations, 1947-1980* (Lahore: Vanguard Press, 1984), p. 9.
- <sup>27</sup> Barnds, "China's Relations with Pakistan," p. 475.
- <sup>28</sup> *Ibid.* p. 476.
- <sup>29</sup> *Ibid.* During that visit, Liu Shao qi declared that the "Pakistani people can rest assured that, when Pakistan resolutely fights against foreign aggression in defense of its national independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, the 650 million Chinese people will stand unswervingly on their side and give them resolute support and assistance." For full text of Liu's speech, see Arif, *China-Pakistan Relations*, p. 102.
- <sup>30</sup> Gill, *Chinese Arms Transfers*, p. 146.
- <sup>31</sup> Aparna Pande, *Explaining Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Escaping India* (London: Rout ledge, 2011), p. 123.

- <sup>32</sup> Yukinori Komine, *Secrecy in US Foreign Policy: Nixon-Kissinger and the Rapprochement with China* (London: Ashgate, 2008), p. 95.
- <sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>36</sup> *Ibid.* p. 96
- <sup>37</sup> Soviet pique was reflected in Gromyko's comment on Pakistan's role as a 'dirty broker' following Kissinger's secret trip to Beijing in July 1971. Cited in Khan, "Pakistan-China Relations," p. 12.
- <sup>38</sup> "Pakistan Delegation in China," *Peking Review* (November 12, 1971), p. 5.
- <sup>39</sup> *Ibid.* p. 23.
- <sup>40</sup> Mohammed Yunus, *Bhutto and the break up of Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 21.
- <sup>41</sup> Khan, "Pakistan-China Relations," p. 12.
- <sup>42</sup> Gill, *Chinese Arms Transfers*, p. 148.
- <sup>43</sup> Fazl-ur-Rehman, "Pakistan's Evolving Relations with China, Russia, and Central Asia," Iwashita Akihiro, Editor, *Eager Eyes Fixed on Eurasia: Russia and Its Neighbours in Crisis* (Hokkaido: Slavic Research Center, 2007), p. 109.
- <sup>44</sup> *Ibid.* p. 150.
- <sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>46</sup> Describing Balochistan as the "gateway from Central Asia to the Sea," rich in natural resources, and strategically placed at the mouth of the Persian Gulf, a Chinese analyst declared:
- Because of its strategic position and rich resources Baluchistan has ever been coveted by the imperialists. Tsarist Russia, in particular, had tried on many occasions to carve a passage south through the Baluchistan area in Afghanistan and Iran to reach the Indian Ocean and secure warm-water harbors on the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf. To make the old tsar's dream come true, the new tsars are trying by every means to ...bring the Baluchistan under their influence." "Moscow covets Baluchistan," *Peking Review* (March 10, 1980), p. 27.
- <sup>47</sup> Cited in Robert G. Sutter, *Chinese Foreign Policy: Developments After Mao* (New York: Praeger, 1986), P. 114.
- <sup>48</sup> Shahzad Akhter, "Sino-Pakistan Ties: An Assessment," *Strategic Studies* (Winter 2010), P. 74.
- <sup>49</sup> Yitzhak Shichor, "The Great Wall of Steel: Military and Strategy" in Fredrick S. Starr, Editor, *Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland* (Armonk: M.E.Sharpe, 2004), p.149.
- <sup>50</sup> Pervez Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006), 201.
- <sup>51</sup> FATF was set up at the G7 meeting in Paris in 1989 to monitor the implementation of measures against money laundering. The FATF Eight Special Recommendations on Terrorism Financing issued on October 31, 2001 are: 1. Ratification and implementation of UN instruments; 2) Criminalizing the financing of terrorism and associated money laundering; 3) Freezing and confiscating terrorist assets; 4) Reporting suspicious transactions related to terrorism; 5) Increasing international cooperation; 6) Regulating alternative remittance systems; 7) Disclosing wire transfer details; and 8) Regulating non-profit organizations. For more details see: [www.oecd.org/fatf/8recsTF-en.htm](http://www.oecd.org/fatf/8recsTF-en.htm)
- <sup>52</sup> Pervez Musharraf, op. cit.
- <sup>53</sup> Aarish Ullah Khan, op. cit., 30.
- <sup>54</sup> FATA comprised seven Agencies of Mohmand, Khyber, Kurram, Orakzai, Bajaur, North Waziristan and South Waziristan and six Frontier Regions, including the Malakand Agency. The region stretches nearly 230 km from Bajaur Agency to South Waziristan. FATA has a population of about 7 million and covers an area of 27,220 sq. kms with a porous border of 450 km with Afghanistan. The Federal government directly administers FATA with the Governor North West Frontier Province acting as an Agent to the President. For details see Dr. Noor ul Haq et al, "Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan" *IPRI Paper 10* (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2005), 71-88
- <sup>55</sup> Maj General M. Shaukat Sultan Khan, "Pakistan's Struggle Against Domestic and Global Terrorism in the Security Realm," in *Political Violence and Terrorism in South Asia*, eds. Pervez Iqbal Cheema, et al., (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2006), 26.
- <sup>56</sup> The Panama scandal broke out in April 2016. The papers leaked from a Panama-based law firm, Mossack Fonesca and CO Limited made startling revelations about assets hidden through 214, 488 offshore companies by the wealthy and the mighty from across the world including Pakistan. The papers linked three of Nawaz Sharif's children, Hussain Nawaz and Hassan Nawaz and their sister Maryam Nawaz to offshore companies Nescol and Nielson. For details see Danyal Adam Khan, "How one of Pakistan's most controversial cases has unfolded," *Herald*, September 24, 2018.