

THE HERITAGE

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"A man has come into the world; his early years are spent without notice in the pleasures and activities of childhood. As he grows up, the world receives him when his manhood begins, and he enters into contact with his fellows. He is then studied for the first time, and it is imagined that the germ of the vices and the virtues of his maturer years is then formed".

"This, if I am not mistaken, is a great error. We must begin higher up; we must watch the infant in his mother's arms; we must see the first images which the external world casts upon the dark mirror of his mind, the first occurrences that he witnesses; we must hear the first words which awaken the sleeping powers of thought, and stand by his earliest efforts if we would understand the prejudices, the habits, and the passions which will rule his life. The entire man is, so to speak, to be seen in the cradle of the child".

"The growth of nations presents something analogous to this: They all bear some marks of their origin. The circumstances that accompanied their birth and contributed to their development affected the whole term of their being".

* Alexis Charles Henri Clérel, Viscount de Tocqueville (29 July 1805 – 16 April 1859), A French diplomat, political scientist and historian.

THE CHANGING PARAMETERS OF PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

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Abstract

The basic direction of Pakistan's foreign and security policy during the last seven decades was set at the country's creation. Confronted with an existential threat from India, and with a geopolitical location on the fault lines of the US-Soviet Cold War, Pakistan walked almost inexorably into the American camp. China is the main strategic rationale for US hostility towards Pakistan and partnership with India. Pakistan's security and foreign policy must also address the monumental global challenges which the humanity faces today and which impact directly on Pakistan: poverty and hunger, climate change and the water crisis, international migration, nuclear conflict, terrorism and growing injustice and inequality, among and within nations. Addressing these challenges requires much greater and more intense regional and international cooperation. Pakistan must remain at the forefront of endeavours to promote such cooperation and create a world where peace, security and prosperity are universal.

Keywords: Cold War, Bipolar, Emerging, US, Pakistan, India, Strategic Partnership, China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), BRI Global, Regional.

Introduction and Context

There were some early disappointments from Pakistan's foreign policy – the US support to India after the Sino-US border conflict¹; and the US arms embargo during the 1965 India-Pakistan war. The failure of the alliance to prevent Pakistan's break up in 1971 reinforced Islamabad's closeness with a still isolated China and,

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after India's "peaceful" nuclear explosion of 1974, a determination to develop nuclear weapons capability to deter India.

After several years of nuclear friction, Pakistan was drawn back into America's anti-Soviet campaign in Afghanistan. This too ended in acrimony over revived US nuclear sanctions after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Each of the twists and turns in the Pakistan-US relationship, and the consequent impact on Pakistan's national circumstances, were the result of global developments that influenced shifts in US policies and priorities. After the end of the Cold War, the Pakistan-US relationship moved from a convergence of strategic interests to progressive divergence. Pakistan charted an "independent" course, visible in its closeness to Afghan and Kashmiri militant groups and the decision to conduct the nuclear explosions in May 1998, following the Indian tests.

Like the world, Pakistanis were shocked by the destruction wrought by Al Qaeda on 9/11. But popular opinion in Pakistan was opposed to the US invasion of Afghanistan and ouster of the Taliban even if the Musharaf Government was obliged to accept and support this war. After Pakistani troops entered South Waziristan to put down the Taliban related Mahsud uprising, and the Red Mosque had to be cleared of violent extremists, anti-government Pakistani groups plus Al Qaeda and its Uzbek, Turkmen and Uighur associates joined to form the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Very soon as subsequent events illustrated-elements of the TTP were coopted by Afghan and Indian intelligence.

Meanwhile, even as Pakistan fought formerly sympathetic militants, India forged a close relationship with the US. It normalized relations with Israel, dumped its pro-Arab "non-aligned" stance, and, most importantly, signaled its willingness to join the US in challenging China's rising power in Asia. The US sealed its strategic embrace of India with the 2005 signature of defense and civilian nuclear cooperation agreements. Similar treatment was denied to Pakistan. US policies towards India and Pakistan were formally "de-hyphenated".

In the post Musharraf years, Washington sought Pakistan's continued collaboration through "transactional" incentives linked to its cooperation against terrorism. It helped Washington to have leaders in Islamabad who were financially and personally vulnerable to US pressure. While offering support on counter terrorism, in exchange for cooperation on Afghanistan, the US continued to deny Pakistan any weapons systems or technologies which could be used to balance its military position vis-a-vis India and it persisted in efforts to constrain Pakistan's

nuclear and missile programs and end any support for the Kashmiri freedom struggle.

The stark reality is that Pakistan is now considered an adversary, not so much by President Trump, who does not have a strategic compass, but by the US “establishment”. This hostility is the consequence of several factors: America’s strategic partnership with India to contain China; the blame assigned to Pakistan for the US military failure in Afghanistan; the atavistic opposition to Pakistan’s strategic capabilities; and the considerable and growing influence of the expatriate Indian-American community which is aligned now with the powerful Israeli lobby.

US hostility is tempered for the moment because Washington needs Pakistan’s help to negotiate a political settlement that enables an honorable withdrawal from Afghanistan. Once Pakistan has served this purpose, the US is quite likely to deploy all possible means to secure Pakistan’s adherence to its (announced) South Asia strategy (basically, a Pax Indo-Americana).

Pakistan will need to create the strategic space to maintain a friction-free relationship with the US in future. Apart from mobilizing its national strength and the support of regional friends to enhance its diplomatic leverage, other areas of potential cooperation with the US need to be promoted: trade and investment, arms control and counter terrorism.

The Emerging Asian Super Power

China is the main (although not only) strategic rationale for US hostility towards Pakistan (and partnership with India).

The Ancient Greek historian, Thucydides, after observing the Peloponnesian wars, concluded that when an established power is faced by a rising power, a conflict is inevitable. Dr Henry Kissinger reviewed twenty such confrontations in history, and found that seventeen had resulted in conflict. It would appear that the US, today’s established power, has stepped firmly into the “**Thucydides Trap**” to confront China, the rising power.

In a speech last September, US Vice President Pence accused China of: unfair trade, technology theft, targeted tariffs against the US, interference in the US electoral process, a military buildup, militarization of the South China Sea islands claimed by China, debt diplomacy (under its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)), anti-

US propaganda and internal repression. This speech was preceded by official US policy papers describing China (and Russia) as America's adversaries and the imposition of unilateral trade tariffs and restrictions against China, sanctions against Chinese military entities, renewed weapons sales to Taiwan and expansion of the so-called "Freedom of Navigation" operations in the South China Sea.

Since Pence's speech, the US has mounted a major media campaign denouncing China's treatment of Uighur Muslims, halted most technology cooperation, restricted Huawei, the Chinese telephone giant, in the US and sought the arrest of its Chief Financial Officer (and daughter of its founder).

There appears to be hope that the high level Sino-US negotiations underway to address the several trade issues will yield an agreement which may be adopted at a Trump-Xi Summit in April 2017. This may help to revive more robust growth in the world economy.

However, a trade agreement is unlikely to lead to a more cooperative Sino-US strategic relationship. The present Republican Administration appears unable to accept another "equal" power. On the other hand, an increasingly confident China does not seem prepared any longer to "hide its strength and bide its time". President Xi Jinping, while desiring shared progress for "humanity", has declared that it is China's time to shine, China will "reach its dreams" and it will not yield "one inch" of its territory.

Although China has largely played "defense" in the current "trade war" with the US, it will not accept concessions that would adversely impact on its core interests: its territorial integrity, domestic stability and continued development. Despite America's greater power, China enjoys several advantages in a global contest. While the US remains entangled in multiple crises North Korea, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan, Libya and is simultaneously confronting Russia in Europe, Ukraine, even Venezuela, China is quietly extending and expanding its influence and power.

It has formed a "strategic partnership" with a resurgent Russia. Between them, China and Russia control the Eurasian "heartland" and are major players across its periphery Southern Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, the Indian and Pacific Oceans and North East Asia.

One hundred and twenty eight countries have joined the BRI. The rail connection between China and Europe is open and expanding. China plus seventeen European countries have formed a group to promote infrastructure investment and business collaboration. Italy has endorsed the BRI. Germany, France and UK have entered into multiple business ventures. China is the main trade and investment partner of most Asian and African nations and even of several Latin American countries.

US proposals to counter China's economic drive appear puny and unimpressive. Washington has created a \$ 60 billion fund for investment in developing countries infrastructure - as compared to over \$ 1 Trillion which China will spend.

The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is the initial part (the "flagship") of Xi Jinping's BRI. So far, projects worth around \$ 27 billion, of the \$ 72 billion committed, have been implemented, which is encouraging progress. Chinese official loans at 2% interest do not create a "debt trap". Pakistan's \$ 100 billion debt burden, which consumes over 30% of its national revenues, is almost entirely owed to Western lenders. This Western debt, unlike Chinese CPEC and other financing, has not created very many productive capacities in Pakistan. The infrastructure installed under CPEC will create the physical foundation for Pakistan's growth and, in its next phase, rapid industrialization.

Given the economic promise and potential of the Pakistan-China relationship, the extensive and long standing strategic cooperation between the two neighbours, India's enduring enmity, and America's visible hostility, only a fool would propose that Pakistan's do anything other than what Pakistan's Foreign Secretary, S.K. Dehlavi, presciently advised in 1962: "tie itself with hoops of steel" to China.

To preserve and build on the traditional relationship of mutual trust and understanding, Pakistan must correctly evaluate a rising China's more diverse and complex national, regional and global interests and objectives.

In the years after the Sino-Indian border war, the equation in South Asia was simple. China supported Pakistan militarily and politically to resist Indian domination. India's military power was almost wholly deployed against Pakistan and thus entirely "neutralized" as far as China was concerned. Today, India and China have reinforced their military deployments and logistics against each other,

and both are building naval power in the Indian Ocean. But at least 65% of Indian land, air and sea assets continue to be arrayed against Pakistan, significantly diminishing India's capacity to confront China.

However, China's policy objective is to avoid rather than frontally confront the Indian threat. China is now India's largest trading partner and a major investor in the Indian economy. Beijing hopes that India will see the benefits of mutual cooperation and the cost of confrontation. This was the message President Xi conveyed to Prime Minister Modi in two bilateral Summit meetings last year. Russia too is pressing India to accept the "Asian order" rather than serve as America's cats paw.

To succeed in this diplomatic seduction of India, Beijing is obliged to adopt public postures on South Asian issues which may appear to Pakistanis as not being as robust as in the past. And China may even hold back from providing Pakistan some advanced weapons that it fears may push India further towards a military alliance with the US.

China's success in persuading India to join the Asian structures of cooperation (under the SCO, the BRI, an Asian trade arrangement), and spurn a military alliance with the US, could serve Pakistan's interests if this makes New Delhi more amenable to an equitable and normal relationship with Pakistan.

However, it is uncertain if Chinese (and Russian) diplomacy will succeed in holding back India from a full-fledged alliance with the US. Indian chauvinism and great power ambitions, especially under Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) – Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) rule, may trump the vision of a cooperative Eurasian and world order. The signals from hyper-nationalist Hindu India are not propitious.

Thus, Pakistan, and China, would be well advised to presume that eventually India will opt to compete as China's rival rather than cooperate as its Asian partner. Beijing and Islamabad must formulate their strategic policies accordingly.

Pakistan and India

The tense relationship between Pakistan and India is the reflection of a thousand years of joint but hostile coexistence between the two peoples. The Muslims and Hindus of the sub-continent may have developed, over the centuries,

a large measure of ethnic fusion through intermarriages and conversions, but the two communities, despite periodic efforts at constructing a common culture, and collective political positions against external communities and powers, such as the British, always retained a sense of their religious, historical, cultural and even ethnic differentness and separateness. This reality of a common habitat but separate identities was the fundamental rationale for the partition of British India and the creation of Pakistan.

The creation of two geographically separate states could have helped to build cooperation between them utilizing the areas of cultural, ethnic and historical commonalities. But it did not help that the steps towards the political separation were marked by the bloodletting of the religious “riots” and intensified into wholesale massacres during the process of emergence of Pakistan. Or that the Indians made every effort in the process of separation to ensure that Pakistan was stillborn. In the minds of the Muslims, these events consolidated their conviction that partition and the creation of a homeland for themselves was the right decision. The experience of independence and the emergence of the two states deepened and gave a tangible identity to the hostility between the two peoples.

In their hour of triumph of realizing the dream of Pakistan, and to stem the bloodletting on both sides, it was obviously essential for the new Nation’s leaders, especially its founding father, to affirm that Pakistan would adhere to the principles of religious tolerance and equal democratic rights for all its citizens. Yet, while Gandhi and Nehru proclaimed that India would be a secular state, there was no confusion in anyone’s mind that Pakistan was a “Muslim homeland”. It is ironic, therefore, that the BJP-RSS ideologies are now “reverse engineering” India’s identity as a Hindu Rashtra (State), reconfirming in retrospect the basic rationale for the creation of Pakistan.

Today, most people ascribe the hostile relations between Pakistan and India to the Kashmir dispute. But this intense dispute is merely the most vivid illustration of the Muslim-Hindu division, mistrust and hostility rather than the cause of this hostility. Contrary to the common dispensation, even if the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir were resolved in the near future, the sense of separateness and rivalry, if not hostility, would still persist between the two states. This is not to diminish the imperative need to resolve the Jammu and Kashmir dispute; it is to place it in the proper historic perspective.

A resolution of this dispute is vital now for several reasons: to fulfill the commitments made to the people of Jammu and Kashmir; to prevent the massive human rights violations being committed against the Kashmiri people, and to avoid the danger of a nuclear Armageddon. The rights and wrongs of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute are no longer in any doubt. The people of the divided state were promised the exercise of the right to self-determination by the UN Security Council and by India and Pakistan. After several years of protracted efforts by the international community to enable the Kashmiris to express their wishes to join India or Pakistan through a plebiscite, and years of Indian obfuscation and delay, the Indian Government declared in the mid-fifties that it was no longer bound by its previous solemn and legal commitments.

Periodic Kashmiri revolts and Pakistan-India conflicts are the consequence of the stalemate created by India's retraction of its solemn and binding commitments. The last major Kashmiri struggle for freedom lasted an entire decade: 1990-2000. India attempted to suppress the Kashmiris through brute force. Pakistan made little effort to disguise its support for Kashmir insurgents, especially religious groups with battle hardened fighters who had recently returned from the anti-Soviet campaign in Afghanistan. Despite deploying over 700,000 troops in occupied Kashmir, India's security forces were unable to put down the Kashmiri struggle, until India's intelligence agencies infiltrated some of the militant groups and commissioned a series of terrorist atrocities against foreigners and civilians which were wrongfully ascribed to the Kashmiri insurgents. Progressively, with growing US support, India succeeded in equating the Kashmiri insurgents with Arab terror groups, such as the then nascent Al Qaeda, and the "jihadis" who had returned from Afghanistan to create havoc in their Middle East and North African home countries.

When Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) elements attempted to assassinate President Musharraf, Islamabad outlawed the organization and agreed to put it on the Security Council's terrorism list. Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT) was also "listed" (with the agreement of the PPP government) for its alleged involvement in 2008 Mumbai attacks. Since then, the JeM has been accused by India of carrying out several attacks against Indian military targets (Uri and more recently Pulwama), which have led to bouts of Pakistan-India crises. However, for all intents and purposes, due to Indian counter insurgency measures and Pakistan's restraints, external aid to the Kashmiri freedom movement is non-existent and it is indigenously developed by the people of Indian Occupied Kashmir. Over the same time, India has enlarged and intensified its sponsorship of Baluch insurgent groups

and TTP terrorism from the territory of Afghanistan as well as Iran. Pakistan has been restrained by the American presence in Afghanistan and its sensitive relationship with Iran from retaliating against this Indian sponsored terrorism from the West. This equation could change once the US withdraws from Afghanistan and Iran cooperates to end cross border terrorism.

To everyone's surprise, inspite of India's extreme repressive actions and with its deployment of 0.7 million force, is unable to suppress the freedom struggle in Kashmir. Inspired by indigenous and youthful Kashmiri freedom fighters, a simmering insurgency caught political fire when Indian forces killed the popular young freedom fighter, Burhanuddin Wani, in 2014. Since then, Kashmir has been gripped by an overt popular movement daily demanding freedom (Azadi) from Indian rule. The brutal and politically clumsy response of India's BJP Government has managed to alienate virtually all Kashmiri Muslims, even those Kashmiri political parties which had collaborated with New Delhi in the past.

Kashmir is vital part of Pakistan for multiple reasons. It was meant to join Pakistan under the rationale of partition. The K in Pakistan's name stands for Kashmir. It's people identify with Pakistan (and reject India). It is geographically contiguous to Pakistan and the source of Pakistan's rivers.

It is now clear that India will not be able to suppress the Kashmiri demand for freedom (Azadi) by its brutal tactics. Continuing Indian oppression will motivate Kashmiris from Azad Kashmir and Pakistani sympathizers to go to the aid of the unarmed Kashmiris. India will, in any event, blame Pakistan for sponsoring "terrorism" and threaten military action. A wider conflict was fortunately avoided after Pulwama, only due to Pakistani restraint. Next time, the restraint may break down. A general Pakistan-India war could cross the nuclear threshold, because Indian attempts to dominate escalation and its brinkmanship may fail.

While it is in Pakistan's interest to dismantle religious extremist groups, which expose it to US sponsored "sanctions", must not act against the pro-Kashmiri groups so long as India continues with its oppression in occupied Kashmir. A just settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute is essential to end the tragic and unacceptable suffering of the people of occupied Kashmir and to eliminate the threat of a catastrophic war in the region.

India is unlikely to agree to the UN plebiscite in the foreseeable future. Pakistan would commit a strategic error if it formally accepts the status quo. The

formula negotiated during the Musharaf period would have been unworkable even if India had accepted it. Joint administration of Jammu and Kashmir would negate Kashmiri self-determination forever and legalize India's forcible occupation of Jammu and Kashmir. It would provide India the legal status to complicate Pakistan's administration of Gilgit Baltistan and access to China across the Karakoram Highway, thus jeopardizing the entire CPEC project.

Given the intractable nature of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute, for the present, it would be perhaps best to aim for an interim settlement that does not ask any of the three parties: Pakistan, India and the Kashmiris, to concede their long held political positions. Such an interim settlement could comprise separate but synchronized steps by India, Pakistan and Kashmiris.

India would have to end its military repression, allow the Kashmiris to exercise their democratic rights, including freedom of speech and association, withdraw its security forces from Kashmiri towns and cities and fully implement, in letter and spirit, the provisions of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. Pakistan, for its part, would proscribe all groups advocating violence as a means to promote Kashmiri freedom, undertake verifiable measures to prevent illegal cross LoC/ border movement by such freedom fighters, and encourage indigenous Kashmiri groups and political parties in occupied Kashmir to engage in reciprocal process with occupying government agencies to eschew violence and create conditions for a United Nation's sponsored plebiscite.

If this interim arrangement leads to an extended peace between Pakistan and India and the development of trade, investment and other forms of cooperation, it is possible that a more permanent settlement based on the wishes of the Kashmiri people may become possible in future. However, stable security between Pakistan and India will also require an agreement or mutual understanding on conventional, nuclear and missile arms control. India's ambitious acquisition of advanced conventional offensive weapons systems has progressively increased Pakistan's reliance on nuclear deterrence, including development of suitable delivery system to maintain strategic balance. India's provocative doctrines of limited war under nuclear overhang are eroding the stability of mutual deterrence.

The recent Pulwama crisis again illustrated the dangers inherent in the current weapons configurations and postures of both powers. India, and the US, should have recognized by now that Pakistan will not be cowed down in a

confrontation. Further acceleration of the divergent strategic postures and capabilities of the two sides could lead to even more dangerous strategic planning - to prevail in a conflict through preemptive strikes and second strike capabilities. Yet, all realistic projections of an India - Pakistan war point to the virtual certainty of "mutual assured destruction". This should motivate both nations and the major powers to initiate an urgent process of nuclear and conventional arms control process between Pakistan and India. Pakistan had proposed a "mutual restraint regime" immediately after the nuclear tests of 1998. This proposal deserves urgent and positive reconsideration.

Afghanistan

All that divides the peoples of Pakistan and India- religion, culture, history- should unite the peoples of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Unfortunately, Kabul's reactive rejection of the Durand Line as the international border set the Pakistan-Afghan relationship on a negative trajectory. This was exacerbated by the super power competition within Afghanistan, King Zahir Shah's ouster by Prince Daud, the resurrection of the Pashtunistan issue, communist coups, the Soviet invasion and India's influence on Afghan thinking.

The period of the anti-Soviet "jihad" was, ironically, the best years in the Pakistan-Afghan relationship. Pakistan opened its borders to a flood of three million Afghans fleeing the Soviet and communist military occupation. Almost all of Afghanistan's elite inhabited Peshawar and Islamabad (until some of them found refuge in the US and Europe). Despite the ongoing war, the economies of Pakistan and Afghanistan became highly integrated. Pakistan served as the base and the launching pad of the Afghan Mujahideen's jihad against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

The nature of the relationship changed after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Most of the Mujahideen groups remained dependent on Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, while some, like Ahmed Shah Masood, the Hazaras and Shia groups, turned to Iran. Pakistan's influence grew further after Mullah Umar's Taliban gained power over most of Afghanistan.

But with return of Osama bin Laden (OBL) to Afghanistan, the emergence of Al Qaeda and aggregation there of multiple Islamic militant groups, the potential for diplomatic damage to Pakistan from its Taliban association was writ large. Early Pakistani-Saudi efforts to have the Taliban hand over or eject OBL were

unsuccessful. The incident of 'Black Tuesday', and Mullah Omar's persistent refusal to surrender Osama, imposed the difficult choice on Pakistan to abandon the Taliban, cooperate with the US invasion of Afghanistan and accept the rule of a hostile Northern Alliance in Kabul.

The American adventure in Afghanistan was destined for failure from inception. Pakistan's military leaders at the time told the US frankly that it would be folly to replace a regime representing the majority Pashtuns by one controlled by the Tajik minority. American hubris ignored this advice. A symbolic Pashtun, Hamid Karzai, was emplaced as the figure-head President (although he accumulated considerable power over the years). The resurgence of the Taliban/Pashtun insurgency was inevitable.

It has taken the US over seventeen years to recognize, as the Soviets did thirty years before them, and the British a hundred years earlier, that defeating an Afghan insurgency is an almost impossible enterprise. Refusing to admit their strategic and tactical mistakes, the US military sought, from the outset, to transfer blame for almost every failure on to Pakistan. Even as the US accepted the inevitability of direct talks with the Taliban, it insisted that Pakistan accept the responsibility for "bringing them to the table".

As noted, the outcome of the US-Taliban talks is uncertain. These could lead to a comprehensive agreement between the US, the Taliban and the other Afghan parties, including the Ghani government. Or the Afghans may not be able to agree on a future structure of governance, and the US may withdraw after an agreement with the Taliban, leaving behind a continuing civil war and an eventual Taliban victory. Or there may be no agreement at all and the US may decide either to withdraw unilaterally or to stay on in a few embattled garrisons in Afghanistan.

Pakistan must be prepared for all possible scenarios. If peace returns to Afghanistan, and a friendly government is installed in Kabul, Pakistan could seek to promote the integration of the two economies and implementation of the several connectivity projects, including CPEC's extension to Afghanistan. If there is no agreement, or partial agreement, Pakistan, at a minimum, should ensure, through action by the Taliban or itself, the elimination from Afghan territory of the TTP and the Baluch groups being used by India for terrorist attacks against Pakistan and the marginalization of India's political influence in Afghanistan. In the event that the Afghan civil war continues, Pakistan should insulate itself from its consequences by

completing the fencing and monitoring of the border and securing the earliest possible repatriation of the Afghan refugees.

Last, but not least, as suggested above, Pakistan should explore how it can create a stake for the US to maintain some measure of cooperation with Pakistan post its withdrawal from Afghanistan e.g. through incentives for US investment and trade, including in CPEC projects, regional arms control and counter terrorism cooperation.

Economic Objectives

As China's leader, Deng Xiaoping, remarked when launching his economic reforms: "Development is the only truth. If we don't develop, we will be bullied". Today, China cannot be bullied. Pakistan has vast economic potential in almost every sector- agriculture, manufacturing, mining, energy, tourism, exports. Yet, Pakistan's economy has grossly underperformed due to mismanagement and inefficiency. Growth in Pakistan's economy can be unlocked by good governance, policy clarity, financial stability and the conscious mobilization of domestic and foreign investment.

Ultimately, for Pakistan, as for other developing countries, investment is the key to growth. The modest rate of Pakistan's economic growth can be easily doubled if Pakistan can attract large investment flows. There are immense and unexploited opportunities for productive and profitable investment in Pakistan.

The investments announced by China under CPEC and by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and other friendly countries recently are an encouraging start and must be diligently consummated. Active efforts should be made to tap other investment sources, including private investment from the US, Europe, Japan, ASEAN and other established sources of capital including sovereign wealth funds, pension funds and private equity funds.

Global Challenges

Pakistan's security and foreign policy must also address the monumental global challenges that humanity faces today and which directly impacts Pakistan: poverty and hunger, climate change and the water crisis, international migration, nuclear conflict, terrorism and growing injustice and inequality, among and within nations. Addressing these challenges requires much greater and more intense regional and international cooperation. Pakistan must remain at the forefront of

endeavours to promote such cooperation and create a world where peace, security and prosperity are universal.

NOTES

¹ The Sino-Indian War, also known as the Indo-China War and Sino-Indian Border Conflict, was a war between China and India that occurred in 1962. A disputed Himalayan border was the main pretext for war, but other issues played a role. There had been a series of violent border incidents after the 1959 Tibetan uprising, when India had granted asylum to the Dalai Lama. India initiated a forward policy in which it placed outposts along the border, including several north of the McMahon Line, the eastern portion of the Line of Actual Control proclaimed by Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in 1959. Unable to reach political accommodation on disputed territory along the 3,225 kilometers (2000 mile) long Himalayan border, the Chinese launched simultaneous offensives in Ladakh and across the McMahon Line on 20 October 1962. Chinese troops advanced over Indian forces in both theatres, capturing Rezang La in Chushul in the western theatre, as well as Tawang in the eastern theatre. The war ended when China declared a ceasefire on 20 November 1962, and simultaneously announced its withdrawal to its claimed 'line of actual control'. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sino-Indian_War

PAKISTAN'S VISION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

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Abstract

Pakistan does not have a formal national security doctrine or a composite national security strategy but the contours and ingredients of its national security policy are well known. The discussion on national security has been marred in the past by the controversy over the establishment and the role of the National Security Committee but we have moved past that stage. Since its birth, Pakistan's decision makers have centered national security on physical security of the state, quest for democracy, good governance, economic development, and social welfare. Pakistan's ideology, in one form or the other, has been the golden thread in the fabric of national security. Throughout its history, Pakistan has been more focused on its survival rather than growth because of the persistent external threats and political uncertainty in the country. But after acquiring nuclear capability and a modicum of economic growth, Pakistan has found its strategic moorings and, despite transient setbacks, is on its way to becoming a major military and economic power.

Keywords: Pakistan, Vision, National Security, Nation, Diplomacy, Economic Security.

Introduction

Pakistan was a dream that came true in 1947. The creation of the state was just the beginning. The bigger dream was and is to shape a model state inspired by the ideals of justice, equality, fair play, and shared prosperity; and peace within and peace without¹. All indicators, past and present, suggest that Pakistan will emerge as a paramount nation. It is nearly impossible to predict the future with any degree of certainty. Pakistan prepares for it guided by a prudent vision and calibrated strategy to rise to its calling.

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What is National Security?

A nation will be considered to be secure or moving on the path of security when it is capable of defending its borders and territory against aggressive military attacks, subversion and sabotage. This is an essential but a narrow definition. A broader definition will include a state's power and competence to safeguard its ideology and avowed value system. A secure state should fully enjoy its self-determination and should not be under any kind of foreign *diktat*, bondage or coercion in regard to its chosen way of life or system of governance. But the core of national security is human security or the security of its citizens, which would encompass opportunities for self-development and collective growth, as well as freedom from want. Human security also subsumes economic security and control over one's natural and human resources and the capacity to create an environment for the well-being and prosperity of its citizens. Above all, a secure state does not compromise its dignity and independence. National security is never static; it is evolutionary and continues to evolve in the face of constant changes in the political and strategic landscapes and threat scenarios. In short, national security entails military strength, economic prosperity and human security.

Pakistan's National Security

Pakistan does not have a formal national security doctrine or a composite national security strategy but the contours and ingredients of its national security policy are well known. The discussion on national security has been marred in the past by the controversy over the establishment and the role of the National Security Committee but we have moved past that stage. Since its birth, Pakistan's decision makers have centered national security on physical security of the state, quest for democracy, good governance, economic development, and social welfare. Pakistan's ideology, in one form or the other, has been the golden thread in the fabric of national security. Throughout its history, Pakistan has been more focused on its survival rather than growth because of the persistent external threats and political uncertainty in the country. But after acquiring nuclear capability and a modicum of economic growth, Pakistan has found its strategic moorings and, despite transient setbacks, is on its way to becoming a major military and economic power.

Pakistan – A Great Nation

Pakistan is ranked as a major and, some would say, a pivotal state in the current world order. It has been a leading contributor to UN peacekeeping in four continents - Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America. Since 1960, more than 200,000

Pakistani peacekeepers have served in 26 countries and 43 missions. Pakistan's Armed Forces are ranked amongst top fifteen armed forces of the world. It is the seventh declared nuclear weapon state. It is not just its military muscle and its quest for global peace that makes Pakistan an important power. Pakistan's very location - at the cross roads of East-, South-, Central-, West- and South-west Asia - makes it a vital nation for regional peace and prosperity. Pakistan's unique economic geography promises a prosperous Pakistan and a lift-off for the entire neighborhood. In the production of different categories of fruit, grains and milk, Pakistan is among the top ten nations of the world. It is true that the manufacturing sector lags behind, but over the years Pakistan has developed a sprawling large-scale and medium-sized industrial infrastructure. In June 2017, the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) upgraded Pakistan from a frontier to an emerging economy in its Emerging Markets Index.

Pakistan is one of the few Muslim countries which has practiced democracy and built democratic institutions. An influential voice within the Muslims bloc, it has simultaneously tried to pursue balanced relationships with the Western countries, China and Russia.

Over the decades, Pakistan has survived many existential maelstroms. The most serious, of course, were the Herculean tasks of salvaging the fledgling state that was created in 1947 against all odds but with a steely resolve; and putting it back on track after the 1971 debacle which had led to the secession of East Pakistan. Terrorism since 2001 has been the most pernicious threat to Pakistan's security and its avowed policy of peace. Despite all this, what makes Pakistan different from other nations is that it has survived as a state and kept its value system alive. This was mainly due to our strong institutions, without which the state may well have collapsed. The onslaught was strong but it was matched by the resilience and endurance of the people of Pakistan.

The Vision

Pakistan should become a great nation and be amongst top 20 economies by 2050. This is not a megalomaniac aspiration but a modest goal. Anything short of it in the next three decades would be a dereliction and betrayal of the assigned destiny of the nation. Given its potential and its current trajectories, a more ambitious goal for Pakistan should be to climb to the top 10 positions. In this context, Pakistan's national security vision can be reduced to three key words - security, prosperity, and clout - in accordance with our own values. Such a vision

should include timelines and objectives till 2050. And to realize its vision, the nation must specify and pursue tangible objectives for the next five to ten to fifteen to twenty years. Without such rigor, it is difficult to reach the desired destination.

Values have Primacy

The core values of Pakistan are Islamic way of life, protection of citizens, economic and educational opportunities for the people of Pakistan, the rule of law, access to justice, and respect for diversity and pluralism. Without adherence to these values, the state would be rudderless and adrift. These values are enshrined in the Constitution of Pakistan and are widely supported, but their inculcation in governance, state structures and societal norms is feeble. The state needs to uphold these values to provide strong underpinnings for nationalism and prepare the people to oppose those who are bent upon undermining them. Violent extremism or primordial versions of faith, alien to the dynamic and enternal message of Islam, gain currency and space because of sheer ignorance or vested interest or weak advocacy, defence and dissemination of the core values. The state of Pakistan would therefore espouse its value-system with vigour and tread the middle path so as to steer clear of extremes.

These values should have resonance in the regional and international milieu so that Pakistan can form coalitions and partnerships with other nations on the basis of mutuality of interests.

Explore Peace

Wars and conflicts are disastrous and mutually destructive. Wars are not in the interest of Pakistan or the region. Pakistan will continue to strive for peace and a peaceful neighbourhood, while protecting its own sovereignty and integrity and fully realizing that unilateral overtures do not necessarily help in avoiding conflict or bringing peace. A long period of peace will provide the necessary space for Pakistan's economic development.

Brace for Stiff Competition

Pakistan will face competition from friend and foe alike in the military, economic and intellectual domains. India and the Gulf region are moving fast and collaborating; Central Asia will catch up; Iran is likely to forge ahead. Pakistan cannot afford to be left behind despite its abundant human and natural resources. Pakistan would have to prepare for harshest competition in propaganda and

communication that would be used to besmear Pakistan's way of life and strategic choices. It would lose its edge if it does not modernize its national portals and platforms to counter this threat and project its genuine perspectives.

Pakistan's armed forces secure borders, repulse proxy wars inside the territory, fight terrorism, safeguard country's economic interests, and project power in the regional neighbourhood. In February 2019, in the aftermath of the Pulwama attack and Indian aggression, Pakistani defence forces' responses at the strategic, tactical and communication levels won international recognition. As of now, Pakistan's defence capability is adequate but it requires constant refinement, up-gradation and modernization. Pakistan's nuclear deterrent is credible and despite conventional asymmetry vis-a-vis India, a proportional equivalence exists. Pakistan's nuclear parity with India in real terms, however, does not guarantee invulnerability. On the one hand, India's war regime is growing exponentially and, on the other, it is trying to scupper Pakistan's deterrent by false flag operations, hybrid warfare and proxy wars, as well as by constantly exploring responses below the nuclear thresholds, be it through the Cold Start doctrine or the so-called surgical strikes. India has openly threatened to use terrorism² and sub-conventional warfare to destabilize Pakistan and "mother of nuclear bombs"³ to destroy it. Such threats are likely to increase in the future because of the growing ascendancy of aggressive Hindu nationalism. So preparedness for the future is as important as current strengths. The next challenge is technological. No weapons, or for that matter doctrines stemming from them, are effective for all times. The strategic and conventional platforms of 2029 will be different from what they are today.

Besides, India's nuclear triad comprising platforms capable of launching missiles from land, air and sea have necessitated a Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) because deterrence is dynamic requiring a comprehensive response. Next generation warfare will shift to space and therefore our efforts in space technology should go to scale. Pakistan also has to erect firewalls against possible attacks on military installations and critical infrastructure and develop its own competencies in cyber space. Another area that needs special emphasis is beefing up of maritime security to fight off piracy and protect seaborne merchandise, especially after the implementation of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. We should also take steps towards building a blue water navy. Pakistan would continue to use its unique experience and expertise to deal with the threats of violent extremism and externally sponsored terrorism that would continue to stalk it.

To achieve these objectives, the state should continue to invest in the capabilities of defence forces, security and intelligence agencies, defence industry, and scientific and technological disciplines. For that purpose, enhanced budgetary allocations should be prioritized. While defence technology purchases, joint production ventures with other countries, bilateral and international military exercises are all very important, Pakistan needs a robust indigenous defence industry to equip its forces by ensuring availability of assured supply chains and professionals.

Economic Security

To usher in prosperity for all, economic security is a must without which Pakistan will not be able to effectively focus on human development and finance its undertakings in the fields of defence and diplomacy. Economy is both the object and the means of national security. In the current phase of its history, Pakistan's economy is the ultimate strategic priority. In the past several decades, Pakistan's economic growth has been cyclical with repeated patterns of peaks and troughs. In the past, for extended periods it showed promise and resilience followed by tardy growth. Chronic reliance on IMF bailouts neither brought about structural reforms nor enabled the economy to take off independently. As an emerging nation, Pakistan should work for a sustained economic growth rate of 5 to 7 percent per annum for two decades. The key is to craft indigenous solutions to unleash the full potential of the talented people of Pakistan, invest in knowledge economy and human capital, popularize innovation, induct new technologies, rejuvenate agriculture, build manufacturing muscle, and reward entrepreneurship.

Pakistan's advantageous demographic trends (currently, according to the United Nations Development Fund, 64 percent of the population, roughly 130 million, is below the age of 30), growing middle class, and entry of more skilled and educated workforce into the market should create a conducive environment for rapid growth, which, in turn, would generate new jobs and businesses. But this kind of push would be possible only through a paradigm shift. Reliance on textiles, raw materials and low-end manufacturing will have to be reduced and our products and markets for them will have to diversify.

We must be clear that Pakistan will continue to be a developing country unless it matches the human development indicators of the Nordic countries, which with small populations and territories have per capita incomes ranging between US \$ 40, 000 to 80,000. Pakistan lacks a 'grow rich culture' and bulk of the

people are content with the pittance they earn despite the abundance of resources. This must be changed through conscious effort, while fighting corruption, rent seeking and crony capitalism. The real richness means creation of wealth for all.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the flagship project of the China-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), is transformative for Pakistan's economy. It is, however, not a substitute for Pakistan's overall economic development plan. The CPEC's crucial investments in the infrastructure, energy, industrial and communication sectors are a godsend for jumpstarting Pakistan's economic growth and making Pakistan a regional hub for trade, manufacturing and services. Let's not forget that the CPEC has made Pakistan the central node of regional connectivity; and has opened doors for development of its blue economy in the territorial waters and exclusive economic zone in front of its 1046-kilometer long coastline.

Another strategic asset Pakistan has is its diaspora community, estimated to be around 9 to 10 million, in North America, Europe, the Gulf and East Asia. This community is rich, educated and keen to support Pakistan inside the country and in the countries where they live and work. They desperately seek leadership and a strategy to contribute to the development of Pakistan.

Revamp Diplomacy

Pakistani diplomats are ranked among the world's best and Pakistan's Foreign Office is seen with respect by its counterpart organizations. Numerous achievements in regard to Pakistan's security, nuclear diplomacy, economic breakthroughs, and averting deadly conflicts can be directly attributed to Pakistani diplomats' efforts to defend their country's vital interests. The state's reliance on diplomacy will increase in the coming years.

To gain a great power status for Pakistan, however, the Foreign Office and our diplomacy need to be revamped and rejigged. The spectrum of Pakistan's foreign policy is comparable to a min-superpower's but the resources earmarked for diplomacy are woefully inadequate. Mindsets and briefs date back to the Cold War or, at best, to post-Cold War period. Foreign Office's diplomatic personnel strength, at home and abroad, is equal to that of much smaller nations. Diplomats' time is consumed in firefighting running from pillar to post, leaving little time for long-term policy planning, threat assessment and identification of emerging opportunities. In addition, there is a lack of the whole-of-the government approach

which hampers a collective endeavor. This is a systemic flaw of largely operating in silos that needs to be rectified.

To be fully competitive abroad, modern day diplomats need new skills and tools. In the near future, enhanced and innovative investments are required in political diplomacy, economic diplomacy and information diplomacy. Until the budgets remain constrained we need to make efficient and smart use of our existing resources.

Modern diplomats should have the mindsets and strategies of entrepreneurs and venture capitalists - ready to take risks, turn around the fortunes of the country and deliver results. They should move out of their offices to reach out to civil society, businesses, political parties, Parliaments and even military establishments in order to build enduring relationships. By increasing the number of allies and reducing adversaries, they would gain support for Pakistan's stance and positions. Our modern diplomat need not be a Mr. Know-All but a catalyst for projection and augmentation of national power.

Economic diplomacy requires a multi-pronged strategy. First, make Pakistan an attractive and lucrative destination for trade and investment. Second, find niche markets for Pakistani products in the initial phase. Third, improve the quality of Pakistan products and make them competitive. And, fourth, show up at the multilateral economic and financial institutions and forums and expand your presence there. In this regard, it is necessary for our decision makers to discard the notion that multilateral diplomacy pertains only to hard core issues related to peace and security, conflicts, disarmament, terrorism, and transnational crime. Multilateral economic diplomacy is much more vibrant and multi-faceted today, which is dominated by the development and financial agenda.

A formidable repertoire for information diplomacy would be required to be developed because of two reasons. In our times, both traditional and new media, in many instances, are being used as weapons of war to spread disinformation, demonize a nation and delegitimize its narrative. The second reason to develop information capabilities is to broadcast one's own values and garner support for them. Most of the wars in future will be information and cyber-spatial wars which would become more complex by the day. In this scenario, risks to Pakistan's national security would increase through collusion by rivals and enemies of socio-economic, commercial and military intelligence. Our information diplomats will have to upscale their communication skills, create supportive networks worldwide

and outcompete detractors. In doing so, project Pakistan's soft power abroad, not just its soft image.

Embrace New Technologies

New technologies have direct bearing on national security and our neighborhood is investing heavily in them. These technologies, including Artificial Intelligence, machine learning, 3-D printing, autonomous unmanned weapons and systems, and robotics, will have a profound impact on warfare and economies. Led by IT innovators and businesses, these technologies, with both productive and disruptive applications, have entered South Asia and will alter doctrines and policies for defence and security. By introducing and adopting them at an early stage, we would ensure our economic and military competitiveness and regulate their uses by state and non-state actors to maximize their benefits and to discredit disinformation directed against the state and society.

Region and Beyond

The so-called liberal international order, it seems, is on the retreat in the western nations, where the challenge has come mainly from within with the rise of ethnic and racist nationalism. Market economies are becoming protectionist and isolationist; and the "global hegemon", the sole superpower and the "indispensable nation" that emerged after the Cold War is advocating America First and projecting itself as a competitor to China and Russia and feels threatened by Islamic terrorism. America's exceptionalism has been challenged though it remains the principal power. China is fast becoming a global power at an unprecedented speed. Just beneath this equation, one witnesses a multipolar order shaping up, which is apparently rule-bound but is rocked by *realpolitik*. Wracked by civil wars and regional conflicts, the Middle East is in a state of disarray. So pragmatism and a close vigil of narrow national interests are the operative norms.

Against this background, Pakistan should manage India's hostility in a way that it does not interfere with Pakistan's economic development. At the same time, India should know clearly, without a shadow of doubt, that it cannot attack Pakistan without risking a proportionate, punishing and devastating retaliation. In Pakistan, Indian extremists, who are the ruling party right now, have found a whipping boy for winning elections, military purchases, and regional hegemony. Pakistan has two-fold responsibilities in this regard: to not let Hindu extremism and fundamentalism hurt it and to curb domestic extremism that can get out of control as a reaction. That still leaves Indian Muslims and Kashmiris vulnerable to

the attacks and depredations of the Sangh Parivar and Bajrang Dal squads. Despite these vulnerabilities, Pakistan should continue to hold out an olive branch in the hope that one day the Indian society itself will be able to deal with the banes of religious fanaticism and xenophobia and help us move the region towards peace and cooperation.

Kashmir should remain on the front burner, not militarily but diplomatically. The human rights violations in the Indian Occupied Kashmir and the denial of their right to self-determination should remain on the international radar screens. In the meantime, desist from exploring out-of-the-box solutions unilaterally, which would give gratuitous concessions and advantages to India.

It is politic for Pakistan to continue to support the peace and reconciliation efforts in Afghanistan, despite setbacks, in the belief that end of strife and conflict in that country would benefit its people and the entire region.

Pakistan should consolidate its ties with traditional allies such as China, Turkey and Saudi Arabia and expand its economic presence in Africa, Central Asia, and East Asia. As I have advocated many times, Pakistan should conceive its own corridors to Europe and Russia via Turkey, Iran and Central Asia.

Relations with the U.S. should not be allowed to deteriorate even if Washington is distrustful of Pakistan for the time being. The onus is not entirely on us. Yet Pakistan needs access to the US for quality education, technologies and products. I recall that in 1998, after the nuclear tests, the US lawmakers and Administration officials regretted that the US had unwisely weakened or severed relations with Pakistan's military and government following its pull-out from Afghanistan. So we should have a long-term view of Pakistan-US relations, even as we deal with the strains caused by Washington's objections to Pakistan's geo-economic closeness to China symbolized by CPEC.

Approaches to Enhance National Security

Proactive statecraft should be employed to foster nationalism and patriotism and to reinforce economic dependencies among various regions of the country. The ideological deficit should not be allowed to widen. Pakistan is meant to become neither a theocratic nor a secular state, but a policy that would promote moderation, tolerance, social harmony, equality of opportunity, equality before law and protection of the rights of the minorities. Dealing with other nations would

require a pragmatic, rather than a doctrinaire approach. Absolute conflation of interests of nations is neither feasible nor desirable. It is therefore advisable to explore the golden *median*, not just the *mean* in international transactions. This has become imperative because of the blurring of ideological fault lines between communism and capitalism. Pakistan should consciously reject the seductive dependence syndrome, dating back to the Cold War, of hopes that it would be somehow salvaged by its one giant ally or the other. Pakistan is now a big nation in its own right and is capable of taking care of its interests. Other nations have their limitations and may not be in a position to bail it out at the most crucial moments. Pakistan has to take its destiny its own hands. Finally, Pakistan would learn to remain in the international mainstream by developing stakes of its strategic partners in the region and beyond; but it should eschew getting sucked into costly strategic entanglements.

Conclusion

The rainbow of Pakistan's rise is real and there would be a pot of gold at the end of the rainbow. The people of Pakistan, with a great leap of faith, will make this nation a great power through hard work, versatility and sheer determination. This job is not for the timid, but for the bold who would venture into the future with confidence and competence. A nation's vision would be realized by hard work and diligence, not by expression of aspirations alone. Nothing is assured unless we harness the energies of the entire nation to realize the stated objectives; and it all boils down to leadership.

NOTES

¹ Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah's oft-cited quotation.

² Indian Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar threatened to use terrorists against Pakistan in May 2015 as widely reported by Indian and Pakistan newspapers.

³ Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi threatened to wipe out Pakistan with the “mother of nuclear bombs”, as reported by CNN on April 18, 2019.

THE GLOBAL SYSTEM: DYNAMICS AND HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

*Professor Dr. Hasan Askari Rizvi**

Abstract

Continuity and change are the characteristic features of the global system. It has changed over time and this process of change will continue as humanity marches on in the 21st century. Some of these changes have been so extensive that one can talk of several world orders rather than emphasizing continuity despite changes. This study offers an overview of the broad features of the global order at the end of the 2nd decade of the 21st century, historical survey of how it changed over time and the factors and political developments that caused these changes. The focus is on the global politics in the post-Cold war era and especially the emergence of the United States as the sole superpower. As it was unnatural for one powerful state to command the world order, it gave way to a more pluralist, complex and disorderly world order. This study also suggests ways and means that the states can adopt to cope with the challenges of an uncertain and multifaceted world order.

Keywords: Global System, Dynamics, Historical Overview, Politics, Challenges, World Order, Post-Cold War.

Retrospective Look at Contemporary Global System

The Global system at the end of the second decade of the 21st century is more anarchic and complex than ever. The United States is still the most powerful military power with one of the leading economies of the world, but it is no longer in a position to completely command the international system. It is not the sole pilot of the global system. The notion of uni-polarity that developed in the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War in 1990-91, has lost its salience by 2019.

The present day global order could be described as uni-multipolar. Despite the preponderance of the US in military and economic powers that give it a unique

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position in the international system, it is not the only significant power center in the international system. Several other power centers have emerged which include Europe, Asia-Pacific, China and Japan. Russia is gradually resurfacing with an agenda for playing an active global role. There are several regionally powerful states that also assert their role in their relevant region.

The success of the US and other states in pursuing any agenda of global or regional dimensions depends on the capacity of that country, including the US, to mobilize support from other power centers. A partnership has to be developed with other power centers in the world order. The more successful the US is in mobilizing diplomatic support from other power centers, the greater is the probability of pursuing its global agenda.

Every major power has to engage in diplomacy for building coalition for pursuing a particular agenda. If such cooperation cannot be cultivated, global agenda cannot be effectively pursued. For major global policy issues, the US seeks the cooperation of the European states and attempts to bring other states like China and Japan or Russia on board or attempts to dilute their opposition.

Such an international environment makes it difficult for a powerful state to pursue international agenda by itself in a unilateral manner. Now, the capacity of a state to strike a bargain on a “give and take” basis strengthens its role at the global level.

The role of abstract ideology has declined in the present day global order. Ideological divides of the Cold War era are permeated by pragmatic and practical considerations. Coalition-building and partnership in the global system depend on the political and economic dividends a state can offer. This means that isolation is not a policy option even for major powers because they can no longer pursue their global agenda in a unilateral and unchallenged manner.

The present day global system has also re-articulated the notion of national security. Traditionally, national security assigned most attention to external and territorial threats emanating from beyond the territorial boundaries of a state. These were primarily military threats and required a military response. The general argument was that if a state has enough military capability in terms of professional personnel, armament and weaponry, it can secure its territory, people, the system of governance and the core values of the political system. Such a security system also provide a safety against internal strife and dissident movements because these

were not expected to succeed without external support. If national security is linked only to military capability and taken to its extreme, the state becomes a “security state” where external security considerations override all other national priorities.

In the 21st century, the focus has shifted to what is described as the comprehensive security that recognizes the relevance of traditional or territorial security but views it as inadequate. It underlines the need of pairing territorial security with the socio-economic measures to ensure societal and human security. The internal turmoil or near collapse of some states in Africa and elsewhere in the early 1990s shifted the focus from territory to human beings, society and internal non-military threats to the nation-state.

Modern communication and information technologies provide ample opportunity to a state to undermine internal harmony and stability of an adversary state without physically crossing the territorial borders. The attention began to be focused on internal, human and societal security issues with the holding of the UN sponsored Disarmament and Development Conferences in 1976 and 1982, publication of two reports by the Willy Brandt Commission (1980) and the Olaf Palme Commission (1982), and the work done by the United Nations Human Development Programme in the 1990s. The UN Millennium Goals (2000-2015) and the UN Sustainable Development Goals (2015-2030) highlight the need of taking measures for human and societal development to avoid internal fragmentation of the states or their failure to discharge basic obligations towards citizenry.

The global system at the beginning of the third decade of the 21st century also requires astute diplomacy on the part of a state to play a dynamic role at the global and regional levels.

The traditional concept of diplomacy has been expanded to cover four types of activities. First and the principal type of diplomacy is official interaction which is critical to pursue the national interests. The quality of official diplomacy matters most. How professional are the diplomats in pursuing the national agenda at the bilateral and multilateral levels and especially in various global forums and organizations? For successful diplomacy calls for addressing the concerns of the international community rather than simply telling others what you want to tell them. While narrating one’s perspective on contentious issues, it is important to address the issues and concerns raised by various players, i.e. states, international organizations and societal groups in other states.

The second type of activity includes non-official interaction that essentially involves the societal groups, especially the media and academia. This type of interaction can continue even if the official interaction is hindered for one reason or another. Important messages can be passed on through non-official channels, especially the media, for managing the troubled relations. Though the issues and problems pertaining to relations between the countries are handled by official channels, non-official sources and channels can pass on messages and signals to other side which set the stage for official interaction. There are several examples of initial messaging through non-official or informal channels that subsequently led to official interaction or meeting between the top leaders. This category also includes different tracks of non-official or semi-official diplomacy.

Third dimension of diplomacy suggests building or enhancing positive relevance of a state with the international system. This happens when states cultivate economic interdependence. How relevant a state is in the context of globalization that calls for greater movement of goods, services, people, technology and ideas across the territorial boundaries of states? Similarly, positive relevance is enhanced by access to markets and opportunities for foreign investment. If protectionism in terms of tariff and non-tariff barriers and bureaucratic procedures or corruption in the government discourages foreign investment and trade, the state loses out in the international system. Economic ties and linkages increase the importance of a country in the international system. Such facilities for economic interaction are available on a reciprocal basis.

Fourth dimension of diplomacy is described as the soft diplomacy or soft power that seems to have acquired much importance during the last two decades. This implies persuasion and attractiveness rather than the use of coercion to change the behavior of a state. The states persuade other states by identifying with the values that are respected by them. This also means convincing others of genuineness of your demands and making them share your preferred outcome. Attractiveness means drawing attention of others to your state and society through history and heritage, culture, arts and architecture, music and sports, technological and academic excellence and tourism. Heritage and cultural artifacts going back to many centuries draw much attention at the international level. For countries like Pakistan Indus Valley Civilization and Mehrgarh archeological excavations in Balochistan show a rich and diverse civilizational and cultural heritage. Major holy places of Sikhs and a rich Buddhist heritage are located in Pakistan. These historical sites provide an opportunity to Pakistan to project its soft image by encouraging religious tourism for Sikhs and Buddhists all over the world. Similarly,

a state can strengthen its reputation and diplomatic clout at the international level by identifying with the universally recognized values like democracy, human rights, the rule of law, humanitarian assistance to fight natural and man-made calamities, humanitarian assistance to refugees and displaced people, human development programmes and participation in UN peacekeeping mission. If all this is paired with economic interdependence, the state improves the prospects for generating goodwill at the global level.

These are some of the characteristics of the present day global system. Let us now review how the global system covered the long span of history and reached to the present day multi-layered and somewhat anarchic context towards the end of the second decade of the 21st century.

Evolution of the Global System

The roots of the present-day state-dominated global system can be traced back to 1648 when the Thirty-Year war in Europe between Catholics and Protestants came to an end. A new political order emerged through the Peace Treaty of Westphalia, October 1648. The church could no longer claim authority over the rulers of European states who began to be recognized as sovereign rulers with no supra-state religious authority commanding them. The notions of territorial state and non-interference in internal affairs of a state is traced back to the outcome of the Westphalian Peace Treaty.

It was during the next hundred years or so that, in Europe, especially in what is today Germany, the above notions of sovereign state and sovereign ruler and non-interference in internal affairs were grounded firmly. Laws and precedents, including the practice of holding inter-state conferences, for managing inter-state relations developed gradually during this period. It was during the 18th and 19th century that European and British state system began to develop firmly. The United States declared its independence in July 1776 and established its federal constitution in 1789. The other important state system was the Ottoman Empire. A large number of Asian and African states gradually went under European and British colonial rule. The important developments that had implications for the state system in Europe were the Congress of Vienna, (November 1814-June 1815), the French Revolution, 1789, and the Napoleonic era (1799-1815), the Quadruple Alliance (November 1815), the Holly Alliance (September 1815) and the Rise of Germany in 1871 onwards and the Balance of Power system that continued to function in Europe until the beginning of the first World War (1914-18).

The inter-war period (1918-1939) witnessed several important developments. These include the entry of the United States in global politics, the formation and failure of League of Nations (1919-1939), a number of alliances in Europe in the 1920s, the emergence of new states in the Middle East, rise of totalitarianism in Europe (Germany and Italy), continuation of British and European colonialism in Asia and Africa, World War-II (1939-45) and the use of nuclear weapons by the US in Japan in August 1945.

The global system experienced many changes in the post-World War-II period. These were the setting up of the United Nations, decolonization in Asia and Europe, and the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union against the backdrop of their nuclear weapons. Subsequently, some other states also acquired nuclear weapons, and the Non-alignment Movement (NAM) questioned the rationale of the Cold War.

The Post World War-II global system began with Bipolarity between the US and the Soviet Union but as they rearticulated their Cold War relations and adopted the policy of *Détente*, the global system moved to multi-polarity by the 1970s.

The post-World War-II global system, dominated by the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union, was described as the bipolar global system against the backdrop of their nuclear weapons. The US initiated the NATO (1949) for ensuring North American-Western European security. The US also launched regional security alliances in different parts of the world to advance its agenda of containment of Communism and Soviet influence. The Soviet Union established the WARSAW Pact (1955) for coordination of the Soviet and Eastern European security arrangements. This was also a response to the NATO.

The global system changed gradually as the two super powers reviewed their bilateral relations, especially their conventional and nuclear security systems, and adopted *détente* as the main principle for their bilateral relations. This reduced tensions at the global level and shifted the global system from bipolarity to multi-polarity by early 1970s. However, the US and the Soviet Union continued to contest each other on global issues and are still engaged in proxy wars in the developing countries.

Major Changes in the Global System

The global system dominated by two super powers and their alliance system changed gradually due to a host of developments in the bilateral relationship of the super powers and changes elsewhere during 1979-1991. The following can be identified as the main drivers of change:

- The Islamic Revolution in Iran in February 1979 that dislodged an extremely pro-America regime there. This change in Iran was viewed as a setback for the US interests in Middle East and started a confrontation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the US on November 4, 1979, a group of hardline Iranian students seized the US embassy in Tehran, taking over 60 people as hostages. Women and some people were released but 52 American diplomats and officials remained confined to the embassy. These hostages were released by the Iranian government in January 20, 1981.
- Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, December 27, 1979; and a global effort led by the US and supported by Saudi Arabia and other conservative Arab states to build Afghan-Islamic resistance mainly in Pakistan to fight the Soviet troops in Afghanistan.
- After the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, February 1989 in fighting began among the Afghan groups caused a new type of civil strife in Afghanistan with a spillover in Pakistan. Some Afghan war veterans began to look for new targets of their Jihad elsewhere.
- The gradual collapse of Eastern European Soviet system, 1989-90.
- Unification of Germany as East Germany joins West Germany, October 3, 1990.
- Iraq's invasion and capture of Kuwait, August 2, 1990.
- The success of the US led military coalition in dislodging Iraq from Kuwait, January-February 1991.
- Formal end of the Cold War, November 1990.
- Breakup of the Soviet Union, December 25, 1991.

From the perspective of the global system, the most significant development was the gradual erosion of the Soviet control of Eastern European states who rejected the centralized and controlled political system and adopted some elements of western liberal democracy in 1989-90. This development overlapped with the meeting of 22 members of the NATO and the WARSAW Pact in Paris on 19th November 1990 and issued a joint nonaggression declaration that

marked the end of the Cold War between the two super powers. They agreed to “build new partnerships and extend to each other the hand of friendship.” Later 12 other states endorsed the joint statement of November 19 and talked of amity, free elections and free economy.

On February 25, 1991, the foreign and defence ministers of the WARSAW countries met in Hungary and decided to abandon the WARSAW Pact, which was formally ended on July 1, 1991. The NATO continued but it gradually redefined its role after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of Eastern Europe.

After the collapse of Eastern Europe, unification of Germany and the formal ending of the Cold War, the US felt triumphant as it had pushed aside its main rival, the Soviet Union, and its ideology. More successes came to the US. It successfully led the military coalition that dislodged Saddam Hussain’s military from Kuwait and rehabilitated its independence (February 1991). In the same year, the WARSAW Pact came to an end and the Soviet Union began to collapse as some of its republics declared independence. Mikhail Gorbachev lost his political clout in 1990-91, and barely survived a coup attempt in August 1991. While his political fortune was on the decline, Boris Yeltsin, President of Russian Federation, slowly nibbled the authority of the Soviet Union and Gorbachev. This set the stage for the breakup of the Soviet Union. A number of Soviet Republics declared their independence or began to function independently without declaring independence. As the Soviet economy faltered and several republics declared their independence, these Republics formed the Commonwealth of Independent States in early December 1991. The expected end of the Soviet Union came in the evening of December 25, 1991, as Gorbachev resigned as the President of the Soviet Union and the Soviet flag was lowered for the last time. The flag of the Russian Federation took its place. On the morning of December 26, the Russian federation government under President Boris Yeltsin replaced the Soviet government system in an orderly and peaceful manner.

The Post-Cold War Era

The political developments in 1989-91 created a strong sense of victory in the US and western allies who argued that western democracy and free economy have triumphed in the global system. It was viewed as the beginning of era dominated by the ideas of liberal, democratic and capitalist system. Soon after the success of the US led coalition in dislodging Iraq from Kuwait, US President George Bush addressed the joint session of the Congress on March 6, 1991, declaring that

“until now, the world we have known has been a divided world, a world of barbed wire and concrete block, conflict and cold war.... And now, we can see a new world order coming into view. A world in which there is a very real prospect of a new world order.” In the State of the Union address on January 28, 1992, President George Bush talked of American victory in the Cold War and said: “A world once divided into two armed camps now recognizes one sole and preeminent power, the United States of America.”

Since 1991-92, the terms of “New World Order” and the US as the “sole super power” and “uni-polarity” in place of “multi-polarity” became popular jargons in the political discourse in the US and the European countries. The rest of the world also picked up these terms after the breakup of the Soviet Union.

The US highlighted a democratic and humane agenda for the New World Order. This included democracy and human rights, human development measures, free economy, environmental issues, refugees and displaced people, nonproliferation and control of weapons of mass destruction, especially the nuclear weapons.

The New World Order emphasized the abstract principles of American/Western political mindset, democracy and constitutionalism and liberal economics. Some American scholars attempted to explain the onset of the post-Cold War world and its possible future direction. Francis Fukuyama in his book “The End of History and the Last Man” (1992) described the end of the Cold War as the recognition of the legitimacy of liberal democracy which he described as the “end point of mankind’s ideological evolution.” In his opinion liberal democracy was the “final form of human government.” Samuel P. Huntington in his article which appeared in Foreign Affairs in 1993 and his book “The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order” (1996) talked of new sources of conflict in the post-Cold War era. He divided the world into several major civilizations and argued that the primary source of conflict in the world is going to be the “people’s cultural and religious identities.” Paul Kennedy in his book “Preparing for the 21st century (1993) identifies the major trends that would pose challenges in the future. These include impact of new technologies that have challenged many traditional assumptions, fast growing demographic imbalances in the world, especially increase in population in poor countries, threats to natural environment, depletion of resources, refugees and movement of people and global telecommunication revolution and impact on economic aspirations of people. Currently, these problems are challenging the human and societal development policies all over the

world, especially in the states of Asia and Africa. Paul Kennedy and his associates published another book “The Pivotal States” (1999), urging the US policy makers to focus mainly on 9 pivotal countries, that included Algeria, Brazil, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, South Africa and Turkey, and six pivotal issues that included population, migrations, environment, human rights, ethnic conflicts, and international finance and trade.

Despite the high-sounding American agenda for the post-Cold War world, its operational strategy was, as in the past, selective in pursuing this agenda. There was hardly any consistent approach towards the international and regional issues. The overriding consideration was to restructure the global system to American satisfaction before other competing players emerge to contest American approach. Further, any perceived challenge to American global strategy was dealt with by military and non-military means. Though the US did not have any real competitor at the global level at least until well into the first decade of the 21st century, different problems cropped up that caused uncertainty in global politics and threatened peace and stability. Global politics continued to be volatile and some the developments threatened American interest or it got entangled into problem because of its ambition for molding regional or global situation to its advantage. The US focused primarily on elimination of threats to its security and primacy in the global system either by a state or by a non-state entity; protection of its trade and economic interests located outside its territory; and support to pro-US regimes anywhere in the world.

Regional stability in the post-Cold War era was threatened by internal turmoil and conflict and tribal wars in many states. Some African states experienced internal turmoil and human killings in the 1990s. These included Somalia, Rwanda, Congo, Sierra Leone, and Ivory Coast. It was because of internal chaos in these states that some scholars began to talk about the “failed” or “failing” states and attempted to create a criterion to evaluate the internal capacity of the state to perform its basic obligations towards citizenry. Robert Kaplan talked of “The Coming Anarchy” in his article published in the Atlantic in February 1994. Yugoslavia, a European state, also underwent internal conflict and breakup in the 1990s. Several other countries experienced internal turmoil in the first and second decade of the 21st century. These were Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen. All this underlined the need of devoting greater attention to the internal dynamics of diversified states in terms of ethnicity and tribalism, languages and regions, other parochial identities and economic disparities. Other issues that attracted global attention included floods, tsunamis, earthquakes, food shortage and famine,

epidemics and refugees and internal displacement of human beings, drugs and human smuggling.

Terrorism emerged as the key security issue in the international system after the terrorist attacks in the US on September 11, 2001, by an Al-Qaeda sponsored group of young people. It exposed the vulnerability of the US to a new kind of threat that was undertaken by a transnational organization that could not be easily located. The US initiated global war on terrorism with the sanction of the UN Security Council. Pakistan joined this global effort to eliminate terrorism. In October 2001, the US and its allies launched an air attack on Afghanistan to dislodge the Taliban government that was accused of allowing the Al-Qaeda to use Afghanistan territory for terrorist activities that resulted in the terrorist attacks in the US. Though the US dislodged the Taliban government from Kabul in early November and installed a new government on December 22, 2001, under Hamid Karzai, its problems did not end in Afghanistan. Since then transnational terrorism has emerged as the key issue of global politics because it threatens peace and stability in many states.

Instead of working towards Afghanistan's economic rehabilitation and reconstruction after the exit of the Taliban, the US shifted its attention to Iraq and started work to dislodge Saddam Hussain's government. It launched a military offensive in Iraq in March 2003, without any authorization from the UN Security Council. The US justified its action by claiming its right to engage in unilateral action in order to preempt Saddam Hussain's use of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Subsequently, it was established that there were no Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq. The US military action established a dangerous precedent of unilateralism and preemption for taking military action against a country.

The US military action in Afghanistan and Iraq, and especially the linking of terrorism with Islam by a good number of American and other western public leaders and writers, caused a strain in the relationship between the Muslim world and the US. The anti-US sentiments resurged in the non-official circles in the Muslim countries. Their governments were somewhat cautious in expressing their reservations on American counter-terrorism policies.

As the US shifted its attention from Afghanistan to Iraq in 2003, the Taliban were able to resurface in Afghanistan and challenged the authority of the Kabul government. Similarly, the US faced difficulties in Iraq. In December 2011, it withdrew its troops from Iraq. Its troops were withdrawn from Afghanistan by the

end of December 2016 leaving behind 8400 troops. In the beginning of 2019, the US has about 14000 troops and support staff based in Afghanistan. It started direct negotiation with the Afghan Taliban in 2018 for evolving a political agreement that would provide a basis for the US to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan. Even if such an agreement is made in 2019 and American troops are withdrawn totally or partially, Afghanistan will take years to return to normal and peaceful political life and economic stability.

The talk of the victory of liberal democracy in the US was accompanied by an emphasis on free economy as advocated by western capitalist ideology. Economic interaction across the territorial boundaries of states increased in pace and volume because of the introduction of modern communication and Information technology, satellite TV and radio and internet based communications, and increased travel facilities. The Western world began to talk about globalization which was an updated version of capitalism and free economy. It emphasized privatization with an advice for a minimum, if any, state role in business and industrial activities. This domain should be left to the private sector.

Globalization advocated free movement of goods, services, ideas and people across the territorial boundaries of the state. That a state must ensure a profit-oriented environment for foreign investment and provide market access to international trade. The emphasis on globalization and privatization strategies strengthened the role of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Multi-National Corporations (MNCs).

Globalization and the advancements in communication and information technologies have challenged the traditional concept of sovereign state and inviolability of territorial boundaries. The internal environment of the state has become more vulnerable to external penetration and intervention than in the past. This has created three challenging issues for developing states where the notion of statehood and nationhood are not firmly established. First, the growing economic and societal dependence on external sources has constrained the autonomy in pursuing economic and social policies. This is more so for the states that depend heavily on international financial institution or rich and industrialized states for financial support and loans.

Second, if the role of the state is being reduced in the economic domain, should it still adopt measures to protect the rights of the poor and under-privileged? Should it intervene in the economic domain to ensure socio-economic

justice and equity in a society where economic disparities are increasing? These are serious issues for internal political and social harmony and peace. These cannot be left to the good will of the private sector.

Third, modern communication and information technology and globalization have made state security vulnerable to new types of threats across the territorial boundaries. These developments enable the state and even transnational groups to penetrate the state and influence its internal political, economic and societal dynamics. It is now relatively easy for the states to exploit internal weaknesses and contradictions in the adversarial state without physically entering the state. The states with internal dissident activity, ethnic, tribal and other sub-or supra-political movements and separatism are now relatively easily vulnerable to external adversary's propaganda, financial and political support to some dissident movement. The neighboring countries can provide safe-havens and other facilities for such activities. This has given a new dimension to internal and external security of the state.

There are already visible strains between the imperatives of globalization and the need to control transnational terrorist activity. The latter activity makes it necessary to put security restrictions on movement of people, goods, funds and ideas across the territorial boundaries. Globalization resists all this and talks about free trade and movement of people and goods among the states. The balancing of the demands of globalization and needs of counter-terrorism strategies has become a challenging task for most states, especially those states that are unable to assert their supremacy within their territorial boundaries.

An important feature of global politics that is likely to become more profound in the 3rd decade of the 21st century is the growing political focus on Asia-Pacific and the notion of Asia-Pivot. The 21st century is now often referred to as the Asian century with the rise of China, Japan South Korea and Malaysia as hubs of economic activity. Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam and the Philippines are endeavouring to move in this direction. The Russian Federation is working towards assuming an active role at the global level in general and the regions around in particular.

The Asia-Pacific region states also made strides in science and technology, paid special attention to human resource development, and offered opportunities for trade and investment.

This shows a shift from Atlantic-Europe based politics to Asia-Pacific focused politics. The US has developed much interest in the economies of this region which brings it in competition with China. It is going to be a competition where positive and negative interaction will go on simultaneously. Both have stakes in cooperation in the economic domains while contesting each other's politico-economic agenda at the same time. Much depends how China on the one hand and the US and its regional allies on the other cope with the conflicts in the South China Sea region.

China's 'One Belt One Road' (OBOR) project emphasizes global economic connectivity. One OBOR economic activity is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) that links China's Xinjiang region with Pakistani seaport of Gwadar. On completion of this project, it will generate a lot of economic activity between China and Pakistan. This Corridor is expected to be linked with the Middle East and Central Asia in due course of time, creating strong economic linkages between Pakistan and the regions around. This connectivity will enhance the importance of these regions and contribute to Pakistan's active role in the neighbouring regions. The US may have reservations on the OBOR related economic corridors but it is not likely to jeopardize the overall economic and political interaction with China.

Russia has also become active in Asian politics. It works relatively smoothly with China on regional security and economy in Central and South Asia and Asia-Pacific region. It has maintained a functional relationship with the US which often encounters strains and setbacks, although this relationship is not expected to degenerate to the Cold War era rivalry.

Concluding Observations

The global system has changed a lot since the days of Westphalian peace. However, the 21st century appears to be much different from the earlier phases of human history. The immediate roots of the differentiated 21st century's global politics can be traced back to the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. It resulted in the ascendancy of the US as the sole super power. Such a skewed global power structure gradually changed to a uni-multipolar world wherein the US continued to be the most powerful military power but there emerged many autonomous power centers in the global system that made it difficult for the US to obtain tangible political dividends from its military and economic preponderance.

Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrated the military outreach of the US. However, the post invasion issues in Afghanistan and Iraq, especially their internal turmoil, showed that the military outreach did not necessarily ensure continued ascendancy in the global system. American role declined mainly due to the gradual rise of other states in the 21st century, emergence of complex socio-economic issues, internal turmoil in some states and sprouting of transnational terrorism as a difficult security issue.

There are now multiple power centers in the global system, making it more complex and anarchic. No single state is in a position to command it by itself. Now, several states and non-state entities can impinge of the global processes. In such complex global system, a state's success depends on working with other states and winning over these states to one's worldview.

The experience of the states of Asia and Africa, especially the economic rise of Asia-Pacific region, shows that the states derive their basic strength from their internal political and societal harmony and economic stability. The inner strength of the state enables it to withstand external pressures and play an active role in regional and global politics. The states that have given attention to economic development, human and societal development and socio-economic justice seem to have better managed their affairs. Internal political coherence and economic stability also makes it easy for a state to join bilateral and multilateral economic networks and cultivate positive and rewarding interaction with the rest of the world.

The regionally powerful states have a tendency to assert their military and economic superiority in their immediate neighbourhood. This challenge can be met primarily by domestic political and economic strengths, military preparedness, and by the use of what is described as the smart power--a combination of hard and soft power. There is a need for mobilization of diplomatic support at the global level; winning over other states, especially the major powers, to one's worldview. This requires both official and non-official diplomacy and a comprehensive understanding of global power dynamics. The 21st century is the age of alertness about one's national interests, sustaining internal strengths of the state, paying attention to human resource development and maintaining a positive collaboration with the rest of the world.

NOTES

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FREEDOM AND SECURITY IN THE CHANGING TIMES

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Abstract

We live in exceptionally dangerous times. The state is being weakened and indignified and the citizens are facing greater existential challenges because of what Mary Kaldor calls 'the new wars'. These wars are associated with state weakness, extremist identity politics and transnational criminality. Furthermore, the rise of Trumpian version of nationalism and national interest and emergence of populist absolutist regimes and trends in a number of countries are attacking the very foundation of the liberal, progressive, democratic state. The solution being enthusiastically offered is rapid development and expanded security at the cost of freedoms. It seems as if the world has reached a stage where it has to respond to a fundamental question: does a state attain greater degree of security by reducing freedom or does it make itself more insecure by doing so? This paper attempts to answer this question.

Keywords: Freedom, Security, Changing Times, New Wars, Ethnic Cleansing, Genocide in Rwanda, Political Thinking.

Introduction

Time has always been changing, unsettling. Any attempt to cage it even for a moment is bound to fail. Time is free like wind. It flows freely and flies freely. Its wings cannot be clipped, and its flight cannot be halted. Similarly, human imagination is free and boundless. It also cannot be caged. Virginia Woolf, English writer and novelist, and one of the most important 20th century modernist authors, says: 'Lock up your libraries if you like; but there is no gate, no lock, and no bolt that you can set upon the freedom of my mind'¹.

However, history is full of instances, accounts, and narratives about powerful persons, institutions and forces, attempting to freeze time, fossilize

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human imagination and impose a perpetual era of status quo - and failing. Arrayed against the philosophers of innovation and fosterers of new ideas and new movements, the sophists of authority have almost always responded by painting the images of omnipotence and invincibility of the church, monarchy, absolute rulers and the increasingly visible new power gods - the establishment, the economic forces, and the democratically elected populist despots - and by reducing (read abolishing) freedoms. Numerous examples can be given to illustrate the point.

For example, in order to hypnotize and prevail upon the common people, the church always bluffed by reiterating that it was never interested in temporal power and projected itself as the caretaker and protector of God's Kingdom on earth and as a custodian and promoter of spiritual and moral power. It used all the power and influence at its command and rarely, if ever, shied away from resorting to different kinds of violence to perpetuate the reign and rule of the church, and consolidate the religiopolitical order based on status quo, suppression, and exploitation. However, despite all the power at its command, the church couldn't stop the arriving time, changing time, from arriving and unsettling the carefully crafted architecture of papal power and supremacy. In due course of time, this institution which had drastically diminished common people's freedom in the name of providing security to the Kingdom of God on earth had to be contended with drastically reduced power and influence.

In the same way, the concept of divine rights of the king was invented to freeze time and perpetuate the reign and rule of the king over the common people. The kings were the next power god, after the clergy, planted in the name of serving the human societies and acting as bulwark against the same common people. Many of them proved to be the monster gods. They tried their best to imprison time, annihilate new ideas, proliferate suppression, unleash terror to obtain the allegiance of the masses and ensure the security, continuity, and dominance of the institution of monarchy for all times to come. But this was not to be.

Neither violence nor suppression could help the monarchs hold their sway forever. The monarchs fell, one after another, in different parts of the world. It was, however, not a normal game of regime change. No longer was a monarch falling and another rising. Times had changed. In these changing times, the institution of monarchy itself was almost swept away. Once the gates of the city of a kingdom were torn down by the invading hordes, the gates of the cities of other kingdoms couldn't be saved for long from the assaults of the other invading hordes. Power

was soon seized by those who raised the slogan of 'Liberty, Equality, Fraternity', who proclaimed the dawn of a new time, a new era, and a new beginning, and promised a government of the people, by the people, and for the people. Time was never the same for the rulers and the ruled after the French revolution.

However, the common people were still far away from the centre of the stage. The champions of democratic ideal and proud inheritors of the historic human rights documents like the Magna Carta, Declaration of Independence by the thirteen united states of America, Declaration of the Rights of the Man and of the Citizens, and the United States Bill of Rights could neither bring about an instant abolishment of the institution of slavery in the US and elsewhere, nor could they summon the quick termination of European colonialism in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The institution of slavery and European colonialism continued to thrive for long, and defended violence, suppression and injustice in the name of consolidating the security and reputation of slavery-and colonialism- empowering power structures. However, the slave masters who were acting like power gods and the colonial power gods had to exit the stage in disgrace when the changing times struck, and the unjust institutions of power and influence were razed to the ground.

Unfortunately, most of the postcolonial societies miserably failed in managing themselves. Sooner or later, many of them were seized by ruthless authoritarian rulers, who converted them into national security states, drastically curtailed freedoms, and caused massive human rights tragedies and disasters. Caught in the traps laid by the Cold War, neo-colonialism, confrontational, violent and exploitative governance at local, bilateral, regional and international levels, and bled and pauperized by the unending arms races and frequently erupting wars within, a number of them were condemned to be ruled by absolutist rulers, and suffered gradual reduction of freedoms and rights, wearing numerous visible and invisible chains.

The beauty of time is that it cannot be put in chains. It never was. As such, it couldn't be prevented from producing visionary people, thinkers with new ideas, thinkers offering new theories of salvation and change. Whatever the circumstances, it continued to produce leaders who challenged the theology and pathology of power, advocated freedom and justice, opposed governance through violent means and demolished the political, religious, cultural and security myths which had paralyzed the human societies. In short, the time could never be forced away from performing its historic task of launching movements for change and

freedom. The societies that learnt lessons from history – both theirs and others’ – , agreed to flow with the flow of time and changed themselves with the changing times and survived, progressed and flourished. Those which tried to build barriers around time, and stay in power unleashing suppression, status quo, violence and injustice were swept aside when the tides turned inward and the dam burst. For their own survival, progress and security, the contemporary societies need to listen to the whisper of the changing times. The whisper is now getting louder than voice. It is asking us to be contemporaneous and futuristic, and work for a new relationship between freedom and security.

When viewed from the above perspective, a study on freedom and security becomes highly relevant for our contemporary times. Such a study is, in fact, the need of the hour. True that not much discussion on the relationship between freedom and security had been done by the academia, concerned research organizations and policy making forums. In fact, the two terms have been presented, in general, as two opposing viewpoints navigating around the zero-sum game. The advocates of security at all costs and by all means seem to hold the view that: a) security is much more important than freedom; b) any enlargement of freedom will result in diminished security; and c) security, by nature, is a highly secretive and closely guarded state enterprise and any enlargement of freedom would expose the enterprise to all sorts of hazard, including the intentional or unintentional revelation of state secrets.

On the other hand, the apostles of peace, democracy, liberalism and freedom maintain that: a) freedom empowers the common citizens and strengthens human societies; b) freedom puts a check on adventurism and diminishes its temptation to resolve conflicts through violent means; c) freedom encourages alternative thinking, and pressurizes the policy makers to explore ways and means to resolve conflicts through peaceful and non-military means; and d) absence of freedom leads to war, violence, disintegration of states, and enhanced insecurities.

These two viewpoints need to be studied with all seriousness because we are living in dangerous times, when the states are increasingly turning authoritarian and acting like monsters against their own citizens in the name of national security imperatives. This tendency needs to be curtailed and controlled, otherwise the peoples, the societies and the civilizations will be overwhelmed by the anarchic forces, and the future of the future will be in great danger.

Hence, the need for an open and focused discussion on the complex relationship between freedom and security. Such a discussion is all the more required now because the concept of security has been broadened to a large extent. Likewise, the concept of freedom has been considerably enlarged. However, the two terms, the two concepts, and the two ideas continue to remain distant and separate from each other. It is, indeed, puzzling, because the world has changed so much, but these terms and ideas are still viewed from the perspective of zero-sum game. These continue to be presented as two opposite, warring, rivaling, confronting ideas busy checkmating each other, outgunning one another. Should the world continue to be a hostage of such a dangerous approach? Or should there be an effort to explore and examine the possibility of turning them into complementary conceptual and strategic ideas? What, in short, needs to be asked in these changing times is this: does a state attain greater degree of security by reducing freedom or does it make itself more insecure by reducing freedom? The present study makes an attempt to answer this question.

Equally importantly, the present study, focusing on the complex relationship between freedom and security, aims at filling-in the gap in research and mainstreaming the issue in the contemporary strategic, security and political debate. Clearly, there is a need for it as the issue concerns the life and well-being of billions of peoples of the world. It also concerns the future of governance at all levels and the future of the weakening and retreating territorial states. This kind of study may be viewed as a sort of natural extension of the pioneering ideas produced in the recent times on related areas concerning war and peace, security and development, and freedom. It is for this reason that the present study claims to benefit immensely from the remarkable works produced by a number of scholars like Johan Galtung, Richard Falk, Gene Sharp, Wolfgang Dietrich, Robert Johansen, Elise Boulding, Glenn D Paige, Ikuro Anzai, Peter van den Dungen, Kazuyo Yamane, Jonathan Schell, Amartya Sen, and scores of others and relates to some of their ideas on war, peace and security in the present study on freedom and security. This study has, in fact, been prepared keeping in view that comprehensive, focused, well-researched, pioneering and path-breaking studies on the important issue of freedom and security are still awaited. The sooner such works appear the better for the military institutions, governments, civil societies and the common people everywhere, and especially for the countries which are ruled by authoritarian regimes.

This paper is an attempt in this direction. It revolves around the emerging challenges and threats to the relationship between freedom and security, and

stresses the need to strengthen the local, regional and international governance by enhancing freedoms at a time when terrorism is visibly on decline, and when the world military spending is on the rise.

According to a report released on 29 April 2019 by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), total world military expenditure rose to US \$ 1822 trillion in 2018, representing an increase of 2.6 percent from 2017. This increase marks the highest level in military spending since 1988 - the first year for which global data is available². The report adds that the world military spending in 2018 was 76 percent higher than the post-Cold War low in 1998. It points out that the increase was mainly due to increase in the military spending of two global powers: the United States and China. According to the report, the US military spending increased for the first time in seven years to reach \$ 649 billion or 36% of total global military expenditure, and there was a rise of 5% in the military spending of China (\$ 250 billion), the second biggest spender. The next to follow in the list of top ten spenders were Saudi Arabia, India, France, Russia, Britain, Germany, Japan, and South Korea³. Furthermore, India increased its military spending in 2018 by 3.1% to \$ 66.5 billions⁴.

The phenomenal increase in the world military spending clearly suggests that the post-Cold War expectations for a people-based defense and not weapon-based defense and the expectations of sustained peace through defensive defense and not offensive defense couldn't be realized. It also suggests that the global strategic environment would continue to be fueled by the US-China confrontation. Likewise, the regional strategic environment in the Middle East would continue to be fueled by Saudi-Iran confrontation. As a result, the insecurities of the common people in the world at large and in different regions as well as in the European region dominated by Russia would further increase because of the raging arms races, and also because of the diversion of resources from common people's well-being programs to militarization programs. It is very likely that the further militarization and weaponization of the world at large and different regions would directly or indirectly cause further curtailment of freedoms and weakening of the civil society organizations in different countries. 'Global security', observes Dan Smith in his introductory write-up on international stability and human security in the SIPRI Yearbook 2018, 'has deteriorated markedly in the past decade'. He says that despite major multilateral arrangements including the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Paris Agreement on Climate Change in 2015, 'many global indicators of peace and security continue to regress'⁵. It is, therefore, likely that the relationship between freedom and security may deteriorate in the future.

In fact, a series of developments has already impacted the relationship between freedom and security in the post cold period. These include the prolonged violence in the Middle East, Africa and South Asia, Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, the support it extended to the separatist forces in Eastern Ukraine, increase in the number of states possessing nuclear weapons in Asia, ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia, genocide in Rwanda, forced regime changes through unconstitutional means, eruption and escalation of terrorism and foreign military interventions in different regions and countries. These and numerous other depressing developments have caused concern for the future and raised a number of questions regarding the reversal of gains in peaceful relations since the cold war, durability of the international security structure, and the possible impending of the management of increased conflict risks due to strategic competition of major powers⁶. In the given context, a question that should be asked is this: should the life, property and freedom of the humans and especially commons be allowed to be sacrificed, again and again, on the altar of national security and in the name of that fictional construct commonly known as national interest? This question deserves serious attention now when the particularist and reductionist notion about nations - the imagined communities imprisoned within the confines of the territorial states, is being increasingly challenged⁷, and when the notions of common security, co-operative security, borderless security, warless world, and security through the well-being of all, including the inhabitants of the imagined and invented enemy states, are being put forward with innovative ideas and rather convincing arguments⁸.

The points raised above regarding the sacrifice of freedom at the altar of security generate additional concern and discomfort when the issue of freedom-security relationship is examined in the light of certain real happenings that took place in the post-Cold War period covering a little more than twenty-five years. As mentioned above, this is the period that witnessed and suffered genocide and ethnic cleansing, explosion of terrorism and enhanced insecurities for the state and public institutions, civilian and military personnel and those belonging to other law enforcing bodies. In addition, it also witnessed the murder of freedom at the altar of security and in the name of national interest in a number of countries including India, Israel, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria.

This was not what was widely expected after the triumph of pro-democracy movements in the Soviet-controlled Eastern European countries in the late 1980s, the collapse of the Soviet Empire in 1991, and termination of the Cold War in the early 1990s. Then the widely held expectation was that peace would now flourish in

Europe and elsewhere, militarism, nuclearism, and jingoism would substantially diminish, the common people would finally be at the centre of the stage in different countries, the security forces would return to the barracks, the rainbow of democracy would dance around, and freedom would bloom and blossom everywhere. But all this was not to be.

A series of happenings in the post-Cold War period dealt a heavy blow to the already deteriorating relationship between freedom and security. On 26 December 1991, the Soviet Union got itself officially dissolved, and by January 1992, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ceased to exist. A year later, in January 1993, the voluntary and peaceful dissolution of Czechoslovakia, another socialist and another European state, into the Czech Republic and Slovakia took place. The dissolution of these territorial states, taking place in quick succession, sent shivers in the corridors of power in many developed and developing countries. A number of them, including India, Sudan, Turkey, Spain, Nigeria, Zaire, Zambia, Algeria, Uganda and many others facing strong separatist movements and tendencies, took strong measures to control and weaken such movements and tendencies. The measures included political, economic, and security measures and almost invariably resulted in the further strengthening of the state apparatus and disappearance of discussion and debate on controversial but crucial national and territorial issues from public, academic and political forums, and curtailment of freedoms. It was the fear of territorial loss that often drove countries like India, China, Spain, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, Turkey, Iraq and others to opt for stronger security measures and reduced freedoms.

While the fear that scores of states would collapse and disintegrate after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia subsequently subsided, and most of the states somehow managed to hold, the emerging post-Cold War international, regional, and local political, economic, and security order received severe jolt when what Mary Kaldor calls 'the new wars' arrived. Kaldor, Professor of Global Governance and Director of Civil Society and Human Security Research Unit at the London School of Economics and Political Science, says in the preface to the third edition of her path-breaking study entitled *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* that the report regarding the decline of war in the 21st century as suggested by the annual reports of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program is essentially about the 'old wars' the world had known for many years. She adds that the world is now facing a new kind of war or 'new wars' and observes that the 'new wars are wars in which difference between internal and external is blurred; they are both global and local; and they are different from both classic

inter-state wars and classic civil wars⁹. Pointing out that the 'new wars' involve 'networks of state and non-state actors and most violence is directed against civilians', Kaldor adds¹⁰:

While we should celebrate the decline of 'old war', we cannot rest on our laurels; we need to be able to address the main contemporary sources of insecurity. In large parts of the world - Central Asia, East Africa or Central Africa - people experience great suffering and these matters whether it is more or less than in the past. Moreover, new wars are associated with State weakness, extremist identity politics and transnational criminality, and there is a danger that this type of violence will spread as the world faces a growing economic crisis. In the context of spending cuts, there is a tendency for governments to cut the very capabilities most suitable for addressing new wars and to protect their capabilities for fighting 'old wars'.

Indeed, the wars, both old and new and including the war of secession fought by the separating federative units of Yugoslavia and resulting in the displacement from their homes of around two-thirds of the population of the country and death of 100,000-260,000 people, the genocide in Rwanda, and the protracting war of terror and war on terror have shaken the very foundation of the contemporary state, dishonored it, embarrassed it and weakened it. Little wonder that these and other ugly events have generated concerns in the corridors of power regarding the power and capacity of the state to protect itself and its citizens and the justification for state spending on the military. Both ethnic cleansing in former Yugoslavia and genocide in Rwanda strongly suggest that there is something seriously wrong with the way the countries are being governed and people are being looked after and protected. We now live in the era of Kaldor's 'new wars' when the states and their security establishments and can very conveniently act as co-perpetrators and take part in the bloodbath of their own citizens.

Located in Central/Eastern Africa and popularly known as 'the land of a thousand hills', the relatively small, landlocked and hilly Rwanda is an overwhelmingly Catholic country. Its population (2019 estimate: 12,752,118) consists of three distinct groups: the Hutu (84%), Tutsi (15%) and Twa (1%). It was colonized by Germany in 1884, and was handed over to Belgium under the League of Nations mandate after World War I. In 1946, the country remained under Belgium under the UN trusteeship. During the colonial, mandate and trusteeship period, tension between the Hutus and Tutsi mounted as the Tutsi minority was patronized and promoted by Germany and later by Belgium. In 1959, the Hutus overthrew the Tutsi monarchy, and in 1962, the country achieved independence. However, the historical enmity between the two ethnic communities continued to poison their relations. It eventually produced one of the greatest human tragedies

of 20th century. According to a report of the World without Genocide Organization, over a time span of only 100 days, between April and July 1994, about 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus disapproving the Tutsi massacre were killed, primarily by the Hutu supremacist militia groups, co-perpetrated by the state of Rwanda, the Rwandan Army, and Rwandan civilians favoring genocide¹¹. Giving details of the terrifying events, *New Yorker's* staff writer Philip Gourevitch writes in his award winning book¹²:

Decimation means the killing of every tenth person in a population, and in the spring and early summer of 1994 a pogrom of massacres decimated the Republic of Rwanda. Although the killing was low tech - performed largely by machete - it was carried out at dazzling speed: of an original population of about seven and a half million, at least eight hundred thousand people were killed in just a hundred days. Rwandans often speak of a million deaths, and they may be right. The dead of Rwanda accumulated at nearly three times the rate of Jewish dead during the Holocaust. It was the most efficient mass killing since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Post-colonial Rwanda reached this stage because it failed to move beyond the past to resolve the ethnic conflict through peaceful means. It didn't open its gates and windows and homes and workplaces for democracy, tolerance, and sharing. Nor did it work for the transformation of the fractured society by taking credible, concrete, confidence-building measures to broaden the scope, space and reach of freedom, understanding and mutual accommodation. Instead, the majoritarian state with all the power at its command went for revenge, slaughter of freedom and understanding, and mass slaughter of the Tutsis. Ever since the takeover of the country by the returning and triumphantly marching Tutsi-dominated military force from Burundi in July 1994, the Rwandan men and women spend a part of their time weeping over its tragic past. It is a past which returns again and again, and which was preventable. Even after twenty five years of heart-searching, confession of guilt by hundreds and thousands of perpetrators, punishment to those proven guilty, and considerable easing of tension, Rwanda remains engulfed in gloom and uncertainty. Insecurities still abound and the wounds are still unhealed. The memory of the tragic past will continue to haunt for decades, perhaps for centuries. But the insecurities may diminish and the wounds may heal sooner if freedom, justice and forgiveness are allowed to play their full role and credible securities provided through soft power in this beautiful and tearful country.

One may add here that the ethnic war and conflict didn't start with the genocide in Rwanda. Neither did it end with this genocide. It also didn't remain

restricted within the four walls of this landlocked and overwhelmingly Catholic state of Africa. As a matter of fact, the geography of ethnic conflict remained widespread both before and after the genocide in Rwanda. Indeed, the issue has almost global reach. A number of North and South American states, and those in Asia, Africa, Europe and Australasia are currently facing it, confronting it, battling with it, and trying to resolve it. In the liberal, progressive and democratic societies, the issue is being discussed, researched, and deliberated upon by the universities and colleges, the media, civil society organizations, and the parliaments. Similarly, relevant policy making bodies are trying to find peaceful solutions to peacefully resolve the issue, and holding the military, police and other law enforcing agencies accountable for their acts and actions in this regard. In contrast, in the illiberal, retrogressive polities, in fragile democracies and in the military dominated states, the ethnic conflicts are generally being managed by disallowing open and frank discussion over the issue in different public forums, curtailing freedoms and opting for coercive means to force a solution upon the societies sharply divided on ethnic lines. Worse still, all such acts and actions are defended in the name of national security and national interest.

What is true of the societies afflicted by ethnic violence is also true of the societies afflicted by terrorism. Hundreds and perhaps thousands of books, monographs, research papers, and policy papers have been written and published in different languages and in different parts of the world on terrorism and counter-terrorism. These provide different perspectives and highlight different aspects of the terror war and on war on terror. In fact, ever since the seizure of power in a military coup by the pro-Soviet People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) in 1978, and especially since the entry of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan in late December 1979, comprehensive accounts of the Soviet-US confrontation over this landlocked South Asian country, the establishment of the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabab, Boko Haram, ISIS and numerous other terrorist organizations and their operation in different countries, and details about the American-led war against terror are available in the archives. Many are also accessible online. In addition, the accounts include the details of devastating consequences of terror war for the world at large, and for different regions and countries. In the midst of the abundant, exhaustive and well-researched studies on numerous important aspects and dimensions of the terror war and war on terror, the absence, invisibility or scarcity of focused studies on the complex relationship of freedom and security especially in the major countries impacted by terrorism is rarely noticed or pointed out.

Of course, there is no denying the fact that scores of studies on terrorism and war on terror significantly contribute to the understanding of their impact at global, regional and local levels. One can, for example, refer here to a precious and almost indispensable work on terrorism impact entitled *The Global Terrorism Index* (GTI). It is produced annually by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) based in Sydney, Australia. Since the year 2000, this Institute has been publishing a remarkable yearbook analyzing the impact of terrorism on the world, regions of the world and on countries now numbering more than 150.

The Global Terrorism Index 2018, released in November 2018, states that the report comprehensively analyzes the impact of terrorism on 163 countries and covers 99.7 percent of world population¹³. According to it, death from terrorism registered a decrease of 27 percent from 2016 to 2017, though the geography of terrorism was still widespread. It informs that as many as 67 countries recorded at least one death from terrorism in 2017, the second highest number of affected countries since 2002. The GTI report adds that Europe achieved the biggest improvement in 2017 on the basis of year percentage improvement by recording the fall of terrorism-related death by 75 percent. The Index further informs that the estimated economic impact of terrorism in 2017 was US \$ 52 billion, and observes that the true economic impact might have been larger. It further observes that over 99 percent of all deaths caused by terrorism occurred in the countries involved in a violent conflict or with high levels of political terror. Hinting at a rising, menacing trend, it says: 'Far right terrorism is a growing concern. The number of deaths from terrorism associated with far-right groups and individuals has increased from three to 17 in 2017'¹⁴.

However, the GTI 2018, like many other well-researched studies on terrorism, doesn't report on the gradual conversion of the terrorism-struck and terrorism-fighting states into hard states, on the growing power of the security establishment in such countries, and on the reduction of freedoms and almost dismantling of the civil societies there. While the humans bleed in these countries, human rights also bleed.

Way back in 2007, a UN study had cautioned the world regarding the devastating impact of terrorism on human rights. It referred to the following resolution of UN General Assembly (60/286)¹⁵:

The promotion and protection of human rights for all and the rule of law is essential to all components of the Strategy, recognizing that effective

counter-terrorism measures and the promotion of human rights are not conflicting goals, but complementary and mutually reinforcing.

Pointing out that terrorism can have ‘devastating consequences for the enjoyment of the rights to life, liberty and physical integrity of victims’, and it could as well ‘destabilize Governments, undermine civil society, jeopardize peace and security, and threaten social and economic development’, it observed more than a decade ago, in 2007¹⁶:

In recent years, however, the measures adopted by states to counter terrorism have themselves often posed serious challenges to human rights and the rule of law. Some states have engaged in torture and other ill-treatment to counter terrorism, while the legal and practical safeguards available to prevent torture, such as regular and independent monitoring of detention centres, have often been disregarded. Other states have returned persons suspected of engaging in terrorist activities to countries where they face a real risk of torture or other serious human rights abuse, thereby violating the international legal obligation of non-refoulement. The independence of the judiciary has been undermined, in some places, while the use of exceptional courts to try civilians has had an impact on the effectiveness of regular court systems. Repressive measures have been used to stifle the voices of human rights defenders, journalists, minorities, indigenous groups and civil society. Resources normally allocated to social programmes and development assistance have been diverted to the security sector, affecting the economic, social and cultural rights of many.

The study further added¹⁷:

These practices, particularly when taken together, have a corrosive effect on the rule of law, good governance and human rights. They are also counterproductive to national and international efforts to combat terrorism.

Respect for human rights and the rule of law must be the bedrock of the global fight against terrorism. This requires the development of national counter-terrorism strategies that seek to prevent acts of terrorism, prosecute those responsible for such criminal acts, and promote and protect human rights and the rule of law. It implies measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, including the lack of rule of law and violations of human rights, ethnic, national and religious discrimination, political exclusion, and socio-economic marginalization; to foster the active participation and leadership of civil society; to condemn human rights violations, prohibit them in national law, promptly investigate and prosecute them, and prevent them; and to give due attention to the rights of victims of human rights violations, for instance through restitution and compensation.

It may be argued that since a study on the issues related to terrorism, human rights and freedom is beyond the domain of GTI, it shouldn't be blamed for its non-coverage of such impact on the targeted and affected countries. In such a case, such an argument would serve as an additional argument in favor of a comprehensive study on such an issue. Such studies are clearly very much needed. More so, because the Trumpian version of nationalism and national interest is on the rise and it is deeply influencing, seducing and corrupting the political thinking and resolve of a number of Western and other countries. It is also shaking the foundation of centuries old liberal, progressive and democratic thought, tradition, practice and institutions. Another development influencing contemporary political and security thinking is the rapid rise and growing popularity of the idea of achieving rapid economic development and expanded security by riding the technology escalator, putting all the hopes in the promised magic baskets the technocrats claim to be carrying and faithfully following what is often referred to as 'the Lee thesis', that is: development first, even though the slaughter of human rights, human dignity and human security if required; democracy and freedom can wait. Likewise, the Chinese model of rapid technological and economic advancement at the cost of human freedoms and rights is getting popular especially in the countries suffering from freedom deficit and long spells of authoritarian rule. These are some of the models on sale in the future-selling bazaars and the number of takers seems to be growing. The long periods of suppression and status quo suffered by the colonial and post-colonial developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America seem to have overwhelmed the commoners, blurred their vision for the future, and sapped their energy for a new struggle for change, justice and freedom. But they would be more insecure and more vulnerable if they do not rise up and struggle for freedom, change and rights. Worse still, if the common people remain insecure for long enough, they will jump on the fast track of anarchy one day and ensure that nothing within the state stays blessed with security and permanence.

What is the way out then? How long is the tunnel? And what is at the end of the tunnel-twinkling, blazing light or an invisible passage to another dark tunnel and another and another? Perhaps it is time to seek guidance from history. History of the recent times tells us that all the roads to rapid development and expanded security built on the corpse of freedom by the leaders like Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini, Shah of Iran, Qaddafi, Saddam Hussein and many others ultimately led them and their countries to hell. When freedom is banished, then security also gets bogged down. Often it is knocked out. This is what the Nazi Germany and militarist Japan learnt during the Second World War and after. Both Germany and Japan are much

more prosperous and secure today than ever before, because they have been investing hugely into freedom, knowledge economy and peace, and not putting everything into the weapon basket.

NOTES

1. <https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/30868-lock-up-your-libraries-if-you-like-but-there-is>
2. *SIPRI Yearbook 2018, Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*
<https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2019/world-military-expenditure-grows-18-trillion-2018>
3. *Ibid.*
4. *Ibid.*
5. Dan Smith, 'Introduction: International Stability and Human Security in 2017', *SIPRI Yearbook, Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* P.3. <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/SIPRIYB18c01.pdf>
6. *Ibid.*, PP.3-4
7. Benedict Anderson's study entitled *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* is popularly regarded as one of the most influential books on the origin and development of nationalism. It is said to have filled the vacuum that existed in the tradition of Western political thought. He is says in his pioneering study: "I propose the following definition of the nation: it is an imagined political community-and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion..... Communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined..... Finally, [the nation] is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately, it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willing to die for such limited imaginings." https://www.goodreads.com/author/quotes/5847920.Benedict_Anderson
Also see Ashis Nandi, *The Illegitimacy of Nationalism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.
8. Many works on these and other related issues have been published during the last fifty years or so by leading scholars on peace and security and human rights. Some of these, taken randomly are by Robert Johansen, *The National Interest and the Human Interest: An Analysis of U.S. Foreign Policy*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980; Johan Galtung, 'Violence, Peace, and Peace Research' in *Essays on Peace*, edited by Michael Salla, Walter Tonetto and Enrique Martinez, Rockhampton, Queensland: Central Queensland university, 1995, PP.1-17; Gene Sharp, *Making Europe Unconquerable: The Potential of Civilian-based Deterrence and Defense*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1985; Unesco, Social and Human Sciences Section, *What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century*, Paris: Unesco, 2003; Mohammed Abu-Nimer, *Nonviolence and Peace Building in Islam*, Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2003; Federico Mayor in collaboration with Jerome Binde, *The World Ahead: Our Future In The Making*, London: Zed Books Ltd, 2001; Wolfgang Dietrich et.al, *The Palgrave International Handbook of Peace Studies: A Cultural Perspective*, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011; Wolfgang Dietrich, *Interpretations of Peace in History and Culture*, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012; Amartya Sen, *Identity and Violence : The Illusion of History*, London: Penguin Books, 2006; Dietrich Fischer, *Nonmilitary Aspects of Security: A Systems Approach*, Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, 1993; Amartya Sen, *Development As Freedom*, New York: Anchor Books, Random House, Inc., 1999; Saul H. Mendlovitz, 'The Realization of Pax united Nations: Global Action to Prevent War, Genocide and internal Armed Conflict' in *Global Governance in the 21st Century*, edited by Young Seek Choue, Seoul: Kyung Hee University, 2000. The list may get lengthier as excellent works on war, violence, alternative security, human security, human rights and freedom keep on appearing. Here one may refer to a good study on alternative security produced in January 2019. It is entitled *Security Policies for Peace: Another Security is Possible and Necessary*, edited by Jordi Calvo Rufanges and published by the Delas Center for Peace Studies, Barcelona. Another important study on war, peace and freedom with particular reference to the role of United States has just come out of press. It has been authored by Christopher Preble and its title is *Peace, War and Liberty: Understanding U.S. foreign Policy*. In this book, Preble raises several security and freedom related issues including the one whether America's policy choices have made the world safer and freer and the impact of those choices on freedom in the U.S. itself.
9. Mary Kaldor, 'Preface to the third Edition', *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence In A Global Era*, Cambridge UK: Polity Press, 2012 https://books.google.com.pk/books/about/New_and_Old_Wars.html?id=RL-iW55bnDUC&printsec=frontcover&source=kp_read_button&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false
10. *Ibid.*
11. World Without Genocide Organization, 'Rwandan Genocide' <http://worldwithoutgenocide.org/genocides-and-conflicts/rwandan-genocide>
12. Philip Gourevitch, *We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families*, London: Picador, 1999, P.3.
13. Institute for Economics & Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2018: Measuring the impact of terrorism, Sydney, November 2018 <http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2018/12/Global-Terrorism-Index-2018-1.pdf>
14. *Ibid.*
15. Office of the United Nations High commissioner for Human rights, Human Rights, Terrorism and Counter-terrorism, Fact Sheet No.32, published by the Peace and Security Section of the Department of Public Information-DPI/24398/Rev 2-December 2007 <https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Factsheet32EN.pdf>
16. *Ibid.*
17. *Ibid.*

PAKISTAN'S EXPERIENCE WITH THE IMF

*Dr. Ashfaque Hasan Khan**

Abstract

From the view point of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), whenever a country faces balance of payments crisis it is because of the excessive demand prevailing in the economy. Pakistan faced a serious balance of payments crisis by the end of 2017-18. It has now decided to go to the IMF for the balance of payments support. IMF uses three key instruments to correct balance of payments crisis. These instruments include tight monetary policy, tight fiscal policy and market determined exchange rate policy. These policies are part of the Stabilization policy. Pakistan has gone to the IMF 21st time in the past and fourth time since the year 2000. It has been observed from the past experiences that IMF Program is not a stabilization program, rather it is a destabilization program in which investment and growth slowed leading to the rise in unemployment which gives birth to social unrest in the country. It also increases the country's debt and as such the country never gets out of the clutches of the IMF Program. Pakistan is now entering 22nd time into the IMF Program. Same medicine will be applied. Will the result be different this time?

Keywords: IMF Program, Stabilization Policy, Debt, Deficit, Growth, Unemployment, Poverty.

Introduction

Ever since the new government took charge of the state of affairs, the debate on whether the new government should go to the IMF or not for a bailout package began within the government and in the Economic Advisory Council of the Government. An overwhelming majority supported the idea that Pakistan has no

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alternative but to go to the IMF for a balance of payments support. However, few argued otherwise and were of the view that Pakistan should learn to live without the IMF. It is fairly clear by now that Pakistan has decided to seek financial support from the IMF. The program is most likely to be finalized by June 2019 and will be applicable from July 1, 2019 for a period of three years. The current article deals with the question: how the program is going to affect the economy, the people and the government?

Before we delve into the details of the subject matter, a few words regarding how the IMF, as an institution, has come into existence; what were the objectives of this Institution; what are the key policy instruments and so on. It is well-known that after the end of the World War-II, Europe was totally devastated and the global monetary and financial system had become dysfunctional. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the 32nd President of the United States invited the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference to deliberate on the issues of the reconstruction and development of Europe and to reestablish global monetary and financial stability. The Conference was held in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire during July 1-22, 1944. Forty-Four nations attended the Conference. After over three weeks of deliberation, the Conference agreed upon a series of new rules for the post WW-II International Monetary System. The two major accomplishments of the Conference were the creation of the IMF and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), better known as the World Bank. The two persons that played key roles at the technical levels for the establishment of the above-stated institution were Harry Dexter White, Special Assistant to the US Secretary of the Treasury and John Maynard Keynes, an Advisor to the British Treasury. Keynes later emerged as the father of the modern macroeconomics.

The IMF was charged with the maintenance of a system of fixed exchange rates centered on the US dollar and gold. Serving as a forum for consultation and cooperation, IMF would contribute to orderly international monetary relations and the expansion of World trade. IMF would provide short term financial assistance to the countries experiencing temporary balance of payments difficulties. The IBRD was made responsible for providing financial support for the reconstruction and development of war-ravaged nations as well as for the economic development of less developed/developing countries¹. These two institutions officially came into existence on December 27, 1945².

Since the establishment of the IMF, this institution performed not only the duty of a “Lender of the Last Resort” but also performed other functions. In fact,

whenever a country faced serious balance of payments crisis, it went to the IMF for financial support. The IMF performed three functions. Firstly, it performed the duty of **surveillance**, involving monitoring of economic and financial developments and provides policy advice to the member countries. Secondly, it provided **financial support** to the member countries to address their balance of payments crisis. Thirdly, the IMF also provided member countries with technical assistance and training of the officers involved in policy making in Ministry of Finance and the country's Central Bank.

Policy Prescription of the IMF

From the view point of the IMF, whenever a country faces balance of payments crisis it is because of the excessive demand prevailing in the economy. In other words, aggregate demand $(C+I+G+X-M)^3$ exceeds aggregate supply $(Y)^4$. The country, when approaches IMF for financial support, they are asked to pursue a policy prescription of the Washington Consensus or 1980s vintage of the Stabilization Policy which is also commonly known as demand management policy or austerity policy. The IMF believes that by curtailing aggregate demand through various policy instruments, the country can restore a balance with aggregate supply. It is critical to note that the IMF never advocates for raising aggregate supply or never prescribes supply side policy. Its entire policy prescription deals with the right hand side of the national income accounts $(Y=C+I+G+X-M)^5$ and never advocated policy for augmenting aggregate supply (Y) , the left hand side of the accounting identity.

There are three key instruments of Stabilization Policy. These include:


- Floating/flexible exchange rate policy,
- Tight monetary policy and
- Tight fiscal policy.

Let me describe how these policies work in reality. The country would be asked by the IMF Staff to pursue **floating or flexible exchange** rate policy which invariably leads to devaluation (the objectives are to reduce import and increase exports – the two components of aggregate demand). Devaluation is by definition inflationary as all the landed costs of imported items in local currency increases. To counter inflationary pressure, the Central Bank immediately tightens monetary policy by increasing discount rate which, in turn, increases overall interest rates in

the economy. Higher interest rate discourages private sector investment (one component of aggregate demand)

Tight fiscal policy on the other hand, prevents government to spend more (another component of aggregate demand). Given the committed nature of spending such as interest, payment, defense, running civil administration and subsidies in which there is little or no flexibility, the axe of spending cut falls invariably on development expenditure. Cut in development expenditure means that public sector investment also declines. Thus, higher interest rate discourages private sector investment and cut in development spending means decline in public sector investment, therefore total investment as percentage of GDP declines. Investment being the critical input to economic growth, lower investment slowed economic growth. Pace of job creation depends on the pace of economic growth. Slower economic growth slows the pace of job creation and hence, rise in unemployment and poverty.

Slower economic growth slows revenue generation. On the other hand, devaluation prompting tight monetary policy which leads to higher discount rate and the rise in overall interest rate. Higher interest rate as a result of the pursuance of tight monetary policy increases the cost of financing government's budget deficit, which, in turn, increases interest payment, current expenditure, and hence, total expenditure. Devaluation also increases dollar denominated public debt in rupee term which increases overall public debt. Given the rise in interest rate, high public debt increases interest payment, current expenditure and hence, total expenditure. Slower economic growth slows revenue generation and given the rise in total expenditure, it increases budget deficit which is counter to IMF policy of tight fiscal policy. Higher budget deficit forces government to borrow more to accumulate more public debt. Given the higher rate of interest, interest payment, current expenditure and total expenditure rise. The economy enters into debt trap (see the flow diagram to understand the mechanics).



IMF policy of stabilization in fact put the country into debt trap. Once the country goes to the IMF for a balance of payments support and implement, it never comes out from the crisis. In fact, the crisis perpetuates because of the nature of the policy prescriptions. The IMF Program is not a stabilization program in which investment and growth slowdown leading to the rise in unemployment which gives birth to social unrest in the country. It also increases the country's debt and as such never gets out of the clutches of the IMF Program. Hence, slower growth, rising unemployment, more inflation and more debt are the outcomes of the IMF Program. The country's macroeconomic policy remains in the hands of the IMF.

The country's Ministry of Finance loses policy making initiative. Its job remains confined to the implementation of the policy prepared by the IMF and gives compliance report to the IMF in each quarter. If the country achieves all the assigned targets for the quarter, the IMF approves the next tranche. The country

lives quarter by quarter or tranche by tranche. Any quarterly target missed, the country applies to the IMF for a waiver. Depending on the country's relations with major shareholder of the IMF, the IMF would treat the country accordingly. The bottom line is that the country loses its financial sovereignty.

Flaws in IMF Policy Prescription

It is not uncommon to see countries experiencing exogenous shocks which adversely affect their key economic fundamentals or throw an economy into aggregate imbalances which require compensatory actions. There are two sources of instability; one is exogenous shocks and the other is self-induced shocks.

Exogenous shocks include, terms of trade shocks, natural disasters, capital flight etc. Many developing countries have narrow export base. Any adverse shock to the prices of their commodities will have strong adverse impact on their export earnings. Sharp decline in oil prices since mid-2014 have severely impacted the oil revenue of the oil producing countries. Many of these countries are facing serious budgetary problems leading to the rise of their external debt. Such an adverse shock slowed their developmental activities.

Self-induced shocks are the result of the poor macroeconomic management of the country. For example, excessively loose fiscal policy increases aggregate demand which is translated into higher imports, worsening of trade and current account balances. Such developments put pressure on exchange rate leading to devaluation, rise in public debt, increase in interest payments, erosion of fiscal space, decline in investment in physical and human infrastructure.

Whenever a country faces such kind of shocks and experience balance of payments difficulties, they approach the IMF for a bailout package. The IMF applies the 1980s vintage of Stabilization Policy. In my opinion, the 1980s vintage of Stabilization Policy or Washington Consensus have lost its charm. Why has it lost its charm? The reason is that the IMF doesn't distinguish between the two types of shocks. It treats exogenous shocks and self-induced shocks one of the same. For the IMF one policy fit in all circumstances. This is a major flaw in the IMF, sponsored Stabilization Policy.

Let me explain a bit more. Consider that there are two countries – country A and country B. Country A has been managing its economy well. Economic growth has been robust, both budget and current account deficits have been low

and the country had sufficient foreign exchange reserves to finance four months of imports. All of a sudden the country is hit by massive external shock like an unprecedented surge in oil and commodity prices which created serious balance of payment crisis. Country B is failing in managing its economy well. Economic growth is low, budget deficit is high, current account deficit is low because the economy is growing slowly but foreign exchange reserves is depleting fast. While Country A is hit by a sudden external shock, not of its own making, Country B is facing serious difficulties because of its inability to manage the economy properly. Both countries go to the IMF for financial support. Should the IMF prescribe the same medicine to both the countries?

In my view, the answer is no. Country A should be treated differently as compared to Country B. Country A has been pursuing prudent macroeconomic policy. External shocks have created balance of payment problems. What is required from the IMF is to provide one time financial support to build its reserve so that the country can wither the external shocks. For Country B, because it was mismanaging its economy that compounded its difficulties, it should be treated differently. Policies should be designed to bring its budget in balance, external account in comfortable zone for which, tight fiscal and tight monetary policy are the solution. The problem with the IMF is that it does not differentiate the root causes of the problems. Hence, it has standard prescription for all kinds of disease. Such standard prescription, instead of addressing the problems, in fact further compound the difficulties. In order to address one problem it gives birth to many problems and hence in the process the country and its people continue to suffer. There is an urgent need on the part of the IMF to rethink the standard prescription for all kinds of disease.

Pakistan has been one of the nine prolonged users of the IMF resources. In so doing, it appears that Pakistan has become addicted to the IMF financial support. Whenever we felt headache, we ran to the IMF for aspirin tablet. We get temporary relief but we never bothered to find out as to why do we get headache after every two/three years. (See Table 1 on next page for the history of the Accounts of various IMF Program during 1988 to 2016).

Table 1: History of the Accounts of Various Facilities/Arrangements with the IMF since 1988 (Amount in US \$ Million)

S#	IMF Programme	To Run for (Coverage)	Total Amount Sanctioned	Total Amount Drawn	Completed/ Delayed/ Suspended
1.	Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF)	1988-1991 (3 years)	\$ 516	\$ 516	Completed after delay of one year
2.	Stand-by Arrangements (SBA)	1988-1991 (3 years)	\$ 259	\$ 259	Completed after delay of one year
3.	Contingency and Compensatory Financing Facility (CCFF)	1991-92 (one time)	\$ 171.6	\$ 171.6	One time facility in one tranche
4.	Emergency Assistance	1992-93 (one time)	\$ 256	\$ 256	One time drawn in one tranche
5.	Stand-by Arrangement (SBA)	1993-1994 (1-1 ½ Years)	\$ 377	\$ 125.5	Suspended in 1993
6.	Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF)	1993-1996 (3 years)	\$ 849	\$ 290	Suspended after about a year plus
7.	Extended Fund Facility (EFF)	1993-1996 (3 years)	\$ 531	\$ 177	Suspended after about a year plus
8.	Stand-by Arrangement (SBA)	1995-1997 (1 to 1 ½ years)	\$ 600 \$ 216 Total: \$816	\$ 277 \$ 150 Total : \$427	Program Suspended 1996 Reactivated 1996 Again suspended 1997
9.	Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF)	1997-2000	\$ 935	\$ 310	Suspended in 1997
10.	Extended Fund Facility	1997-2000	\$ 623	\$ 77	Suspended in 1997
11.	Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) Reactivation of 1997 Program	1998-2001	\$ 637	\$ 53	Suspended in 1998 and reactivated in 1999. Again suspended 1999.
12.	Extended Fund Facility (EFF) Reactivation of 1997 Programme)	1998-2001	\$ 557	\$ 77.6	Suspended in 1998 and reactivated in 1999. Again suspended 1999.
13.	Contingency and Compensatory Financing Facility (CCFF)	1999	\$ 495	\$ 495	Completed in one tranche drawl
14.	Stand-by Arrangement (SBA)	2000 to 2001	\$ 600	\$ 600	Completed
15.	Poverty Reduction & Growth Facility (PRGF)	2001 to 2004	\$ 1.322 (billion)	\$ 1.186 (billion)	Completed on 2004
16.	Stand-by Arrangement	2008 to 2010	\$ 11.3 billion	\$ 8.7 billion	Suspended in 2010

S#	IMF Programme	To Run for (Coverage)	Total Amount Sanctioned	Total Amount Drawn	Completed/ Delayed/ Suspended
17.	Extended Fund (Facility (EFF)	2013 to 2016	\$ 6.68 billion	\$ 6.68 billion	Completed with 15 waivers
Total			\$ 26.925 billion	\$ 20.392 billion	

Note: 75.4% (\$15.4 billion) IMF loan disbursed during the last two programs (2008-11 and 2013-16).

Pakistan's Experience with the IMF

As stated earlier, Pakistan has been under the IMF Program for most part of the decade (2008-18). It has pursued the IMF dictated stabilization or demand management or austerity program all along the decade. In the words of the Managing Director, IMF (Ms. Christine Legarde) as posted on IMF direct, September 1, 2016, the longer demand weakness lasts, the more it threatens to harm long-term growth as firms reduce production capacity and unemployed workers are leaving the labour force and critical skills are eroding. Weak demand also depresses trade, which adds to disappointing productivity growth".

The statement of the Managing Director accurately depicted the current state of Pakistan's economy. After 10 years of stabilization policy, Pakistan witnessed its economic growth slowing, unemployment situation worsening, fiscal and current account deficits deteriorating, public and external debt growing astronomically and foreign exchange reserves depleting. The Managing Director has advocated the need for forceful policy action to avoid a low growth-trap. She believed that monetary policy has limited capacity to support demand. The global economy, including Pakistan has experienced a prolonged period of record-low interest rate environment and yet it has failed to bolster demand and hence economic growth. She therefore, advocated a larger role of fiscal policy through boosting public sector investment as well as undertaking wide-ranging structural reforms and reducing the cost of doing business, including trade costs, as a solution for boosting demand and economic growth. She also made a strong case for inclusive growth, that is, the benefits of growth are broadly shared by the people. Unfortunately, the IMF itself is a stumbling block in achieving the above-mentioned objectives as enunciated by its own Managing Director. The type of macroeconomic policies that it has advocated in countries who have sought financial assistance from the IMF, have suffocated their economies and damaged medium-to-long run growth prospects of these countries. What has been the experience of Pakistan in implementing IMF dictated Stabilization Policy over the last one decade? Let me begin with growth and employment first.

Growth and Employment

Pakistan pursued the Stabilization Policy during the last one decade (2008-18). Such policies, by and large, have been anti-growth which suffocated Pakistan's economies. Such a prolonged period of austerity or anti-growth policies have severely damaged the country's growth prospects, both in the short and medium-terms. Pakistan economic growth averaged 3.8 percent during the last one decade (2008-18) as against 6.3 percent during the last four years when Pakistan was not in the IMF Program. Agriculture, large-scale manufacturing and services growth decelerated sharply during the last one decade when Pakistan pursued, by and large, an IMF dictated Stabilization Policy as against the period when Pakistan was out of the Program (see Table 2).

Table 2: Growth and Employment (Percent)

Items	2004-05 to 2007-08	2008-09 to 2017-18
Real GDP growth	6.3	3.8
Agriculture growth	4.5	2.3
Large Scale Manufacturing	10.2	3.0
Services	7.0	3.2

Source: Pakistan Economic Survey: Statistical Supplement 2017-18 and 2010-11

The persistent of low growth during the last decade has taken the country to a deficient demand mode, as suggested by the Managing Director of the IMF, which has eventually caused deficient supply as reflected by a mere 3 percent average growth in large scale manufacturing. Why should investors or producers invest or produce more in the midst of deficient demand? The long slump, on account of the type of macroeconomic policies that Pakistan pursued during the last decade (2008-18) has hurt the economy's productive capacity and hence lowered long-run growth prospects. The 'new normal' growth for Pakistan appears to be in the range of 3.5 – 4.0 percent. If this is the case, then the governments that ruled the country during the last decade have made the people of Pakistan permanently poor. The economy may not be seen growing by 7-8 percent level unless and until Pakistan changes its policy stance from stabilization to 'job-rich' growth. Such a change in policy stance is not possible under the IMF Program.

The persistence of low economic growth (3.8% per annum) over the last one decade has failed to create enough jobs for the new entrants in the job market, as well as for those who were already in the pool of unemployed. People in general

and youth in particular, found it extremely difficult to get jobs. Those remaining unemployed for a longer duration became unemployable, with all its social and economic ramifications.

Not only has the unemployment rate surged to 8.5 percent a 13-year high in 2014-15, and youth unemployment rate has increased to over 10 percent by 2017-18. The annual entrants into the labour force which averaged 1.9 million per annum during 2004/05 to 2007/08 shrank to 1.3 million and further shrank to an average of only 350,000 during the last two years of the decade under review. This reflects the worsening state of the labour market and lends support to the view that for years of pursuance of Stabilization Policy under the IMF Program, Pakistan's economy has entered into a low growth mode and failing to create sufficient jobs⁶.

Table 3: Key Labour Force Statistics (Percent)

	2007-08	2008-09	2010-11	2012-13	2013-14	2014-15	2017-18
Literacy Rate (Overall)	56.2	57.4	58.5	60	58	60.7	62.3
Below Matric	36.5	37.1	38.0	37.9	38.1	37.5	36.9
LFPR	32.2	32.8	32.8	32.9	32.3	32.3	31.7
Rural	33.8	34.3	34.3	34.2	33.8	34.0	32.7
Urban	28.9	29.9	30.0	30.2	29.4	29.0	30.0
(15-19 Years)	36.9	37.0	36.4	35.8	35.3	33.5	32.6
Male	53.9	52.7	51.6	51.2	49.7	47.6	47.6
(20-24 Years)	52.4	53.8	53.8	53.1	52.3	52.6	52.5
Male	85.1	85.4	84.3	82.4	81.7	82.3	84.5
Unemployment	5.2	5.5	6.0	6.2	6.0	5.9	5.8
(15-19 Years)	8.7	9.5	10.6	11.3	11.7	10.1	10.4
(20-24 Years)	6.8	7.3	10.0	9.9	9.2	11.0	11.6

Note: LFPR is Labour Force Participation Rate

Source: Pakistan Labour Force Survey 2008-09, 2012-13 and 2013-14, 2017-18.

Even more serious development is the fact that the Labour Force Participation Rates (LFPR) among youth (15-19 years) and prime age (20-24) workers have declined during the last decade (2008-18). Almost 2.0 million workers belonging to these two age groups have moved out of the labour market. The LFPRs for the urban youth and prime age workforce declined from 53.9 percent in 2007-08 to 47.6 percent in 2017-18 and from 85.1 percent to 84.5 percent

respectively during the decade under review. These developments point to growing 'discouraged worker phenomenon' in the country. Since the country remained by and large, under the IMF Program during most period of the decade, the economic growth remained subdued which failed to create enough jobs for the new entrants. When the people fail to get job for so long a period, they don't apply and get out of the job market – a 'discouraged worker phenomenon'.

More so, the unemployment rate for graduate and post graduate degree holders has increased to a dangerous level of over 20 percent⁷. There are 2.4 million educated workers with poor job prospects. These developments are the direct consequence of the type of macroeconomic policies pursued under the IMF Program.

Fiscal Side

Tight fiscal policy as an instrument of the IMF dictated Stabilization Policy meant to reduce fiscal deficit. This is because a sound fiscal position is vital for achieving macroeconomic stability, which is increasingly recognized as being critical for sustained higher economic growth and poverty reduction. Pakistan remained under the IMF Program for most part of the last decade (2008-18) but failed in reducing fiscal deficit. During 2008/09 to 2012/13, Pakistan sustained a very large budget deficit averaging 7.0 percent of the GDP. Massive manipulation of statistics took place during 2013/14 to 2016/17 (4 years) ranging from holding back refunds and forcing commercial entities to pay taxes in advance to jack up revenue, privatization proceeds and foreign grants were treated as non-tax revenue to inflate overall revenue rather than treating them as financing items, engaging in qasi-fiscal operations outside the budget, allowing for large statistical discrepancy each year (cumulatively Rs. 600 billion in three years) to show lower expenditures, exaggerating the size of the Provincial cash balance surplus, retaining earmarked revenues in the Federal consolidated Fund and building up large contingent liabilities (over Rs. 1400 billion of power sector circular debt, accumulation of over Rs. 800 billion debt under commodity financing and pending tax refunds). The IMF staff either been blissfully unaware of or has condoned this creative accounting. After all, IMF Program is a political program. Adjusting for these practices implies a fiscal deficit each year in the range of 7.0 to 8.0 percent of the GDP⁸.

The IMF Programs over the last one decade have failed miserably in reducing Pakistan's fiscal deficit. They kept their eyes and ears closed and allowed the authorities to damage statistics. IMF was so generous that during the last

Program (2013-16) they extended fifteen waivers. Perhaps never in the history of the IMF that a country received such a large number of waivers⁹.

Public and External Debt

Fiscal indiscipline remained the hallmark of the previous two regimes that ruled Pakistan during the last decade (2008-18), mostly under the IMF Program. How can IMF allowed member country, Pakistan, to remain fiscally indisciplined and maintain an average fiscal deficit of over 7.0 percent of GDP; and yet continued to doll out financial resources amounting over \$15 billion during the program periods? As stated earlier, IMF Program has been in a political program. They kept their eyes and ears closed and continued to pour dollars and drowned the country under debt. Pakistan's public and external debt surged during the last one decade (2008-18) under the IMF Program. These facts are well-documented in Table 4.

Table 4: Trends in Public and External Debt

Year	Public Debt (Billion Rs)	External Debt and Liabilities (Billion \$)
2007-08	6040	46.2
2008-09	7631	52.3
2009-10	8890	61.6
2010-11	10680	66.4
2011-12	12652	65.5
2012-13	14321	60.9
2013-14	16389	65.4
2014-15	17819	65.2
2015-16	20054	73.1
2016-17	21783	83.4
2017-18	25574	95.3

Source: State Bank of Pakistan; and Debt Policy and Coordination Office, Ministry of Finance.

A cursory look at Table 4 is sufficient to see that Pakistan's public and external debt have grown at a threatening pace during 2008/09 to 2017/18 (10 years) owing to fiscal profligacy on the one hand and substantial decline in non-debt creating inflows on the other. Public debt grew at an average rate of 19 percent per

annum during 2008/09 to 2012/13 when Pakistan was under the IMF Program for most of the time. Public debt grew at an average rate of 12.3 percent per annum during 2013/14 to 2017/18. The reason for a relative slow growth of public debt during this period was a near fixed exchange rate policy that the then government implemented. Pakistan remained under the IMF Program for the first three years of the period. For decade as a whole, public debt grew at an average rate 15.6 percent per annum.

As percentage of the GDP, the public debt surged from 58.4 percent to 74.4 percent during the decade under review. It is important to note that Pakistan's fiscal situation remained precarious and public debt as percentage of GDP surged, during the IMF Program which speaks volume about the efficacy of the IMF Program in restoring fiscal balance.

External debt and liabilities also jumped from \$ 46.2 billion to \$ 95.3 billion during the decade under the IMF Program. The readers would recall that Pakistan also remained under the IMF Program during the decade of the 1990s. This decade was termed as "lost decade for Pakistan" by independent economist¹⁰. Table 5 reports the amount of external debt and liabilities added during the two 'lost decade for Pakistan' – 1990s and 2008-18.

Table 5: Addition to Debt

Period	No. of Years	Debt Added
1990s (1990-2000)	10 years	\$ 17.4 billion
2008/09 – 2012/13	5 years	\$ 14.7 billion
2013/14 – 2017/18	5 years	\$ 34.4 billion
2008/09 – 2017/18	10 years	\$ 49.1 billion
1990s and 2008/18	20 years	\$ 66.5 billion

A cursory look at Table 5 is sufficient to see that Pakistan accumulated \$49.1 billion of external debt during the decade of 2008/18 and it added \$17.4 billion in the decade of the 1990s. Altogether, Pakistan added \$66.5 billion external debt and liabilities during the two last decades for Pakistan. In other words, Pakistan added 70 percent of total outstanding external debt and liabilities during the two 'last decades'.

What was common in these two 'last decades', that is, in the 1990s and in 2008-18, was that Pakistan remained under the IMF Program and implemented IMF dictated Stabilization Policy. Pakistan is now entering into another IMF Program from July 1, 2019 for three years. In so doing, it will be implementing the same 1980s vintage of Stabilization Policy. Should we expect a different result this time? Can Pakistan afford to lose yet another decade of 'lost opportunities'?

Summing Up

Decade of pursuance of IMF dictated Stabilization policy has caused economic growth to slow down, less job creation and hence rising unemployment which is a sure recipe of social unrest in the country. Such policy has caused budget deficit to rise owing to the combination of hike in discount rate and devaluation of Pakistani rupee. Higher interest rate increases the cost of financing fiscal deficit which, in turn, increases interest payment. Devaluation on the other hand, increases the size of the public debt. Hence, these two policies increase the size of the public debt and cost of financing deficit; which raises interest payment, current expenditure and total expenditure. Revenue, on the other hand, failed to increase because of the slower economic growth owing to the pursuance of anti-growth policies.

Higher expenditure and slower growth in revenue lead to the rise in fiscal deficit. Higher fiscal deficit means more borrowing to finance deficit and more borrowing means more accumulation of debt. More accumulation of debt means more interest payment, higher current expenditure, and hence rise in expenditure. With revenue growing at a slower pace owing to slower growth in economic activity, budget deficit would be rising and the country is stuck in the vicious cycle. Hence, IMF Program will cause more harm than good to the economy and to the country. Low economic growth, higher unemployment, particularly for educated youth, rising poverty, growing debt are the outcomes of the IMF Program. It is a sure recipe of social unrest in the country. Recent study has found that the IMF Program has failed miserably in stabilizing economies of many developing countries, including Pakistan with one or two exceptions.¹¹

Was there any Alternative to IMF Program?

Fiscal year 2017-18 has been one of the most challenging and difficult years in Pakistan's economic history. Within one year, there were three finance ministers (Ishaq Dar, Miftah Ismail and Dr. Shamshad Akhtar) managed the economy. Economy was never on the radar of these ministers. Fiscal profligacy was on the

rise which was translated into higher imports. As a result, the current account deficit ballooned to \$19 billion or over 6 percent of GDP in 2017-18. Budget deficit surged to 6.6 percent of GDP but this number was grossly understated for a variety of reasons.

The present government inherited an economy which was in a very bad shape. From day one, the newly elected government was in favour of going to the IMF for a balance of payments support. Overwhelming members of the Economic Advisory Council also supported the government stance of going to the IMF. Few economists, however, advocated against seeking assistance from the IMF for three reasons. Firstly, Pakistan has been a prolonged user of the IMF resources. It has already been in the IMF Program for 21 times. Unlike in the 1990s when almost all of the IMF Programs either stalled, interrupted or completed with delays but during 2000 onward, 3 out of the 4 IMF Programs were fully completed. With a relatively high rate of completion of the IMF Programs since 2000, as well as within 2 years since the “successful completion” of the last IMF Program in September 2016, one wonders why Pakistan has left with no option but to go to the IMF once again? If a patient suffers a relapse soon after remission, then it is quite reasonable to question the authenticity of the clean bill of health given to Pakistan by the IMF after the completion of the Program in the first place. Furthermore, prolonged treatment for a curable disease casts doubts about the efficacy of the medicine¹². Secondly, the changing Geo-Strategic environment would force IMF to go strictly by their books. They would not be a benign IMF as was the case during 2013-16 IMF Program when they accorded fifteen waivers in a three-years Program. Here politics played an important role and the attitude of the IMF was influenced by the borrower country’s ‘relationship’ with the major shareholders of the IMF.

Thirdly, Pakistan could not afford yet another era of low growth. As stated earlier, the average economic growth during the decade of 2008-18 has been merely 3.8 percent per annum. Going to the IMF again and pursuing the same 1980s vintage of Stabilization Policy would keep the pace of economic growth in the range of 3.5 – 4.0 percent with serious implications for job creation. Pakistan needed ‘job-rich’ growth which cannot be achieved through stabilization policy. The group of economists who advocated for Pakistan not seeking financial support from the IMF argued that it should pursue aggressive import compression policy including banning imports of certain non-essential goods for a year and a half to reduce current account deficit. Some actions on exports side were needed which included review of taxation policy in the organized sector with a view to relieving burden of taxation on private sector, aligning input prices with major competitors

like India and Bangladesh to boost exports, releasing refunds to exporters to improve their liquidity position, and gradual adjustment of exchange rate, it needed, to make exporter competitive in international market. Some actions on improving the flow of remittances were required. Beside these policies the government should have gone to the international debt capital market to float Eurobonds, Islamic Bonds (Sukuk), Chinese bonds, non-resident Pakistani Bonds, exchangeable bonds etc. to mobilized foreign exchange to boost reserves. The government did not take this route and decided to get the same aspirin tablet 22nd times from the IMF.

Pakistan has pursued stabilization policy with an exclusive focus on budget deficit reduction during the last one decade and hence paid a heavy price of slower economic growth, less job creation and human suffering. Going forward, Pakistan needed to pursue a forward looking macroeconomic policy which is not directed exclusively on budget deficit reduction. Rather, it needed to strike a balance between stabilization and developmental roles of macroeconomic policies instead of pursuing the same 1980s vintage of Stabilization Policy.

Pakistan has been in a low growth mode (3.8% p.a) during the last one decade which has taken the country into deficient demand mode which eventually caused deficient supply. Why should investors or producers invest or produce more when there is deficient demand? The long slump, on account of the type of macroeconomic policies that Pakistan pursued during the IMF Program period, has hurt the economy's productive capacity and hence lowered long-run growth prospects. What is required is a larger role of fiscal policy by boosting public investment as well as undertaking wide-ranging structural reforms and reducing cost of doing business, including trade costs, as a solution for boosting demand and economic growth.

As an alternative to going to the IMF for a balance of payments support, Pakistan should have pursued homegrown policy of curbing imports, promoting exports and remittances, floating sovereign bonds, attracting foreign direct investment and introducing wide-ranging structural reforms. Beside, Pakistan should have pursued forward looking macroeconomic policies with a larger role of fiscal policy which, in no way, advocates a lax fiscal policy or encourage fiscal indiscipline. Rather, it advocates for changing spending priorities. It is possible that in the short-run, budget deficit and public debt may increase but they will be sustainable. On the expenditure side, greater budgetary allocation should be made towards building human capital, that is, higher allocation to education, health, skill

developments and social safety nets as well as higher allocation be made towards strengthening the country's physical infrastructure, that is, roads and highways, communication, energy, water, and port development etc. Such spending will enhance productivity of workforce and infrastructural developments will create jobs besides improving the country's investment climate. For the purpose of development, what matters is where and how fiscal deficit is being spent. Is it spent on building human capital that would improve productivity and hence growth? Is it spent on building or strengthening physical infrastructure that could contribute to promoting growth and employment generation? Is it spent to support the poorer segments of the society? If the answer is yes, Public debt, even though it is high and rising in the short-run, would be sustainable¹³.

As long as fiscal deficit is being used to enhance debt carrying capacity of the country, higher and rising debt is not a burden to the economy. It is important to note that public debt does not contribute positively to growth contemporaneously, its contribution to growth comes with a lag, therefore, public debt-to-GDP ratio may rise in the short-run. What is important here is to give greater emphasis on quality and composition of expenditure, rather than on aggregate budget deficit and public debt. Pakistan needs to change its expenditure priorities to achieve the developmental goals of macroeconomic policy. Franklin D. Roosevelt, the US President, noted in his 1936 budget message that "the deficit of today...is making possible the surplus of tomorrow"¹⁴.

Prioritization of expenditure is one element of the fiscal policy. The other element is the mobilization of domestic resources for which Pakistan needs to undertake tax system and tax administration reform, broaden the tax base, tighten regulation on tax heavens and improve efficiency of tax administration through training and retraining of its staff. Monetary policy – the other component of macroeconomic policy is already overstretched, as the central bank of the country has already raised the discount rate into double digit. What is required is easing of monetary policy with decline in inflation. The private sector can take advantage of low interest rate environment, provided auxiliary policies are in place. Such auxiliary policies include growth—critical reform where Pakistan has not done enough. China – Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a great initiative. It has enormous potential to revive economic activity in Pakistan. Within CPEC, launching of nine Special Economic Zones (SEZs), have the potential for industrialization and export promotion. Four years have passed and Pakistan has not come out from the slogans of 'game changer' and 'fate changer'. Little efforts have thus far been made by Pakistan to take advantage of CPEC. Lethargic and

non-serious attitude of the officers and bureaucracy have stalled this great initiative. Pakistan must get out of the power point presentation to policy making. Wasting of time is not an option for the country.

Let me conclude by saying that excessive focus on stabilization for a fairly long period of time has led to the neglect of the developmental role of macroeconomic policies. Accordingly, it has exacerbated the negative output and employment effects of external shocks. Thus, the macroeconomic policy of 1980s vintage as dictated by the IMF has caused undesirable consequences for Pakistan, that is, “stabilization traps” of low inflation with low growth or excessive growth volatility with serious implications for poverty, unemployment and economic security of the people. Pakistan is currently experiencing ‘stabilization fatigue’ and urgently needs breathing space for which prudent fiscal and monetary policy along with wide-ranging structural reforms is absolutely vital. Since we have decided to go to the IMF 22nd time, prolongation of “Stabilization Trap” or “Stabilization Fatigue” will be the fate of the people of Pakistan.

Conclusion

By the time this book is printed, Pakistan must have gone back to the IMF for the 22nd times for a bailout package. How this Program is going to affect the economy and the people of Pakistan? Should the results of the 22nd Program will be different from the previous ones? What are the instruments that the IMF dictated 1980s vintage of stabilization policy would be implemented? How these instruments stabilize or destabilize the economy? What has been the performance of the last two programs during the period 2008-18? Was there any alternative to the IMF Program should Pakistan decided not to take this route again? These were the subject matter of this paper.

It goes without saying that the present government had inherited an economy which was truly in bad shape. Pakistan faced a serious balance of payments challenges by June 2018 when the current account deficit stood at all-time high of \$19 billion or over 6.0 percent of GDP. With over \$11.0 billion of debt servicing, Pakistan needed \$30 billion in foreign exchange to stave of difficulties. Pakistan had two options – one going to the lender of the last resort (the IMF) for a balance of payment support and second, pursue a homegrown agenda of reforms and policies, that is, pursuing an aggressive import compression policy, undertake policies to promote exports and remittances, float several sovereign bonds in international debt capital market, float an exchangeable bonds – a form of

privatization, take concrete steps to make CPEC an instrument of economic revival and launch wide-ranging reforms in various sectors of the economy.

After months of debate within the Cabinet and in the Economic Advisory Committee of the Government, the government opted for an IMF bailout package which will be 22nd Program altogether and fifth since 2000. The IMF Program has always been a political program. The Program's approval, design and implementation are, by and large, influenced by the borrower country's relationship with the major shareholder of the IMF. If the relationship is cordial, the IMF would keep its eyes and ears closed and would be generous in giving waivers in case of failure to achieve quantitative targets. If the relationship is not cordial or tense, the design of the program would be painful and the implementation would be ruthless.

There are three key instruments of the 1980s vintage of the IMF Program – flexible/floating exchange rate policy, tight monetary and tight fiscal policy. These three instruments are designed to aggressively curtail aggregate demand as the IMF Stabilization Policy is nothing but demand management or austerity or anti-growth program. Pakistan has pursued such policies for over last one decade (2008-18). Such a prolonged use of demand destruction policy has suffocated the economy of Pakistan. The average real GDP growth during the last one decade has been merely 3.8 percent per annum. It has given rise to unemployment and most importantly youth and educated unemployment touched at dangerously high levels with serious consequences for national security.

Neither budget nor current account deficit reduced under the IMF Program. As such, Pakistan witnessed astronomical increase in public and external debt. Interest payment ballooned during the Program period and has consumed more than one-third of tax revenue. The outcomes of the two programs that were pursued during 2008-18 include low growth, higher unemployment; rise in poverty, budget and current account deficits; surge in public and external debt. In the case of Pakistan, IMF Stabilization program in fact, turned out to be a destabilization program.

Pakistan is now entering into the 22nd Program with IMF and 5th one since 2000. Three out of the four programs with IMF were fully completed since 2000. The last program (2013-16) was completed in September 2016 and was termed as “successful” indeed. Infact, the IMF launched its Report for the Year 2018 in Davos and was very upbeat on Pakistan. The Report said that “Pakistan can manage

without the IMF support". It has all the praise for the then economic managers of Pakistan.

Surprisingly, within two years of the "successful completion" of IMF Program in September 2016, we were told that Pakistan has no option but to go to the IMF once again. If a patient suffers a relapse so soon after remission, we have every right to question the authenticity of the clean bill of health given by the IMF in the first place. Since Pakistan is once again going to the fold of the IMF, it is legitimate to question the efficacy of the medicine given to the patient thus far. Will the same medicine prove to be effective 22nd time or will history repeat itself? As far as the so-called reform program under the IMF was concerned, it was again political. Whether a country implements the reform agenda or not, IMF in its quarterly review of the Program would use political language such as "Reform program is broadly on track".

Given the changed geo-strategic environment, Pakistan should have avoided going to the IMF. Few economists had suggested to the Government to avoid going to the IMF. Pakistan should learn to live without the IMF. These economists suggested an alternative to the IMF which include aggressive import compression policy for a year and half, take measures to promote exports and remittances, float sovereign bonds in the debt capital market to raise foreign exchange, float exchangeable bonds, pursue a forward looking macroeconomic policies, and implement wide-ranging structural reforms.

What is in store for Pakistan under the 22nd IMF Program? Slower economic growth in the range of 3.0-4.0 percent in the next three years will continue. The economy would fail to create enough jobs for the new entrants and hence the pool of unemployed, particularly youth and educated youth will keep on rising with all its social consequences. Both budget and current account deficits will widen, resulting in the rise of both public and external debt. Ill-conceived additional tax measures and policies pertaining to power and gas sector will put tremendous burden to poor and fixed income group. Prime Minister's 10 million jobs and 5 million low cost housing initiatives may not succeed under the high interest rate environment. The new IMF Program will create enormous challenges for the economy and given the lack of capacity to implement the program, it is feared that the new program may not see its successful completion.

NOTES

¹ US Treasury (1944).

² See Sandra (2013) and Iqwe (2018) for historical development of Bretton Woods System.

³ The Components of US GDP identified as “Y” in equation form, include Consumption (C), Investment (I), Government Spending (G), and Net Exports (X-M). $Y = C + I + G + (X - M)$ is the standard equational (expenditure) representation of GDP.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ See Pasha (2018) for a detailed discussion on Employment.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ See Khan (2016).

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ Ishrat Hussain termed the decade of the 1990s as lost decade for Pakistan (see Khan (2016).

¹¹ (See Siddiqui et. al (2019) for a detailed discussion.

¹² I am thankful to Asif Qureshi for sharing his thoughts timely. For a detailed discussion on IMF Program, see Qureshi (2019).

¹³ See ESCAP (2013) for a detailed discussion on this issue.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

PAKISTAN'S QUEST FOR SECURITY: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

Dr. Syed Rifaat Hussain*

Abstract

Ever since its emergence in August 1947, Pakistan has been engaged in efforts to seek security against the threat from its Eastern neighbour India. This perennial quest for security led Pakistan to seek alignment with the US in the first two decades of its existence and after 1965 war with India led to its strategic alignment with China following the Sino-Indian war in 1962. After the debacle of 1971 war with India which led to Pakistan's dismemberment and defeat, Islamabad launched a policy of internal alignment by developing its nuclear weapon option. Pakistan faced the spectre of US sanctions as Washington opposed Pakistan's nuclear programme. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 forced a change in Washington's attitude and Pakistan emerged as a frontline state during the second cold war between Washington and Moscow. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 and the subsequent fall of communism in 1991 gave Pakistan short lived sense of victory. The 9/11 terrorist attacks brought new turbulence in Pakistan's security environment and Islamabad was forced to become ally of the US in the global war on terror for the next decade and half. Pakistan continues to suffer from the violent legacy of this war even today.

Keywords: Security, Nuclear Weapons, War in Afghanistan, War on Terror, Sino-Pakistan and Pak-US Ties.

Introduction

A country's security policy is shaped by its threat perceptions and the capabilities required in coping with the perceived challenges. Pakistani threat perceptions have been shaped by what former foreign minister Abdul Sattar has aptly characterized as the *crucible of objective realities* manifested in "threats to its existence (from a hostile India) and the tyranny of imbalance of power."¹ In addition to having to deal with a hostile India in the east, Pakistan had to contend

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with an *irredentist* Afghanistan in the west. These realities created a security environment in which "strategic options open to Pakistan never were extremely attractive..... increasingly risky, and limited in number."²

Although born as a *garrison state*,³ Pakistan did not have sufficient national resources to support military forces that would be capable of defending both wings of a country separated by a hostile neighbour, India. The dilapidated condition of Pakistan's armed forces⁴ and concern for its borders in the face of territorial disputes with its neighbours', India and Afghanistan, forced Karachi⁵ to turn away from South Asia for security assistance. Several other factors induced Karachi to look in the directions of the Western block, particularly the United States. First, Pakistan's ruling elite "hailing from the feudal and to some extent, commercial classes, the bureaucracy and the military" had a liking for the West due to its Western education and cultural outlook. The Quaid-i-Azam himself represented the best of Western education, cultural values and rationality. Secondly, Pakistan's economy was integrated with the West, particularly Britain, during the colonial era and it would not have been easy to transform it along the socialist lines. Pakistan "preferred to have trading partners in the West because they were in a position to supply consumer goods at very competitive prices for local requirements and provided almost assured markets for Pakistan's raw materials."⁶ Thirdly, Pakistan expected strong Western diplomatic and political support from the United States and Great Britain in the settlement of its multiple disputes with India including accession of Kashmir. Finally, "the transfer of power by the British in the subcontinent to the Governments of India and Pakistan had not brought about any immediate change in the Soviet opinion and, since the Soviet Union had apprehensions about the role of the decolonized nations in the world affairs, its own attitude was somewhat cool."⁷

Barely two weeks after its inception, Pakistan's Finance Minister, Ghulam Mohammad, during his informal talks with the US Charge d' Affairs, Charles W. Lewis, Jr., sought capital and technical assistance for Pakistan on the ground that funds were needed to "meet the administrative approximately \$ 2 billion over a period of five years. Immediately thereafter Pakistan submitted to the State Department the following breakdown of Pakistan's requirement \$ 700 million for industrial development, \$ 700 million for agricultural development and \$ 510 million for building and equipping defence services. Further breakdown of the defence expenditure showed \$170 million for the Army, \$ 75 million for the Air Force, \$ 60 million for the Navy and \$205 million to meet the anticipated deficits in Pakistan's military budget."⁸

These Pakistani appeals for urgent financial aid from Washington were greeted with vague promises bordering on 'wait and see' attitude. Several considerations underpinned this American reluctance to assume the role of a military benefactor for Karachi. The first was a continuation of Washington's pre-independence desire to consult with London on matters of importance in South Asia. The second was Washington's insistence on talking a regional approach to the area that called for evenhanded approach vis-à-vis controversies between Pakistan and India. The third factor was the American preoccupation with the European affairs and the consequent denigration of South Asia as an important strategic region. It was not until after the fall of China to the Communists in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War a year later that the US began to pay any serious heed to the South Asian region in the context of its emergent global strategy of the containment of Communism.

Desperate for external aid and in search of a powerful patron to counter-balance India, Pakistan turned toward the United States, which needed regional allies "to build up positions of strength in areas such as the Middle East that were of crucial strategic value."⁹ Pakistan signed a mutual security agreement with the United States in May 1954 and became the most *allied ally* of the US when it joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in September 1954 and the Baghdad Pact in February 1955. This effort to *balance* the strategic threat from India through military association with the United States not only allowed Pakistan to survive in a harsh security environment marked by active conflict with India over Kashmir and tensions with neighbouring Afghanistan over the status of the Durand Line, but it also provided tangible economic and military gains. Between 1954 and 1965, the United States provided Pakistan with US \$ 630 million in direct grant assistance and more than US \$ 670 million concessional sales and defense-support assistance." As a result the Pakistan army, air force and navy were "transformed into fairly modern, well-equipped fighting forces" well-versed in the "latest concepts in military organization and thinking."

While enabling Pakistan to successfully survive in a harsh security environment marked by active conflict with India over Kashmir and tensions with neighbouring Afghanistan over the question of *Pushtoonistan*, this alignment strategy also made the country overly dependent on the West for supply of arms and military equipment.

In the wake of the Sino-Indian war of 1962 in which India suffered a major defeat,¹⁰ the United States shipped arms to India without advance notification to

Pakistan and ignored Pakistani apprehensions that these arms would be used against Pakistan.¹¹ To make things worse, the US urged President Ayub Khan to make a “positive gesture of sympathy and restraint”¹² toward India and advised Pakistan to put its “border talks with China on hold.”¹³ Ayub did not take advantage of India’s vulnerability in its war with China but was disappointed that Pakistani inaction had not been rewarded with a serious negotiation leading to the settlement of the Kashmir dispute. The several rounds of Bhutto - Swaran Singh talks supported by US and British diplomats failed to produce any agreement on Kashmir because India had accused Pakistan of “unlawfully ceding two thousand square miles of “Indian territory” to China.

The limitations of this strategy of external reliance were sharply exposed during the 1965 India-Pakistan war in which the United States failed to come to the help of Pakistan. During the 1965 war, the United States decided to terminate its arms supply relationship with both India and Pakistan, a decision that caused “anger, bitterness, and disillusionment with the United States.”¹⁴ A series of widespread anti-American demonstrations in Pakistan, including the stoning of the US embassy, the burning of United States Information Service library, and mob attacks on the US consulate in Lahore, provided stark testimony to the depth of anti-American sentiment in Pakistan.¹⁵ The prestige and credibility of the United States fell to new depths in Pakistan.

Washington’s decision to cut off all American military assistance to India and Pakistan during the 1965 war affected the latter disproportionately, as over 80 percent of all military support to Pakistan came from the United States. Pakistan quickly realized the grave mistake it had made by putting all its security eggs in the American basket. The perils of single-source dependency on the United States were exacerbated by shifting American strategic priorities in South Asia that were summarized by Kennedy administration the then National Security Council (NSC) aide Robert Komer as, “If we must choose between Pakistan and India, the latter is far more important.”¹⁶ Pakistan was compelled to search for new allies. To offset the loss of American diplomatic and material support, Pakistan turned toward China that was having its own difficulties with India due to Nehru’s *forward policy*.

The outbreak of Sino-Indian war in 1962 rang alarm bells in Washington. To help India “defend itself better should the Chinese Communists renew their attack at an early date,” Washington announced an Anglo-American emergency \$120 million military aid package for India in December 1962.¹⁷ Overriding Pakistani pleas to link the supply of American military assistance to India to settlement of

the Kashmir issue, Kennedy sent a message to Ayub Khan which said the United States believed “the supply of arms to India should not be made contingent on a Kashmir settlement because” Chinese aggression posed “as grave an ultimate threat to Pakistan as to India.”¹⁸ Pakistan refused to go along with such *disingenuous* logic. Pakistan’s unwillingness to cave-in to mounting American demands that “Pakistan should be very careful in dealing with the Chicom” lest it “jeopardize the relations with the Western world” and cause a “very unfortunate reaction” in the United States, only widened the crisis of confidence between the two allies.¹⁹ Pakistan justifiably felt betrayed by Washington.

During a “stiff” meeting with the American ambassador on September 29, Ayub “upbraided the United States for its revocation of solemn pledges regarding defense support; decried the lack of cooperation by the United States and the lack of appreciation for Pakistani efforts to moderate Chinese policies toward Vietnam; and accused the United States of bullying a friendly nation.”²⁰ Pakistan needed support, but it wanted friends, not masters. China offered itself as solid anchor, and Pakistani leaders embraced that offer with unmitigated enthusiasm.

Pakistan-United States relations became sharply acerbic during the Johnson administration. Viewing China as an *outlaw* state which had become a *near-demonic force* whose “aggressive, adventurist and unpredictable” behavior needed to be contained,” not courted, President Johnson decided to withdraw his invitation to the Pakistani President as a punishment for “greeting Mao, Zhou and their compatriots with open arms” and for “pledging lasting friendship and fruitful cooperation” between Pakistan and China.²¹

In his April 14, 1965 letter to President Ayub, Johnson said that Ayub’s proposed visit would “focus public attention on the differences between Pakistan and United States policy toward communist China and might gravely affect continued legislative support for Pakistan’s development and defense efforts.” Under the circumstances, Johnson concluded, “A postponement of the visit appeared the wisest course of action.”²² Ayub expressed anger over the abrupt cancellation of the visit. Inflexible and unforgiving, Robert Komer, a top National Security Council official, defended the US decision and said, “Ayub got the signal, though we need to remind him,” and would be forced to “reflect on the moral that Uncle Sam should not be just regarded as a cornucopia of goodies regardless of what they do or say.”²³

China offered itself as a crucial strategic counterweight to a much larger and overbearing India with which Pakistan had already fought a war over Kashmir. China had its own reasons to seek Pakistan's cooperation. The 1960s began with a Sino-Soviet split over ideological and strategic differences that erupted into the open in 1963, marking the beginning of the Coldest War in Asia. The American decision to ship arms to India exacerbated Chinese fear that the United States intended to contain China militarily. Hemmed in by these military and diplomatic pressures, China reached out to Pakistan because it saw both **defensive** and **offensive** possibilities. Defensively, a friendly Pakistan "could serve to impede Soviet, American, and Indian actions hostile" to China. Offensively, closer ties with Pakistan "would provide China an entrée into the Islamic world, would serve to improve China's image as a beneficent patron of Third World nations and, over the long term, would open the door for greater Chinese influence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean."²⁴

Following the exchange of high level visits in 1964 and 1965, Pakistan and China agreed to common positions on several issues, including a call "for Peoples Republic of China (PRC) seating in the United Nations, support for Afro-Asian solidarity against imperialism and colonialism, consensus on nuclear disarmament, and the continuation of friendly cooperation between China and Pakistan."²⁵ Abandoning its former posture of neutrality, China publicly endorsed Pakistan's position on Kashmir. The joint statement issued on February 23, 1964, after Premier Zhou Enlai's visit to Pakistan, expressed hope that the Kashmir issue would be resolved "in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir as pledged to them by India and Pakistan."²⁶ The most tangible proof of China's appreciation of the security conundrum facing Pakistan came during the 1965 war when China expressed its readiness to intervene in the conflict by opening a second front "against Indian positions in the Himalayas to reduce the pressure on Pakistan if Pakistan requested such help."²⁷

Ayub himself decided against asking China to make such a move because he "feared that both the United States and the Soviet Union would support India," and that "his country would find itself in the unenviable position of facing the hostility of both superpowers."²⁸

After the war, Pakistan's elite and broader public had a much more favorable view of China. Chinese arms began to flow into Pakistan and were proudly displayed at the national day parade on March 23, 1966. During Liu Shao Qi's visit to Pakistan in March 1966, China offered a \$ 100 million grant to Pakistan

to purchase arms from the international market, thereby freeing the country “from overdependence on the West and allowing it to defend itself against India...”²⁹ In July of the same year, the two countries concluded an arms supply agreement worth \$ 120 million that included Chinese T-59 tanks, F-6 fighter jets, and IL-28 bombers.³⁰

By 1970, Chinese weapons constituted 90 percent of Pakistan's modern fighter planes, one-quarter of Pakistan's tank force, one-third of its air force, and nearly two-thirds of its interceptor-bombers. One reason China was willing to provide this weaponry was to bolster Pakistan's capacity for self-defense, which had suffered because of the American arms embargo. A second factor influencing these Chinese decisions was the intensifying Sino-Soviet rivalry in Asia. After suppressing the reform movement known as the *Prague spring* in 1968 and enunciating the Brezhnev doctrine under which the Soviet Union arrogated to itself the right to intervene militarily in other socialist countries, Moscow launched its *Asian Collective Security Plan* in 1969 to contain China. Pakistan objected to the Plan because it excluded China and could only be construed as an anti-China alliance. A Pakistani official statement declared that Pakistan would “never join any security arrangement in Asia which may involve her in the Sino-Soviet confrontation.”³¹

In 1969, Soviet and Chinese troops clashed along the Ussuri River, provoking fears of nuclear war. Seeking to take advantage of the Sino-Soviet split and to extract the United States from the Vietnam War, the Nixon administration decided to improve relations with China. On August 1, 1969, Nixon visited Pakistan and, in a confidential one-to-one meeting with President Yahya Kahn, stated, “The US would welcome accommodation with Communist China and would appreciate it if President Yahya would let Zhou Enlai know this.”³² The two Presidents also discussed China's view of the world. Yahya told Nixon that China felt surrounded by hostile forces and suggested a “dialogue with China to bring China back into the community of nations.”³³ Nixon responded, “Asia cannot move forward if a nation as large as China remains isolated.” He also said that the United States should not participate in “any arrangements designed to isolate China.”³⁴ Yahya arranged a meeting between Kissinger and Air Marshal Sher Ali Khan, who had visited China in July. When asked by Kissinger if there was any perceptible change in China's external behavior, the Air Marshal explained that Zhou maintained that the Soviets were “deliberately provoking” China by trying to extend their territory beyond recognized boundaries.³⁵ Pakistani officials confirmed that Beijing feared the Soviets might attempt a “preemptive attack on China.”³⁶ Yahya delivered Nixon's message to Zhou in November and Pakistan continued to play the crucial role of

intermediary by delivering secret messages between Washington and Beijing until July 1971 when Kissinger made his secret trip to Beijing.

Pakistan's decision to act as a **bridge** between the United States and China enraged Moscow.³⁷ To punish Pakistan for its crucial role in bringing China and United State closer, Moscow decided to throw its strategic weight behind India. Moscow and New Delhi concluded the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Peace in August 1971. The signing occurred while Pakistan's army was fighting a war for the survival of the country against the forces of secession in East Pakistan led by the Awami League, which had won the 1970 national elections on the basis of Sheikh Mujib's six points. Awami League was being fully backed by India. As the East Pakistan crisis deepened, former Pakistani Foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto traveled to China to seek military assistance.

Bhutto told his Chinese hosts, "in order to intimidate us, India has placed in battle position its armed forces, including heavy armor and artillery and aircraft on the borders of both wings of Pakistan. These feverish military activities lead to one conclusion only. That is, India is planning to achieve its objective against Pakistan through armed conflict."³⁸ Aware of the presence of nearly 40 divisions of Soviet troops on China's borders and the security clauses contained in the Indo-Soviet Treaty, Acting Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei was non-committal. Reiterating Peking's established position he said:

*Our Pakistani friends may rest assured that should Pakistan be subjected to foreign aggression, the Chinese government and people will, as always, resolutely support the Pakistani people in their struggle to defend their state sovereignty and national independence. The Chinese Government and people are greatly concerned over the present tension in the Subcontinent. We maintain that the internal affairs of any country must be handled by its own people. The East Pakistan question is the internal affair of Pakistan and a reasonable settlement should be sought by the Pakistani people themselves, and it is absolutely impermissible for any foreign country to carry out interference and subversion under any pretext.*³⁹

With the outbreak of the third Indo-Pakistan war in 1971, the Chinese issued statements of outrage condemning the Indians and fully supporting Pakistan. In the first week of December 1971, the Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan tried to arrange a meeting between Mao Zedong and President Yahya Khan in Kashghar but the meeting could not take place due to latter's "negative response."⁴⁰ Beijing continued diplomatic support to Pakistan could not help avert Pakistan's military defeat and the dismemberment of the country. But after the creation of

Bangladesh, China used its first veto in the Security Council to block the entry of Bangladesh into the UN until the vexed issue of Pakistani **war crimes** in East Pakistan was resolved to the satisfaction of the truncated **new** Pakistan. The decision to veto Bangladesh entry into the world body was a difficult one for China because of its long-standing opposition to use of the veto and its well-known sympathies for the Bangladeshis. More importantly, it “defined the extent to which China could go to stand by Pakistan in a situation of crisis.”⁴¹ China also voiced its support for the Simla Agreement (1972) which normalized relations between India and Pakistan, and the New Delhi Agreement (1973) which led to the release of over 93,000 Pakistani security personnel who had been taken as prisoners of war by India following Pakistan’s military defeat in 1971. After the East-Pakistan military debacle and the birth of Bangladesh in 1971, China took it upon itself to totally rehabilitate the Pakistani armed forces.⁴² Between 1971 and 1978, China assisted Pakistan to build two defense-related mega projects, the Heavy Rebuild Factory for T-59 tanks, and the F-6 Aircraft Rebuild Factory.⁴³

Despite this solid Chinese help and US diplomatic tilt toward Pakistan during the 1971, the very fact that Pakistan had been defeated and dismembered by India forced Pakistan to pursue a strategy of **internal balancing** with a view to meeting its national security needs. While forging closer ties with the Third World and the oil-rich Muslim states, Islamabad launched its bid for a nuclear weapons capability that became a matter of strategic necessity following the detonation of an underground nuclear device by India in May 1974. Because of its nuclear pursuits, Islamabad became the target of American coercive pressure. In 1977 all American economic aid to Pakistan was suspended and in April 1979 additional sanctions were imposed.

After India detonated its first nuclear device in May 1974, Beijing offered “firm and resolute support to Pakistan’s just struggle in defense of its national independence and sovereignty against foreign aggression and interference, including that against nuclear threat and nuclear blackmail.”⁴⁴ In 1976, Prime Minister Bhutto gained “China’s acquiescence in helping Pakistan develop a nuclear weapon, including the provision of uranium for a Pakistani enrichment facility.”⁴⁵

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 marked the beginning of new Cold War and Washington, out of its strategic compulsions of fighting the **evil** Soviet empire, revived its security links with Islamabad by offering the latter a five-year, \$ 3.2 billion package in economic and military assistance. Islamabad was also granted a six-year waiver of Symington-Glenn sanctions. During

the Afghan war, Pakistan's nuclear programme gathered momentum while its conventional military capability significantly improved. With the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989, Pakistan's active nuclear programme once again became the focus of American punitive actions. In October 1990, all American aid to Islamabad was suspended and in August 1993, Washington imposed sanctions on both China and Pakistan for violating the missile technology guidelines. In April 1994, Washington offered to lift sanctions against Pakistan provided Islamabad agreed to a verifiable cap on its nuclear programme. Islamabad refused to accept the deal.

In January 1996, under the Brown Amendment, Washington agreed to ease some Pressler restrictions to permit delivery of \$368 million worth of Pakistan-owned military equipment and the resumption of economic aid, investment guarantees, and military training. Islamabad was not given the F-16s that it had paid for. Instead proceeds from their sale to a third party were to be reimbursed. The passage of the Brown Amendment and its subsequent implementation not only marked the failure of American punitive strategy and sanction-oriented approach towards Islamabad coupled with a tacit acceptance of Pakistan as a de facto nuclear weapon state but also signaled "the Clinton administration's desire to put relations with Pakistan on a friendlier footing."

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan also raised alarm bells in China. Chinese analysts raised special concerns about Soviet designs on Balochistan.⁴⁶ The seriousness with which Beijing viewed Moscow's military intervention in Afghanistan was reflected in a toughly worded government statement that **vigorously condemned** Moscow's **wanton violation** of all norms of international behavior and warned that its **hegemonistic action** posed a "grave threat to peace and security in Asia and whole world." The statement called the Soviet invasion "a grave step for a southward thrust to the Indian Ocean" and it warned that Moscow's extension of the Brezhnev doctrine of **limited sovereignty** to nonaligned and Islamic countries with which it had signed treaties of friendship and cooperation was an ominous portent.⁴⁷

To contain the Soviet threat, Beijing developed wide-ranging cooperation with Pakistan and formed a quasi-alliance with the United States to roll back the Soviet military advance into Afghanistan. China, through Pakistan, "provided covert military supplies worth \$ 200 million to the Afghan resistance and agreed to provide the US with facilities to monitor Soviet activities in its Xinjiang province."⁴⁸

Xinjiang was also used as a base for training Afghan Mujahedeen to fight the Soviet Union.⁴⁹

As part of this trilateral strategic cooperation directed against the USSR, Beijing also provided critical help to Pakistan to strengthen its deterrent capability against India. Taking advantage of its role as a front-line state in the Afghan war, Pakistan intensified its quest for nuclear weapons capability. The lifting of US anti-proliferation sanctions against Islamabad gave Pakistan the necessary breathing space to pursue this quest. The United States turned a blind eye to this Pakistani effort because Washington needed Islamabad's cooperation to push the Soviets from Afghanistan. The acquisition of nuclear weapon capability by Pakistan gave rise to a situation of "non-weaponised deterrence in South Asia which enabled a smaller and conventionally weaker Pakistan avoids becoming victim of Indian nuclear black-mail. The logic of this existential deterrence was most forcefully demonstrated in 1990 when faced with a peril of nuclear escalation both sides "decided against colliding with each other over Kashmir." To a lesser degree the same thing happened in 1987 when confronted with unpredictable consequences of nuclear signaling by Islamabad, New Delhi had to call off its military exercise *Brass-tacks* which Islamabad had found threatening for its existence.

In May 1998 India and Pakistan conducted rival nuclear tests. These tests were followed by a limited War between India and Pakistan over Kargil in 1999 that was resolved through American diplomatic intervention. The Kargil conflict was widely seen as reckless adventure by Pakistan and congealed international perception of Pakistan as irresponsible nuclear-armed state. It also evoked a great deal of sympathy for India as Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee had taken the Lahore initiative to bury the hatchet between the two countries during his landmark visit to Lahore in February 1999. Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear weapon capability helped Pakistan resolve its traditional security dilemma vis-à-vis its hostile neighbour India. Nuclear weapons appear to have had three general effects on inter-state relations. First nuclear weapons provide the nuclear state with an "infrangible guarantee of its independence and physical security." Second, mutual deterrence among antagonistic nuclear states places a limitation on violence and in turn acts as a brake on total war. Third, by altering the *offense-defence* balance in favour of defence, nuclear weapons have made it possible for weaker states to 'defend themselves effectively against large powerful countries.'

Pakistan's elusive quest for security experienced new turbulence in the post-nuclear period. The 9/11 terrorist attack on the United States created new

security dilemmas for Pakistan. Faced with the coercive American pressure either to “be with America or with the terrorists” and in case the latter “be prepared to be bombed backed to the stone age,”⁵⁰ Islamabad not only jettisoned the Taliban regime in neighbouring Afghanistan but also agreed to provide vital logistical support for **Operation Enduring Freedom**. In its role as a frontline state against terrorism, Pakistan undertook an extensive set of efforts to counter the looming threat of religious militancy and overcome Al-Qaeda’s terrorist threat. These measures have included the following:

- Sharing of intelligence on terrorist activity with the United States and its allies;
- Ban on Jihadi organizations such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM), Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-Jafariya (TNFJ), Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM);
- Strengthening of the anti-terrorist law and setting up of anti-terrorist courts with the military’s participation;
- Condemnation at the highest level of acts of international terrorism performed by groups with societal links and roots in Pakistan;
- Ban on display and carrying of weapons;
- Freezing of the financial assets of the banned Jihadi groups;
- Freezing of bank accounts of more than 50 organizations suspected of links with sectarianism or international terrorism;
- The decision to incorporate the anti-terrorism recommendations of the inter-governmental Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering in Pakistani banking laws;⁵¹
- Arrest and trial of those involved in terrorist activity;
- Hunting down and arrest of remnants of Al-Qaeda network in Pakistan;
- Ban on “hate speech” during Friday prayers;
- Setting up of a special anti-terrorist task force.

The efforts made by the Pakistan government to control Al-Qaeda’s terrorist threat yielded some concrete results. Pakistan captured large number of terrorists.⁵² Those captured by Pakistani authorities have included many prominent Al-Qaeda figures such as Abu Zubayda (March 2002 in Faisalabad), Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (March 2003 in Rawalpindi) and Abu Faraj al-Libbi (May 2005 in Mardan).⁵³ The focus of Pakistan’s anti-terrorist campaign since 2001 has remained Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)⁵⁴ which, because of its geographical

proximity with neighbouring Afghanistan, tribal codes offering protection to honored guests, reputation as a *lawless frontier*, and difficult terrain emerged as the main sanctuary for Al-Qaeda and Taliban elements. In an attempt to open up these fabled *No-Go Areas* especially the North and South Waziristan, to “prevent outflow of terrorists/miscreants and unwanted elements from entering into Pakistan,”⁵⁵ Pakistan military launched several military operations with mixed results. After the killing of Osama Bin Laden by US Special Forces in Abbottabad in May 2011, Pakistan, reacting to allegations of its complicity in harboring OBL, decided to take it fight against terrorism to its logical end. In June 2014, Pakistan military under General Raheel Sharif launched ground offensive Zarb-e-Azab in North Waziristan to destroy the infrastructure of terrorism. In the ongoing operation, over 2000 terrorist have been killed. As part of this campaign Pakistan has tried to improve its bilateral cooperation with Afghanistan. During President Ashraf Ghani’s visit to Pakistan in November 2014 both countries decided to coordinate and deepen their cooperation in jointly fighting the terrorists who pose a grave danger to both countries.

Following terrorist attack on Army Public School on December 16, 2014 in which 140 students were killed, Islamabad announced National Action Plan to fight violent extremism and combat terrorism with new vigor and resolve. Pakistan also appealed to Kabul to take action against Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) that had claimed responsibility for the APS attack.

The new army leadership led by General Qamar Javed Bajwa launched Raad Al Fasad in 2017 to fight against forces of sectarian and religious militancy across the country. The outbreak of “Panama”⁵⁶ corruption scandal and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s family’s involvement in it made it exceedingly difficult for Islamabad to pursue the fight against terrorism single-mindedly. Supreme Court of Pakistan removed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif from office in 2017 and Mr. Shahid Khaqan Abbasi as the interim Prime Minister replaced him. The 2018 General Elections led to the electoral victory of Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf led by former cricketer, Imran Khan.

The change in government in Islamabad coincided with the advent of Donald Trump’s rise to power in the White House. President Donald Trump like previous US governments asked to do more to Pakistan. Instead of accepting Pakistan’s sacrifice in global war on terrorism, he appreciated India’s role in the stability of Afghanistan. At a later stage, US administration decided to withdraw half of American troops from Afghanistan. For this purpose, President Trump

appointed veteran Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad as the State Department envoy on Afghanistan and tasked him to find a political settlement to the Afghan war by initiating direct contacts with the Taliban insurgents. Ambassador Khalilzad toured Pakistan, China Afghanistan and the Gulf countries to mobilize regional support for his peace initiative. Several rounds of direct talks between Ambassador Khalilzad and Afghan representatives have been held in Doha, Qatar where the Taliban have maintained their office. Pakistan has played a pivotal role in facilitating talks between the Taliban insurgents and Washington and Washington has publicly acknowledged this constructive role played by Islamabad.

As the above narrative suggests, the most serious security challenge facing Pakistan is the threat from religious Islamic militancy running rampant in its tribal areas. Pakistan's security environment will remain turbulent unless the country is able to contain, tame and ultimately defeat this menace, which has caused the death of over 50, 000 civilians including 7000 security personnel and losses worth 100 billion rupees to national exchequer. To effectively deal with this challenge, Pakistan has once again tried to revive its National Action Plan. In the wake of NAP's revival, Islamabad has launched a concerted drive against all Jihadi and militant groups operating in the country.

NOTES

- ¹ Abdul Sattar, "Foreign Policy," Rafi Raza, Editor, *Pakistan in Perspective, 1947-1997* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 67.
- ² Stephen P. Cohen, *The Pakistan Army* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p. 147.
- ³ Ishtiaq Ahmed, *Pakistan: The Garrison State: Origins, Evolution, Consequences: 1947- 2011* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013).
- ⁴ Mohammad Ayub Khan, the first Muslim Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army (1951-1958), and later Pakistan's president (1958-1969) recalled Pakistan's defence capability at the time in the following words:
Our army was badly equipped and terribly disorganized. It was almost immediately engaged in escorting the refugees who streamed by the million into Pakistan; and not long after that it was also involved in the fighting in Kashmir. Throughout this period we had no properly organized units, no equipment, and hardly any ammunition. Our plight was indeed desperate. But from the moment Pakistan came into being I was certain of one thing: Pakistan's survival was vitally linked with the establishment of a well-trained, well-equipped, and well-led army. I was determined to create this type of military shield for my country.
See Muhammad Ayub Khan, *Friends, Not Masters: A Political Autobiography*, New York, 1967, pp. 20-21.
- ⁵ Karachi was the Federal Capital of Pakistan from 1947 to 1958, after which Rawalpindi became the interim capital city and finally the foundation of a new capital territory was laid out next to Rawalpindi and the new Federal capital was named as Islamabad.
- ⁶ Mahboob A Popatia, *Pakistan's Relations with the Soviet Union 1947-49: constraints and Compulsions*, (Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1988) p. 29.
- ⁷ Ibid.
- ⁸ M.S. Venkataramani, *The American Role in Pakistan, 1947-1958*, Lahore, 1984, pp. 15, 19-20.
- ⁹ Ibid.
- ¹⁰ Panicked by the instant meltdown of his army, a desperate Nehru sent two letters to President Kennedy requesting American military help. On November 19, describing India's predicament as "really desperate," he requested the "immediate dispatch of twelve squadrons of all-weather US fighter aircraft and the prompt installation of a sophisticated radar network." In addition, he asked that US personnel not only operate the requested radar stations but also pilot the fighter jets. Robert J. McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India and Pakistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 292.
- ¹¹ During Ayub Khan's visit to Washington in July 1961, President Kennedy assured the Pakistani President that "If a Sino-Soviet conflict ever erupted and India asked the United States for military aid, he would consult with Ayub before making any commitments." Ibid. p. 332.
- ¹² Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001), p. 112.
- ¹³ Feroz Hassan Khan, *Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), p. 40.
- ¹⁴ Robert J McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, p. 332.
- ¹⁵ Ibid.
- ¹⁶ McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, p. 283.
- ¹⁷ Ibid. p. 296.
- ¹⁸ Ibid. p. 308.
- ¹⁹ Ibid. p. 296.
- ²⁰ Ibid.
- ²¹ Ibid. p. 321.
- ²² Ibid. p. 322.
- ²³ Ibid. p. 324.
- ²⁴ Gill, *Chinese Arms Transfers*, p. 143. Pakistan has played a key role in shaping a positive image of China in the Muslim world. For example, after the July 2009 Xinjiang riots that resulted in at least 193 deaths due to Beijing's "strike hard" policy, Islamabad deployed its diplomatic skills to prevent the issue from being included on the agenda of the Organization of Islamic Conference annual meeting, thus sparing China a damaged image in the eyes of the Muslim states. See "Pakistan Saved China from Embarrassment on Xinjiang Violence: Chinese Ambassador," *Daily Times*, September 5, 2009.
- ²⁵ Ibid.
- ²⁶ K. M. Arif, Editor, *China-Pakistan Relations, 1947-1980* (Lahore: Vanguard Press, 1984), p. 9.
- ²⁷ Barnds, "China's Relations with Pakistan," p. 475.
- ²⁸ Ibid. p. 476.
- ²⁹ Ibid. During that visit, Liu Shao qi declared that the "Pakistani people can rest assured that, when Pakistan resolutely fights against foreign aggression in defense of its national independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, the 650 million Chinese people will stand unswervingly on their side and give them resolute support and assistance." For full text of Liu's speech, see Arif, *China-Pakistan Relations*, p. 102.
- ³⁰ Gill, *Chinese Arms Transfers*, p. 146.
- ³¹ Aparna Pande, *Explaining Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Escaping India* (London: Rout ledge, 2011), p. 123.

- ³² Yukinori Komine, *Secrecy in US Foreign Policy: Nixon-Kissinger and the Rapprochement with China* (London: Ashgate, 2008), p. 95.
- ³³ *Ibid.*
- ³⁴ *Ibid.*
- ³⁵ *Ibid.*
- ³⁶ *Ibid.* p. 96
- ³⁷ Soviet pique was reflected in Gromyko's comment on Pakistan's role as a 'dirty broker' following Kissinger's secret trip to Beijing in July 1971. Cited in Khan, "Pakistan-China Relations," p. 12.
- ³⁸ "Pakistan Delegation in China," *Peking Review* (November 12, 1971), p. 5.
- ³⁹ *Ibid.* p. 23.
- ⁴⁰ Mohammed Yunus, *Bhutto and the break up of Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 21.
- ⁴¹ Khan, "Pakistan-China Relations," p. 12.
- ⁴² Gill, *Chinese Arms Transfers*, p. 148.
- ⁴³ Fazl-ur-Rehman, "Pakistan's Evolving Relations with China, Russia, and Central Asia," Iwashita Akihiro, Editor, *Eager Eyes Fixed on Eurasia: Russia and Its Neighbours in Crisis* (Hokkaido: Slavic Research Center, 2007), p. 109.
- ⁴⁴ *Ibid.* p. 150.
- ⁴⁵ *Ibid.*
- ⁴⁶ Describing Balochistan as the "gateway from Central Asia to the Sea," rich in natural resources, and strategically placed at the mouth of the Persian Gulf, a Chinese analyst declared:
- Because of its strategic position and rich resources Baluchistan has ever been coveted by the imperialists. Tsarist Russia, in particular, had tried on many occasions to carve a passage south through the Baluchistan area in Afghanistan and Iran to reach the Indian Ocean and secure warm-water harbors on the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf. To make the old tsar's dream come true, the new tsars are trying by every means to ...bring the Baluchistan under their influence." "Moscow covets Baluchistan," *Peking Review* (March 10, 1980), p. 27.
- ⁴⁷ Cited in Robert G. Sutter, *Chinese Foreign Policy: Developments After Mao* (New York: Praeger, 1986), P. 114.
- ⁴⁸ Shahzad Akhter, "Sino-Pakistan Ties: An Assessment," *Strategic Studies* (Winter 2010), P. 74.
- ⁴⁹ Yitzhak Shichor, "The Great Wall of Steel: Military and Strategy" in Fredrick S. Starr, Editor, *Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland* (Armonk: M.E.Sharpe, 2004), p.149.
- ⁵⁰ Pervez Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006), 201.
- ⁵¹ FATF was set up at the G7 meeting in Paris in 1989 to monitor the implementation of measures against money laundering. The FATF Eight Special Recommendations on Terrorism Financing issued on October 31, 2001 are: 1. Ratification and implementation of UN instruments; 2) Criminalizing the financing of terrorism and associated money laundering; 3) Freezing and confiscating terrorist assets; 4) Reporting suspicious transactions related to terrorism; 5) Increasing international cooperation; 6) Regulating alternative remittance systems; 7) Disclosing wire transfer details; and 8) Regulating non-profit organizations. For more details see: www.oecd.org/fatf/SecsTF-en.htm
- ⁵² Pervez Musharraf, op. cit.
- ⁵³ Aarish Ullah Khan, op. cit., 30.
- ⁵⁴ FATA comprised seven Agencies of Mohmand, Khyber, Kurram, Orakzai, Bajaur, North Waziristan and South Waziristan and six Frontier Regions, including the Malakand Agency. The region stretches nearly 230 km from Bajaur Agency to South Waziristan. FATA has a population of about 7 million and covers an area of 27,220 sq. kms with a porous border of 450 km with Afghanistan. The Federal government directly administers FATA with the Governor North West Frontier Province acting as an Agent to the President. For details see Dr. Noor ul Haq et al, "Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan" *IPRI Paper 10* (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2005), 71-88
- ⁵⁵ Maj General M. Shaukat Sultan Khan, "Pakistan's Struggle Against Domestic and Global Terrorism in the Security Realm," in *Political Violence and Terrorism in South Asia*, eds. Pervez Iqbal Cheema, et al., (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2006), 26.
- ⁵⁶ The Panama scandal broke out in April 2016. The papers leaked from a Panama-based law firm, Mossack Fonesca and CO Limited made startling revelations about assets hidden through 214, 488 offshore companies by the wealthy and the mighty from across the world including Pakistan. The papers linked three of Nawaz Sharif's children, Hussain Nawaz and Hassan Nawaz and their sister Maryam Nawaz to offshore companies Nescol and Nielson. For details see Danyal Adam Khan, "How one of Pakistan's most controversial cases has unfolded," *Herald*, September 24, 2018.

TRANSFORMATION OF WORLD ORDER: CHALLENGES AND OPTIONS FOR PAKISTAN

*Dr. Moonis Ahmar**

Abstract

The transformation of world order from bipolar to unipolar following the collapse of the Soviet bloc reflected paradigm shift in global power politics. It was in the wake of the end of the cold war in 1991 that the then American President George H.W. Bush came up with the concept of 'New World Order.' Twenty eight years after the end of cold war the world is transforming from unipolar to multipolar. The decline of American power and the rise of a new power bloc composed of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa known as BRICS, will in coming decades reshape world order. Pakistan as the world's six populous country and the only nuclear state in the Islamic world will face enormous challenges in the transformational phase of world order. How Pakistan will deal with global issues fraught with tests and trials is a major question. This paper will analyze issues which tend to deepen the level of insecurity in global power structure and to what extent there is a possibility of averting global disorder in the wake of environmental, economic and security threats.

Keywords: World War-II, Cold War, World Order, Unipolar World, New World Order, BRICS, Preventive Diplomacy, United Nations, Peace Keeping, Peace Making.

Introduction

The phenomenon of world order is as old as the modern history of this world. For centuries, the world had several centers of power and that order remained in practice till the end of the Second World War. The defeat of Axis powers and the decline of European empires in the post-1945 era led to the emergence of a bipolar system dominated by the then Soviet Union and the United States. The ideological division of the world with two poles of power shaped the dynamics of world politics. The Soviet led communist bloc and the US dominated democratic and capitalist world was the essence of bipolar order.

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The transformation of world order from bipolar to unipolar following the collapse of the Soviet bloc reflected paradigm shift in global power politics. It was in the wake of the end of the cold war in 1991 that the then American President George H.W. Bush came up with the concept of 'New World Order.' In an article on "Bush's talk of a New World Order Foreign Policy Tool or Mere Slogan?" Don Oberdorfer argued that "President Bush actually had spoken of a "new world order" at least once before, in February 1990 political speech hailing the crumbling of the Iron Curtain. By August 30, the phrase became a central feature of Bush's public oratory, including an address to the UN General Assembly and three speeches to joint sessions of Congress. According to a presidential documents published by the White House, President Bush mentioned publicly to a "New World Order" at least 42 times from last summer to the end of March 1991".¹ According to Joseph Nye in his article; "What New World Order?" "the 1991 Persian Gulf War was, according to President Bush, about "more than one small country; it is a big idea; a new world order," with "new ways of working with various nations . . . peaceful settlement of disputes, solidarity against aggression, reduced and controlled arsenals and just treatment of all peoples."² He asked a question that, "Why not simply leave the task of world order to the UN? Because the United Nations is the sum of its member nations and the US is by far the largest power."³ Robert T. Grey a former Political Counselor at the United States Mission stated that:

*The new threats to the international order now and in the future, are not likely to be armies crossing international frontiers. They will most often be ethnic and tribal conflicts within nation states, violation of human rights, humanitarian disaster resulting from massive refugee flows across national borders.*⁴

For critics, President George H.W. Bush's idea of a New World Order was a non-starter because neither peaceful settlement of disputes nor measures against aggression or reduction of weapons, became the basis of that order. Contrary to the assertion of President Bush that the New World Order will be based on shared principles and responsibilities of major powers through a responsible role of the UN, the world plunged into the vicious cycle of intra-state conflicts, violence and terrorism. The New World Order emerging from the ashes of the Old World Order faced numerous difficulties, crises and challenges. Therefore, it is rightly argued by Carl Gershman that, "the essence of the political crisis facing the world today is that no new international order has yet emerged to replace the old one that has disappeared. It may be emerging, but it is far from securely established, and its weaknesses and vulnerabilities are dangerous. The old state system succeeded, however crudely, when it was able to establish an equilibrium – between states

during the 19th century and between divergent political systems during the Cold War. All that is now history and the new challenge is to construct an international order that can contain disorder and gradually bring the forces of violence and disruption to submit to a framework of law.”⁵

Almost three decades following the end of the cold war, the world is transforming from unipolar to multipolar. The decline of American power and the rise of a new power bloc composed of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa known as BRICS will in coming decades reshape world order. Pakistan as the world's six populous country and the only nuclear state in the Islamic world will face enormous challenges in the transformational phase of world order. It is rightly argued by the analysts of international affairs that 19th century was Pax Britannica; 20th century Pax Americana and 21st century will be Pax Asiana. How Pakistan will deal with global issues fraught with tests and trials is a major question.

This paper will examine transformation in world order by raising the following questions:

- What is world order and how it has *transformed* in the last 74 years?
- Will American/Western hold over world order *diminish* resulting into the emergence of multipolar world with several centers of power?
- How *vacuum* in the prevailing world order is a threat to global and regional peace and security?
- What are Pakistan's options and challenges to deal with the transformation of world order?

Furthermore, the paper will analyze issues which tend to deepen the level of insecurity in global power structure and to what extent there is a possibility of averting global disorder in the wake of environmental, economic and security threats.

Dynamics of World Order

Words like World, International or Global are synonymous with one another. International order is defined as,

Sometimes used as a synonym for international system. It usually refers to a pattern of activities or the set of arrangements that characterizes the mutual conduct of states. In this sense, it has a number of formal

attributes – political, diplomatic, legal, economic, military – which ensures method and regularity to international relations⁶.

Therefore, one can argue that the ‘contemporary international order is based on European state system established at the peace of Westphalia in 1648; multiplicity of sovereign states coexisting in a condition of anarchy which nevertheless, recognize common standards of behavior and interaction. There have been other international orders, such as empires, suzerainties and tribute systems with different mechanisms, but the contemporary order, which is now global, is based on a dismissal of world government and a presumption in favor of state sovereignty. It is said to display order in the sense that it recognizes regulating elements (e.g. balance of power, diplomacy, law) which provide a framework within which interaction takes place.⁷’ Three conclusions could be drawn from the definition of International order. First, states form the core of international order as their regulation and interaction can result into cooperation or conflict. Second, the contemporary international order has its roots in the treaty of Westphalia of 1648, which became the basis of nation state system. Third, International order would remain incomplete unless balance of power, diplomacy and law are included. The International order which emerged from the ashes of the Second World War replaced centuries of order which was imperial and colonial dominated by the European powers.

Peter Calvocoressi, a noted writer on World politics explains world order as: “World order is commonly measured by the sum of international and civil wars but financial instability, if seemingly less destructive, may destabilize world order no less than armed conflict. And just as the international political system was proving too weak to cope with the swelling range of armed conflict, the international economic order – both as provider and as regulator – was showing signs of lagging behind the process of change.⁸” Calvocoressi’s contention of world order makes sense because unless conflicts are peacefully resolved, there is little possibility of stability in international economic order. Since politics and economic are interlinked, any effort to stabilize world order cannot materialize unless issues which trigger anger, antagonism, violence, radicalization, militancy, wars and terrorism are adequately dealt with. Since 1945, the world has not experienced Third World War but the credit should not go to United Nations of averting another global war but to nuclear deterrence. Any global war or war between the two nuclear states will result into massive destruction.

After the end of cold war, the then Secretary General of UN Boutros Boutros-Ghali unveiled UN’s ‘agenda for peace’. Earlier, the then American

President George H. W. Bush had talked about his vision of 'New World Order.' In his 'agenda for peace' concept, Ghali argued that, "the passing of an old order does not of itself create a new order. Peace requires a comprehensive effort, across the spectrum of action and time. Preventive diplomacy seeks to resolve conflicts before violence breaks out. Peacemaking and peace-keeping are required to halt conflict and preserve peace once it is achieved. If successful, they strengthen the chances for post-conflict peace building. Preventive diplomacy is to avoid a crisis and peace-building is to prevent a recurrence. Each step reinforces the others. All are essential for the maintenance of international peace and security.⁹"

Does it mean that nuclear weapons despite their destructive capability, are responsible for maintaining superficial peace in the world? The phenomenon of 'zero sum game' in case of a nuclear war, is enough to prevent such a thing to happen. Therefore, one cannot deny the relevance of nuclear deterrence in the post-Second World War era. Dynamics of world order cannot be analyzed unless the work of Joshua S. Goldstein is cited. Examining the evolution of International Order, the author holds that,

Over the centuries, international institutions and rules have grown stronger, more complicated and important. International order started out based largely on raw power but it has evolved to be more on legitimacy and habit than on power. Domestic law, too, was once enforced only by the most powerful for the most powerful. The first states and civilizations were largely military regimes. Law was what the top ruler decreed. International law and organization likewise began as terms imposed by powerful winners or losers after wars¹⁰.

For Goldstein, "twentieth-century world order depended heavily on the America power and for a few decades, on the division of power between the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States at times, came close to following the explicit role of "world police force." But in truth, the world is too large for any single state - even a hegemon - to guard effectively. Rather, the world's states usually go along with the rules established by the many powerful state within constant policing.¹¹" The notion of single power dominating the International order is the bottom line. Goldstein further elaborated his perspective of world order by arguing that, "World orders encompass not only power relationships, but the rules and norms that transform behavior and patterns on international stage. International Law provides an important and detailed guide to such behavior, which states generally - though not follow the laws of war. One feature of world order during the decade preceding 2001, was the increasing role of international law.¹²" But, the erosion of international morality along with international

institutions like the UN, International Court of Justice (ICJ) and International Criminal Court (ICC) to prevent aggression, occupation and violation of human rights by state security forces tends to augment the fragility of world order. Whether it is the use of force without seeking mandate from the UN Security Council in Syria, Yemen, Somalia¹³ and Afghanistan or the policy of ethnic cleansing unleashed by the Indian security forces in occupied Kashmir, Israel in occupied West Bank and Myanmar against the Rohingya Muslims, there is no order to check blatant violation of UN Charter or the Universal Declaration of Human Rights passed on December 10, 1948. Critics of world order argue that the erosion and fragile nature of international system is the result of the collapse of bi-polar world and the emergence of a unipolar world order. When states and not international institutions responsible for maintaining world order get an upper hand and when the UN is bypassed while using force, it means the degeneration and fragility of world order.

The dynamics of world order can be further analyzed by outlining eight major realities. First, Euro-Atlantic dominated world order is still in existence since the end of the cold war. While Europe is a junior partner of the U.S led world order, it largely shares cultural, religious, economic and political values with North America. Countries representing Group of Seven, called as G-7¹⁴ is the most powerful economic, political and security framework which came into existence in the aftermath of oil crisis of 1973-74. Briefly, it was transformed as G-8 when the Russian federation was co-opted after the collapse of the USSR but was barred when Moscow occupied Crimea in 2014. G-7 members meet every year and discuss global financial and security order and threats to their interests. Contradictions within the Euro-Atlantic alliance on issues ranging from terrorism, extremism and NATO exist, but the alliance is still intact. Second, the reality that there exists great leadership vacuum in world order in the event of a crisis cannot be denied. Those who wield power are unable to stop violence and bloodshed in Libya, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Palestine, Afghanistan and Kashmir. They were also unable to prevent the genocide of Rohingya Muslims at the hands of fanatic Buddhist groups and the military. As a result, one can observe surge of violence, terrorism and inadvertent use of force in different parts of the world. The United Nations, which is supposed to play a leadership role in enforcing peace and security, is in the background and powerful states like America, Russia, Israel and India get a free hand in dealing with issues which require consensus and multilateral diplomacy. When recently American President Donald Trump signs an order which recognizes Golan heights (part of Syria but occupied by Israel in June 1967 Arab-Israeli war) it means violation of UN Security Council Resolution 242 which called upon Israel to

withdraw from Arab occupied areas of Gaza, Sinai, West Bank and Golan heights. Unilateralism has permeated in the existing world order with serious implications.

Third, the reality of BRICS as an alternate to the U.S led world order will go a long way in transforming not only international system but also regional orders. Formed in 2009, BRICS favors transforming the world order by inducting multipolarity and giving space to those countries which are not in consonance with post-cold war realities. Will BRICS be able to provide an alternate leadership to the world? It all depends on the unity of the Euro-Atlantic Alliance and the G-7 members to sustain their edge as far as world order is concerned. But it seems, BRICS representing the non-Western world has the capability and resources to cause a shift from unipolar to multipolar world. Fourth, the rise of China as the world's second largest economy with its political, economic and security clout in parts of Asia and Africa through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is perceived as a major change in global order. It is estimated that in coming 10 years' time, China will supersede the United States as the world's number one economic power. And it is not the economic might of China which will transform the world order but it is also world's second largest military spender. Fifth, the role of non-state actors particularly multinational corporations, corporate sector and violent/ terrorist groups also shape and influence the world order. When erosion of state actors creates a vacuum non-state actors take advantage of the space which they get. The surge of income disparity as a result of corporate culture tends to augment extremism and radicalization of youth. The absence of a mechanism to deal with multiple threats of violence and terrorism in the aftermath of Christ Church terrorist attack on two mosques on March 15, 2019, cannot be taken lightly. In that case, more threats from state actors, is the one from the network of violent and terrorist groups.

Sixth, the fragility of global order cannot be analyzed unless the threat of global warming and climate change is also taken into account. Environmental pollution is the single man made threat which cannot be dealt by erecting a wall. Unfortunately, the U.S President Donald Trump announced America's withdrawal from 2015 Paris agreement on Climate change mitigation. Erosion of glaciers, rise in sea levels, melting of Arctic and Antarctic cannot be termed as mere superficial threats but are real. The absence of wise, prudent, visionary and bold leadership at the international level is responsible for the mushrooming of environmental threats in different parts of the world. If the United States, which still claims to be the world's only superpower, doesn't feel responsible to be part of Paris agreement in that case, it will have to face consequences of global warming and climate change.

Seventh, global order will also be at stake if the gap in resources particularly water and energy widens. Already, world's population has reached around 8 billion people. It is feared that if there is no control over the surge in population, the world will experience serious food crisis and famine. Same is true as far as shortage of water and energy is concerned. Already, water crisis particularly in water deficient countries will augment inter and intra-water conflicts. Over population and unplanned urbanization will deepen human security issues. The marginalization of international institutions dealing with energy, food and water crisis is because of irresponsible attitude and behavior of states with surplus resources.

Finally, the role of technology in generating crisis and conflict is a major reality in contemporary global order. Certainly, technology is a double edged sword because it can be used for human development and destruction. Presently, the world spends 1.6 trillion dollars on military expenditures out of which the US share is almost 50% i.e. 700 billion dollars. China is second and spends 175 billion dollars. Top arms exporting countries are primarily from the West and major arms importing countries are from the Middle East and South Asia. Reversal of nuclear arms control talks between the US and Russian federation and America's withdrawal from Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty of 1987, tends to augment the threat of nuclear proliferation. When there is no leadership at the global level which can take initiative for nuclear and conventional arms control, if not disarmament, one can expect more fragility of world order in the years to come.

The Process of Transformation

World order can never be static or to the advantage of dominating power(s) forever. Never in world history, there is any precedent that only one power or two and three were able to maintain their influence. During the medieval era, Umayyad, Ottoman and Mughal empires had reached their zenith defeating Christian rulers of Spain, Constantinople and Balkans. The Mongol empire also emerged as a force during medieval era and established its influence from China to Central Asia, Iran, Iraq and Russia. Multipolar world existed even after the medieval era and the rise of European imperial powers till the end of the Second World War, when the United States and the Soviet Union transformed the world from multipolar to bipolar. It was for the first time in medieval and post medieval history that the world became unipolar which is still the case to a large extent.

The emergence of America as a regional power when it defeated Spain in the American-Spanish war in 1898, reflected a transformational change in the world

which was still imperial. Amazingly, America was able to emerge as a regional power in a span of only couple of decades. During the inter-war period, 1919-1939, the world was dominated by the European powers because of their imperial and colonial tutelage. But, the defeat of Axis powers and the process of decolonization led to a paradigm shift and the United States took the responsibility as the guardian of western interests.

Samuel P. Huntington, an American Professor of Political Science at Harvard University wrote an article “Clash of Civilizations” in which he discussed the challenges emanating after the end of the Cold War with reference to Western, Islamic and Confucian cultures. Linking civilization and order, Huntington argues that, “during the Cold War, what order there was the product of superpower dominance of their two blocs and superpower influence in the Third World. In the emerging world, global power is outdated, global community a distant dream. No country including America, has significant global security interests. The components of order in today’s more complex and diverse world are found within and between civilizations. The world will be ordered on the basis of civilizations or not at all. In this world, the core states of civilizations are sources of order within civilizations and through negotiations with other core states, between civilizations¹⁵.”

Huntington in his research, pertaining to ‘Clash of Civilizations’ mentions far reaching changes which took place in an era of modernization, industrialization and technological advancement. While civilizations played a leading role of shaping one’s cultural and religious identities, connectivity also made it easier for knowing each other. He argues that, “in today’s world, improvements in transportation and means of communication have produced more frequent, more intense, more symmetrical, and more inclusive interaction among people of different civilizations. As a result, their civilizational identities become increasingly relevant. The French, Germans, Belgians and Dutch increasingly think of themselves as Europeans. Middle East Muslims identify with and rally to the support of Bosnians and Chechens. Chinese throughout East Asia relate their interests with those of the mainland. Russians provide support to Serbs and other Orthodox peoples. These broader levels of civilizational identity means deeper consciousness of civilizational differences and of the need to protect what distinguishes “us” from “them.”¹⁶” When cultures and religions, instead of ideologies like communism, capitalism and democracy determine and shape perceptions and policies of state actors, it means the deepening of polarization in world order emerging after the end of the cold war.

Transformation of world order in the post-9/11 era led following dominant patterns:

- Islamophobia
- Terrorism
- Religious Extremism
- Radicalization of Youth
- Regime Change
- Collateral Damage
- Preventive Strike

As mentioned earlier, the marginalization of United Nations and other international institutions to ensure order, rule of law and justice system provided space to powerful global actors to impose their will on weak and small states. Four major requirements of transformation of world order which since the emergence of international system till today are:

- State Transformation
- Actor Transformation
- Role Transformation
- Cultural Transformation

State transformation impacting on world order means when the nature of state changes in case of the United States, Peoples Republic of China and Russian federation. If a state pursues an aggressive or conciliatory role in world affairs, it has an impact on world order. It also depends on the nature of state: whether it is democratic, authoritarian or a welfare state. Actor transformation means a situation in which an actor's influence on international system ceases to exist as was the case with the Soviet Union. Its disintegration ended the cold war and replaced bipolar system with unipolar. Role transformation means a situation in which the role of a particular power changes from ideological to non-intervention. For instance, Peoples Republic of China for decades played the role of assisting, supporting and sponsoring socialist and communist parties in different parts of the world. That role ended in 1979 when under the 'open door policy' China decided to focus on economic progress and development instead of intervening in different countries.

Cultural transformation means when soft power becomes a part of state policy to influence the world by spreading its culture through diplomacy, aid, trade, technology, music, songs and cuisine. The use of culture to deepen its influence is a pillar of soft power as is done by China and some western powers including the United States. Unfortunately, unlike soft power which is a prudent way to influence the world order, the use of hard power is common particularly exercised by the United States, Russian federation, Israel and India. Coercion, the use of force, sanctions, threats and brinkmanship are the tactics which are used by such power to maximize their influence particularly on the weak states and groups.

Challenges and Options for Pakistan

In view of its geo-strategic location, world's fifth largest populous state; sixth largest military and the only nuclear state in the Muslim world, Pakistan is termed as a pivotal state¹⁷. Pakistan's role in the bi-polar and unipolar world order was based on two different policies. First, during the Cold War days, Pakistan became a part of western alliance system in 1950s which proved to be counterproductive because of the backlash from the Soviet Union and India. By identifying itself from one pole of power, Pakistan minimized its options in bipolar world. Second, in the post-cold war era, despite the fact that Pakistan acted as a 'frontline' state benefiting the US/Western interests, it was India which despite its anti-American stance was able to reap the benefit of a unipolar world. The growing Indo-U.S nexus, particularly the nuclear deal deepened Pakistan's strategic and security equation with China. In a nutshell, if Pakistan was an ally of the United States during cold war years and India was non-aligned but close to Moscow and rather hostile to Washington, the beneficiary was India and the loser was Pakistan. During 1990s, Pakistan was the most sanctioned ally of the United States till the time after 9/11 when it joined the U.S led war on terror, it again assumed the role of a front line state for America in the region.

Like many Third World countries, Pakistan also faced a difficult situation in the post-cold war era and the emergence of unipolar world. Therefore, "with the end of the Cold War the constraints have increased. The threat from Pakistan's regional environment lives on in the form of a perceived Indian dominance, only this tie the global environment that is not able to compensate for its regional weaknesses. Pakistan's objectives have not changed with the transformation of the international system from bipolarity to uni-polarity; in fact, it is Pakistan's very inability to adjust to the post-Cold War order, with its new mechanisms that have restrained Pakistan's foreign policy.¹⁸" Therefore, "Pakistan's security concerns imposed certain limitations on its foreign policy which led it to depend on extra-

regional interference in its affairs; as a result, it became involved in Cold War politics. Any change at the global level had a direct impact on Pakistan's foreign policy options"¹⁹. How Pakistan needs to adjust in changing world? That would require Pakistan to "adapt to the changing world order. Pakistan needs to stabilize itself internally and consequently become a model for the region. The perception of security in its broad sense is mainly dependent on a stable domestic environment, which can be achieved through democracy. The development of a democratic society ought to be supported by economic development and an element of continuity in the domestic setting rather than through a reliance on superpower politics"²⁰." Pakistan faced several challenges as a result of transformation of world order from bipolar to unipolar as it was India which benefited from the collapse of the Soviet Union and not Pakistan. Civil war in Afghanistan which erupted after the Soviet military withdrawal had serious negative implications on Pakistan. The euphoria which existed as a result of the emergence of Central Asian independent states disappeared because of instability and violence in Afghanistan.

Some of the challenges which Pakistan faced after the transformation of world order were:

- War and civil war in Afghanistan.
- Shifting of alliances and interests with India getting closer to the United States.
- Imposition of nuclear and democracy related sanctions against Pakistan in 1990, 1998 and 1999 by the United States which were only lifted after 9/11.
- Surge of extremism, intolerance, militancy, radicalization of youth, violence and terrorism.
- India's policy to isolate Pakistan.
- Cutoff of American economic and military aid during Trump administration.

No country can deal with external challenges unless it is able to put its own house in order. Same is true of Pakistan because unless the country is able to strengthen its economy and ensure political stability, its internal fault lines will continue to augment its vulnerability in dealing with external challenges. A secure Pakistan in the domestic front will not give any opportunity to a hostile neighbor or a big power to meddle in its affairs.

What are the options for Pakistan to deal with the challenges when the world order is passing through a transitory phase and its transformation from unipolar to multipolar is in the offing? One can figure out four options for Pakistan in the prevailing world order and once it is transformed. First, a confident, secure, progressive, enlightened and developed Pakistan requires a leadership whose level of maturity, prudence, intelligence, integrity and courage is beyond any shadow of doubt. World history is replete with examples to prove that states faced enormous challenges and threats were able to confront difficult situation because of their leadership. Second, the focus of state should be on human and social development so that people feel secure and can deal with any external and internal challenges. Countries like China, Malaysia, South Korea and Singapore gave priority to provide access to the basic necessities of life like clean and safe drinking water, providing better health and quality education, affordable housing and public transport. As a result, the standard of living of people of such countries improved substantially and along with that their economic conditions also improved. Pakistan can also follow such models of development so that its per capita income, Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Gross National Product (GNP), foreign exchange reserves and Human Development Index (HDI) can improve. Only with a sound economic and technological base can Pakistan have its mark as far as world order is concerned.

Third, in the arena of foreign policy, qualitative change should take place. Instead of reactive, Pakistan's foreign policy should be proactive in nature so that countries in the region and outside should think twice before exerting pressure on Pakistan. And foreign policy of a country is a reflection of its domestic politics. If Pakistan is domestically peaceful, secure and prosperous, certainly such pluses will have their impact on the country's foreign policy. It may be difficult for Pakistan to undo with the baggage of cold war days when it joined the Western alliance system Baghdad Pact in 1955 renamed as Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1958 and South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1955. Pakistan paid a heavy price of joining CENTO and SEATO in the form of hostility of Soviet bloc. Every time Pakistan agreed to be a frontline state all the way since 1950s till 9/11 it complained of letting down by the United States in the form of suspending its military and economic aid and imposing sanctions. The policy of 'not putting all eggs in one basket' should have been pursued by Pakistan but it was because of nexus between the pro-Western elites of Pakistan and the United States which lured Pakistan of siding with America. Finally, a policy of self-reliance and not depending on foreign aid/loans will go a long way in strengthening Pakistan and not coming under external pressure or coercion. The more Pakistan is dependent on external assistance and loans, the more it will lose its sovereignty resulting into

its diminishing status in global affairs. No nation can get self-respect unless it is economically strong, politically stable and technologically advanced. Pakistan, like many post-colonial states has a long way to go in order to have its noticeable influence in the world and that it is only possible when the country comes under top fifteen economies of the World. If poverty, under-development, social backwardness, illiteracy, extremism, militancy, intolerance, violence and terrorism are eradicated from Pakistan, one can expect the country to seek recognition and respect in the comity of nations.

When the per capita income, exports, foreign exchange reserves, GDP, GNP, remittances and foreign investments will substantially augment, in that case Pakistan can expect to have its prominent place in world economy. Additionally, advancement in science and technology, research and development and sports will also go a long way in enabling Pakistan to have its mark in world affairs.

NOTES

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HYBRID WARFARE - A NEW BASELINE OF INSTABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA

*Ambassador (Retired) Sanaullah**

Abstract

Security and stability in the South Asian region has remained delicate and fragile, to say the least, since the British left the Subcontinent in 1947. Pakistan's current security environment and subsequent vulnerabilities are shaped by a combination of events and actions at the global and regional levels. Since the 1998 nuclear tests first by India, followed by Pakistan, conventional war between the two rivals under the nuclear threshold has become too risky and too dangerous. Super powers' divergent interests have (further) added to the complexity of the region making it unpredictable.¹ The security environment amid the evolving strategic inter-relationship between US, China, India, Pakistan and Russia is fast shifting the threat perceptions, and each one of these powers wants to enforce a rebalance (of its choice) onto the region.² In the above context, the geopolitical developments in South Asia add a new dimension to hybrid threats the security of Pakistan has been facing and their severity makes it incumbent on traditional security establishment to educate all segments of population on current and future threats of hybrid warfare. The paper would explore whether Pakistan would be able to diffuse the current threats without losing its significance as part of the solution rather than the problem in the region.

Keywords: Hybrid War, Regional Security, Hidden Agenda, Non-Conventional War, Strategic Environment, South Asia, Pakistan, India, US, China, Russia, Afghanistan.

Introduction

In hybrid warfare, the target is mostly the population, social, legal and economic systems and infrastructures. The state usually tries to use "all instruments of power at its command to target perceived specific vulnerabilities of the enemy

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state. The elements of ambiguity³, non-linearity, surprise, cognitive skills of warfare and secrecy normally help achieve the desired objectives without fear of retaliation. The targeted country is often unable to detect the impact of hybrid wars to undermine its security till only after signs of destructive effects become apparent. Even then it may not still fully grasp the dimensions and scale of the hybrid attack and the elements involved. Hence the traditional security establishments usually find themselves unprepared to deal with the modern hybrid warfare. The principle of deniability is always at work to offset the apprehensions or avoid alerting the target country.

Hybrid warfare is a different ball game than a conventional war, albeit still not fully defined despite its resurgence and renewed practice in Ukraine⁴ in 2014 and in Syria⁵, Lebanon and Middle East.⁶ It is almost impossible to quantify serious threats hybrid warfare can pose to any state. NATO defines "the hybrid war as a wide range of overt and covert military, paramilitary, and civilian measures employed in a highly integrated design".⁷ The term also implies infiltration into government, military and security systems and disruption through social media, fake news and engineered alternate narratives with the aim to manipulate opinions, perceptions and buy influence in an adversary country.

It is presumed that hybrid war by nature never stops. It continues to be waged everywhere⁸ but nowhere to be seen, by anyone at once with all or some tools of state power with a synchronized action⁹ to influence societal weakening or collapse in a targeted country. Different in nature and expanded in unregulated activities but still similar in many ways to conventional war tactics, it is another dimension of the efforts where "states competing with each other for power, prestige and status used a broad repertoire of instruments, including politico-diplomatic, economic, cultural and other tools of statecraft that scholars and practitioners of strategy have been familiar with ever since the writings of Sun Tzu some 2,500 years ago."¹⁰ Furthermore, "the hybrid warfare is synchronized and systematic – the response should be too..... comprehensive cross government effort to understand, detect and respond to hybrid threats" is required.¹¹

Within this context, it has never been difficult for Pakistan to identify its traditionally hostile and strategically competing countries in the region. The high tech communication equipment and globalization, and changes in the World Order have transformed the old form of hybrid war into more effective and an affordable mode to practice policies aimed at sapping and breaking the will and belief system of an adversary. Resultantly, more countries have joined the rank.

Only in this context, one can understand why the regional turmoil and chaos in South Asia has been an unending circle.

Realization of Hybrid Warfare Threats

Pakistan has faced threats to its survival since its infancy. While political statements and manipulative political games are well recorded in history books, but what remains repressed is a huge network of attempts to undo Pakistan's entity is nothing short of a well-managed "Hybrid War". Fresh knowledge and leaks are beginning to lead to a comprehensive understanding of how the Indian leadership has used words as swords in conjunction with deceptive operations to break the will of a struggling nation. Initially, Pakistan's institutions failed to decipher the engineered disinformation and to pick up the high degree of deceit and hostility in associated covert operations. However, they woke up to decode the vanishing traces of an irregular war waged by India and consequently supported by its allies.

What constituted, as fresh realization in Pakistan, are the ominous aspects of hybrid warfare. The repeated claim of the current military leadership of Pakistan that a "hybrid conflict" has been imposed on Pakistan manifests the seriousness of the realization.¹² In April 2018, General Zubair Mahmood Hayat, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee had warned that a "hybrid war" had been imposed on Pakistan.¹³ He made no bones about the challenges such warfare can impose at the target country and further added "Pakistan is faced today with multidimensional political, economic, social and ideological hybrid threats both internally and externally and the aim of these hybrid attacks was to hurt the progress of the state encompassing all development areas including mega projects, education, reputation, and consequently the building of a national narrative".¹⁴

Instability, Strategic Contests

Pakistan is apprehensive about the unrelenting uncertainty created by the on-going hybrid antics in South Asia. Without stability, the region is likely to remain a hot bed of proxy wars, a live theatre of power games with consequences well beyond this region. Each state has been professing full support for elimination of terrorists, proxy wars and deployment of irregular troops to achieve their political agenda. While in practice, each one of them is doing the opposite in practical terms. The hidden agenda is raising alarm bells in all South Asian capitals. South Asia as a region is suffering irreparable colossal economic loss. If major components of today's hybrid war including surgical strikes, drones, terrorist and cyber-attacks, economic undermining and coercive diplomatic pressure continue

unabated, the capacity of the military and political leadership would fall short unless trained to comprehensively respond and timely address the threats involved in a 'hybrid war'.

If one has to classify hybrid challenges broadly at the global, regional and bilateral levels, the US foreign policy exasperation at its declining lone super power status holds the key. The US current strategic interest is to preserve and prolong its global outreach and influence. This focus is feeding into new regional understandings, strategic partnerships and alliances at all three levels in the same timeframe. For the first time in history, US finds itself pitted against three resurgent regional powers, China, Russia and Iran and is unable to manage its relations with European Union allies, neither is able to restrain the growing influence of the above trio in their immediate neighborhoods.

Shift in US Policy

The myriad challenges of the South Asian and Asia Pacific regions are basically embedded in the geopolitical developments connected with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979. The US is impatient to quit its abroad wars which have costed her trillion of dollars. The new US policy for Afghanistan and South Asia, announced in August 2017, expressed serious concerns about Pakistan's role in Afghanistan as well as challenges allegedly posed by China, Russia, and Iran. The policy invited a more robust Indian economic and developmental role in Afghanistan while speaking about "safe havens for the agents of chaos" and accusing "Pakistan as part of the problem and India identified as part of solution".¹⁵ President Trump in his speech also expressed concern over "the tense relations between the nuclear armed Pakistan and India that might spiral into a conflict".¹⁶

The policy reaffirmed the tone that shifting relationships, alliances and understandings would continue to determine the security environment in South Asia. The region would be dealt with in the light of American perception that "China and Russia are playing power games at regional and global levels to undermine US interests by creating their respective spheres of influence". The new US Afghan policy was viewed in the region as a response to this challenge. It was therefore, natural for the US policy strategists to view Pakistan's deepening relations with China, its fresh understanding with Russia and the renewed interest of China and Russia in Afghanistan as negative developments.

The US National Security Strategy (December 2017) further fortified the view by explicitly singling out "China and Russia as competitors challenging American power, influence, and interests." US sought "favorable regional balances of power in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, the Middle East, and the Western Hemisphere," declaring that "Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in US national security". Iran was branded as a state that "continues to sow violence and remains the most significant challenge to Middle East stability."¹⁷

US Drift towards India

In contrast, "the US National Security Strategy describes India as central to its Indo-Pacific strategy and an essential component of Indo-Pacific security architect".¹⁸ The strategy asserts, "we will deepen our strategic partnership with India and support its leadership role in Indian Ocean and throughout the broader region...we welcome India's emergence as leading global power and stronger strategic and defence partner. We will seek to increase quadrilateral cooperation with Japan, Australia and India".¹⁹ President Trump's 1st January 2018 tweet further aggravated the environment when he accused Pakistan of 'lies & deceit'.²⁰ The tweet followed with tangible actions by suspending all military aid to Pakistan and placing of Pakistan on a special watch list for severe violations of religious freedom²¹.

The matter did not end here. The US also approached the Financial Action Task Force, a Paris based group, to place Pakistan on a global terrorist-financing watch list. Consequently, Pakistan was placed in the grey list,²² making foreign loans it urgently required prohibitively expensive. The situation may get worse in September 2019 if Pakistan again "fails to satisfy the FATF concerns about deficiencies in Pakistan's implementation of its anti-money laundering/counterterrorism finance regime as required by UN Security Council Resolution 1267".²³ Encouraged by the US administration, its senators have been leveraging with FATF and IMF.²⁴ It should be borne in mind that India is a member of the FATF Board that is assessing Pakistan's actions and decides whether to exonerate Pakistan or place it on the black list. This makes Pakistan's efforts to avoid being listed in black category more difficult.

The depth of US-India strategic collusion is also manifest from the fact that US Indo Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) pays special attention to the Indo-Pacific region and on the Indian role in the region. Admiral Philips Davidson,

Commander of the US Indo Pacific Command told a Congressional hearing in February 2019 that US and India in September 2018 signed Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA). He described the signing as “pivotal moments” bilateral relations.²⁵ The agreement envisages “sale of sensitive US military equipment, facilitates interoperability and information sharing capabilities and high-end technology between the two militaries”²⁶. It also “allows the US to offer real-time data sharing with the Indian military over secure channels”²⁷. Another agreement namely, the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) signed in 2016²⁸ enabled the US Navy “to replenish supplies from Indian Navy logistics platform and vice versa.” A robust China containment policy is hence taking concrete shape with India playing a pivotal role in the Indo-Pacific region.

Implications for Regional States

The US objective in its Indo-Pacific strategy is “to respond to regional security challenges and resist adversary’s military and economic coercion”.²⁹ The US is now obliged to take India into confidence before taking any major initiative with respect to other South Asian countries. India thus enjoys significant power on certain security related matters between US and South Asian countries. The US Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy, therefore, poses a major security dilemma not only for Pakistan but also for China as it further disturbs the strategic balance in the region. “COMCASA allows the Indian army to use high-tech weapons and high-tech encrypted sensitive communication technology to monitor China and Pakistan’s military movements”.³⁰ The recent US move to label and at the same time enable India as a ‘Net Security Provider’ for the region and beyond has caused heightened security concerns for Pakistan. Russia and Iran perhaps can live with the idea, as they may not have any problem with the Indian design to help US restrain China’s assiduous rise perceived by US as a threat to its global power status. Pakistan does not accept the NSP status for India.

The new multi-dimensional warfare is essentially “not new” in the context of Pakistan-India hostility or at the regional or sub-regional levels in Afghanistan and the Middle East. The only glaring change is that many earlier wars have “had both regular and irregular components, occurring in different stages, theaters or formations but in hybrid wars into the same force at the same time and in the same battle space”.³¹ In this context, Pakistan’s security concerns multiply manifold about the growing Indian influence in Iran and Afghanistan as a serious challenge to its aspirations for peace and stability in its neighborhood. In such trying conditions, Pakistan seeks solace and strength from its time-tested strategic relations with

China for economic progress and development as well as a cushion against any US or Indian misadventure.

Challenges for Pakistan

The growing security and defence cooperation between US and India “at the cost of US traditional cordial ties with Pakistan”³² has unfortunately emboldened an already hostile India. It is now publically committed to isolate Pakistan diplomatically, especially in the region and the Muslim world. The essence of this onslaught is to project Pakistan as a terrorism sponsoring state, a dangerous place for investment and tourism.

Evidently, the Indian government has been pursuing this policy aggressively at all levels in its bilateral, regional and global interactions. The covert part of the same policy that aims at breaking the will and resolve of the people either remains hidden or is widely ignored by the world. Pakistan may not have the capacity to expose the full spectrum of the threats of the covert warfare involved but has a fair understanding of Indian intentions in the context of its past history and present adventures.

Major strands of the Indian hybrid war against Pakistan range from diplomatic isolation to coercive policies to seeking compliance on regional and global issues and in case of refusal subject Pakistan to a host of restrictions through new found allies. India's hybrid activities instigate instability, support to sectarian strife, weakening national aspirations and the government's will to act in a timely fashion to address these threats.

India fermented trouble in the two Pakistani provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan in 1950s as part of its policy to punish Pakistan for Kashmir cause. Later indirect support in the form of scholarships helped India to widen its influence among local elite as a friend. "The Indian-Soviet partnership proved a recurring theme in Pakistan's brush with hybrid warfare in subsequent years".³³ Pakistan's breakup in 1971 is the most glaring example of modern hybrid warfare executed by India.³⁴ To prepare the ground, on January 30, 1971 India staged the hijacking of an Indian Airlines Fokker to Lahore. The Pakistani leadership welcomed the hijacking, thinking Kashmiri separatists had done it. India used the pretext to deny its air space to Pakistani aircraft, flying to former East Pakistan. Pakistan later became severely handicapped to defend its territory against Indian onslaught in 1971. Balochistan has been another primary target of Indian 'hybrid

warfare' for decades.³⁵ The Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) agent Lt Comd Kulbhushan Jadhav, a serving Indian navy officer operating from Iran since 2013, was financially supporting the Baloch separatists and militants, fuelling sectarian violence in the province and the country.³⁶ *'kante se kanta nikalna'*,³⁷ episode indicated the Indian penchant for "employing terrorists to catch or kill terrorists, and for covert actions against its perceived enemies. As a calculated policy "the Kashmiri freedom struggle was projected as terrorism to erode its legitimacy as established under UN resolutions. For this purpose false-flag operation, infiltration of militant Kashmiri groups and concerted propaganda was carried out".³⁸

The Indian move to oppose the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project first "as a violation of Indian territory" and then to malign it as a debt trap for Pakistan is a reminder of how a connectivity project, which can bring prosperity to the entire region as a flagship of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has been made controversial. Misinformation and data manipulation are being used as tools to create doubts about the efficacy and real objectives of the connectivity project. The American military establishment perceives CPEC as a Chinese strategic move to access the Indian Ocean by using "disputed territory"³⁹. Sections of KPK and Balochistan population have been so influenced to have become skeptical and started to criticize and trivialize CPEC's obvious benefits for the country. In July 2018, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo tried to jeopardize an IMF financing program for Pakistan arguing that it should not be used to repay Chinese 'bond holders' and banks. A Wall Street Journal video projected "Pakistan and CPEC as the fulcrum of US-China strategic competition".⁴⁰ A consistent media campaign was launched so that CPEC be derailed or stalled by denying IMF package to achieve the required stabilization of Pakistan's economy. "The US has a grand interest in disrupting, controlling, or influencing the Silk Road and CPEC".⁴¹

US has employed the tool of "exaggerated proliferation concerns and coercive diplomacy to hold back Pakistan's nuclear and missile programs"⁴², and punished Pakistan by slapping sanctions. In contrast, the US has played down "the militarization of outer space dimension of the Indian testing of its first domestically produced Anti-Satellite Missile (ASAT), hitting a defunct Indian satellite at an altitude of 300 kilometers".⁴³

Since Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared that Indian troops fought along Mukti Bahini in East Pakistan⁴⁴ and admitted to an Indian conspiracy to divide Pakistan, there have been similar confessions from other prominent Indians. Earlier, in 2013, the Indian Army Chief, General Vijay Kumar Singh admitted that

"following the 2008 Mumbai attacks, the Indian army raised a Tactical Support Division (TSD), which carried out bomb blasts in Pakistan, and paid huge incentives to the 'separatist' elements in Balochistan".⁴⁵ The infamous Doval Doctrine reemphasized the Indian intention to assert its retribution regime against a country, which in Indian calculation was a threat to its interests. This regime may include "surgical strikes or engagement of terrorists".⁴⁶ At the Heart of Asia Conference Amritsar, India encouraged Afghanistan to embarrass Pakistan.⁴⁷

The growing Baloch nationalist movement and the rise of the group known by its title Pakhtun Tahaffuz Movement (PTM) is an obvious demonstration of a hybrid war aimed at dividing the population. "The PTM never emerged during the TTP and affiliated group's insurgency between 2007 and 2015 that supposedly protected the Pashtun community. Surprisingly, the rise of the PTM after the return of relative normalcy to the Pakhtun regions of Pakistan raises many questions".⁴⁸ The above facts are just a few examples of how hybrid means and machinations are being employed to destabilize and malign Pakistan.

Regional Future Prospects Afghanistan

Despite the recent positive development where America has finally started a dialogue with Taliban, Afghanistan is nowhere close to being a normal functional sovereign state again. Though all regional countries are on board with America, the fact that the Taliban are not ready to talk to the Afghan government indicates the difficulties an intra-Afghan settlement entails in terms of power sharing. Unfortunately the Afghan leadership on both sides (Afghan government & Taliban) have failed their people who continue to suffer. The insensitivity of the Afghan leadership on both sides is likely to deepen the chaos by infighting. This time, in case the on-going negotiations culminate in an agreement, the Taliban leaders would not feel obligated to any state for bringing them into power. They would be inclined to be more independent and intolerant to any opposition. The way they have been conducting them at the current Doha negotiations with the US and resisting the US pressure to talk to official representatives of the Afghan government foretell the future Afghan nightmare.

The likelihood of civil war cannot be ruled out if American forces suddenly decide to leave Afghanistan. Since the national security of both Pakistan and Afghanistan cannot be separated from each other due to "sufficient close links"⁴⁹, many old contentious issues may crop up. For instance, new turmoil may lead to a

fresh wave of Afghan immigrants to Iran and Pakistan. The Afghan- Pakistan border management in such a situation would be critical for Pakistan to remain relevant in final solution of the Afghan imbroglio. In case of future migration, Pakistan authorities have to be watchful of pro India Afghans and subsequent wave of terrorist acts on Pakistan soil. Pakistan may also have to deal with water and trade issues afresh. For the time being, Pakistan may not be seen giving unrequited advice, especially in public, to the Afghan government on any issue other than those of directly impacting on its national interests. The current policy to support Taliban- US talks with or without participation in the negotiations is the best policy. It conveys the message that Pakistan has no favourites in Afghanistan. In fact, Pakistan may not see the refusal of Taliban to hold intra-Afghan dialogue in Pakistan as an upsetting development; rather it is an act of salvaging Pakistan's neutrality in Afghanistan.

United States

Despite “perceptible US pressure”⁵⁰, Pakistan's relations with the US are central to its national interests. Proactive diplomacy and engagements are required to acknowledge the shortcomings in their respective approaches. The almost casual disregard of Pakistan's intense counterterrorism and counter-insurgency efforts is a continuing problem between the two countries. Pakistan is still in a position to help US in resolving the Afghan problem.

The US understands Pakistan's special dependence on China. Therefore, it is possible for Pakistan to have stable working relations with US without diluting bilateral relations with China. However, strategists in Pakistan must not ignore that Pak-US relations would remain mired in problems as US finds it difficult to overcome its misconceptions about CPEC, “harboring terrorists”⁵¹ and Pakistan's defence cooperation with China. Nevertheless, the transactional nature of relations with US makes it a bit easy to deal with contentious issues. Focus on security and stability in Afghanistan is just one aspect of the bilateral relations with US. Greater engagement with US may be initiated without indulging in ambiguous statements that normally fortify the existing mistrust. Preferably, during talks, commitments and stance be stated clearly and recorded. Any disruption in relations would allow India to work unhindered against Pakistan in a country which matters most for Pakistan with regard to stability and implementation of its mega projects, injecting substantial economic dimension in its excessively political ties with the Central Asian Republics (CARs). The positive development is that both Pakistan and US are engaged with each other despite complex relationship. Pakistan has to focus on its immediate problems, recognize its power potential to impact US foreign policy

objectives and act accordingly. There is an urgent need to build a group of friends in Congress and Pentagon who can connect the missing dots in Pak-US perceptions on peace and security in South Asia.

India

The Indo-US growing defence cooperation is no doubt a challenge. The bigger challenge however, is to be able to mitigate the Indian hybrid warfare and take timely actions. There is no harm to keep working for a “sustained and structured dialogue with India on all issues and disputes to understand each other’s position better”.⁵² With the anti-Pakistan agenda upper most in the Indian policy construct, engagement with India currently seems a futile exercise. But in the long run this process would help manage bilateral relations and also, to some extent, facilitate realization of Pakistan’s economic projects. As long as Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence remains credible, Pakistan can withstand the Indian coercive diplomacy and “can prevent adversary (India) from gaining escalation dominance, employment of coercive tactics in a crisis or to attain power at its expense”.⁵³ Therefore, there is a limit to how far India can diplomatically isolate Pakistan. However, if Indian capacity to sustain the on-going aggressive hybrid warfare against Pakistan dramatically increases, the risk of a nuclear standoff between these two rivals does not remain so far-fetched.

Recommendations

Pakistan is faced with daunting challenges. Apart from internal political, economic and social issues, the non-traditional challenges such as those emanating from climate change, burgeoning young but unemployed population, underperformance in social sectors etc. will mainly determine Pakistan’s strength and will to fight back hybrid war being waged against it.

Pakistan needs to be cautious of a possible implosion due to statecraft’s failures or deficiencies, and hybrid antics inspired by India and its allies. Institutional and structural response to galvanize critical ministries including the foreign ministry would be helpful to focus on real issues in real time and avoid reactive diplomacy. For instance, the administration and political wings maybe separated to allow maximum time to the foreign secretary to deal with complex external challenges which are not easy to handle, given sudden and frequent changes in geopolitical situation at the regional and global levels. In order to sustain pressure and sinister implications of the on-going hybrid war against Pakistan, concomitant efforts are required to ensure financial stability and credible

rule of law in the country. Attention is also required at the highest political and the Federal Cabinet levels to gear the national plans in a way to address other non-traditional security challenges.

Conclusion

The current influx in alignments at the regional and international levels and the emphasis on regional solutions bypassing the United Nation is a trend fraught with serious pitfalls. Moreover, with technology advancement and artificial intelligence, non-kinetic but lethal tools are now available to achieve national security objectives. A situation can no longer be ruled out where the functional balance of power between US, Russia and China may entail a serious risk of collapse.

Pakistan is on the cusp of change. There are vast opportunities for peace and development of the region. As Pakistan progresses towards stability and prosperity, the challenges from its adversaries will concomitantly grow. Pakistan's security and military agencies are deeply aware and apprehensive of the sophisticated ways of the country's adversaries to undermine Pakistan's security. The political leadership unfortunately has not been able to build national consensus within its ranks and where it did (on fighting terrorism) was unable to deliver. Pakistan is facing active hybrid warfare, as it never ceases and its agents are faceless. The trend unfortunately in South Asian region is that it will keep increasing “especially after the checkmating of the Indian Cold Start Doctrine by Pakistan”.⁵⁴ Pakistan's future challenges are likely to intensify as the continued instability and hybrid wars would not allow implementation of connectivity and energy projects and the region would further plunge into poverty. Pakistan needs to remain engaged with the world powers for regional prosperity. Without the positive contributions from world powers interested in South Asia and Indo pacific region, dreams and aspirations of people would remain elusive. It is politically imprudent to overstretch time-tested relationships. Ultimately a country has to fight its own survival battles, pursue its own strategic options in a complicated and challenging environment and assert its own strategic autonomy.

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HYBRID WARFARE – CHALLENGES FOR PAKISTAN

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Abstract

In order to achieve political aims; the traditional means of kinetic warfare have always been supplemented by aggressive diplomacy, economic coercion, intelligence gathering, propaganda and proxy wars. A combination of all these tools is essential for a nation to achieve its political goals set out to win a war. All through the ages, technology has played a significant role in enhancing the capacity and capability of nations to win wars. The tools of modern warfare based on cyber and information technology has transformed the nature of warfare. Social media in particular is being used subtly as well as aggressively to shape public opinion and weaken the morale of the nation. The geographical dimensions of the battlefield have been eliminated. War is now waged in the minds of not only the opposing commanders but also in the minds of the nation. The dictum that strategy is the dialectic of opposing will is truer now than ever before. Wars can now be won without firing a single bullet. This changed nature of warfare needs to be understood in its entirety. While contingency plans exist in military headquarters to counter a physical invasion, there is little by way of collectively responding to the threats launched from various technical platforms. This paper is an attempt to look into the transformation of war fighting and suggests a few policy options for Pakistan to take up the challenges of hybrid warfare and keep the national will and morale intact during the worst of times.

Keywords: Cyber Warfare, Social Media, Propaganda, National Will, Morale and Public Opinion.

Introduction

As per famous military sage Karl von Clausewitz, war is the extension of policy by other means. In order to fulfill a policy objective, kinetic means of warfare have always been supplemented by diplomatic pressure and economic coercion; intelligence gathering and propaganda; espionage and proxy wars. A balanced combination of all these means and other traits and characteristics such as the quality of leadership and the resilience of a nation in adversity; and the economic

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and political standing of a nation and internal stability are instrumental in leading to the successful culmination of the war effort.

Ever since the Stone Age, technology and scientific innovation have played an important role in ushering in successive waves of revolution in military affairs. These scientific discoveries have increased the power potential of nations manifold through the introduction of such revolutionary means of conducting warfare such as gun powder; wind, steam and fossil fuel energy to propel battleships and battle tanks; and nuclear power to cause widespread death and destruction. Technology is now moving at a phenomenal speed to bring about fundamental changes in the nature of warfare. The theatre of warfare has drastically expanded from its pre-established definitions due to the introduction of 'virtual' battle spaces. The discourse on warfare is now more technologically driven than before. It has become elusive in character and is marked by the creation of abstract settings and use of multiple means of power to establish supremacy and achieve the political goals. This has led to the elimination of physical barriers and has empowered hidden forces that can manoeuvre and defeat the adversary without fighting an actual battle. It has become a mind game and Andre Beufre's famous dictum that strategy is the dialectic of opposing wills, has now become the absolute truth.

Scholars and academics refer to this transition as the 'hybridization' of warfare. In all honesty, there is little agreement on what actually constitutes a hybrid threat and what does not but there is substantial agreement over its existence and the fact that states use hybrid tactics in modern times for the extension of their political and economic goals. The term 'hybrid warfare' was used for the first time by Frank Hoffman. Hoffman asserted that hybrid threats fundamentally comprised simultaneous usage of conventional competencies coupled with other asymmetrical tactics, which portray a stride of criminality. Hoffman, like others before him and like those who followed him did not identify the actors engaged in the use of hybrid tactics and / or the targets. The basic explanation of the synchronized deployment of forces, both regular and irregular is rooted in producing a well-coordinated synergistic effect encompassing both, the physical and psychological dimension of conflict. These effects, he believed could be gained at all levels of warfare i.e. tactical, operational as well as strategic. Hoffman's understanding of hybrid wars described the conduct and use of force as the conjunction of regular and irregular threats through the use of sophisticated technology and decentralized system of execution. He built this idea by positing hybrid warfare as the synergistic fusion of conventional and unconventional forces in conjunction with terrorism and criminal behaviour. This fusion was oriented

towards a desired objective through a political narrative, which simultaneously and adaptively unified all the elements of the force.¹

Hybrid wars can hence be defined as coordinated and often simultaneous deployment of multiple instruments of power and influence aimed at exploiting the adversary at every level from leaders to citizens. Most vulnerable in fact is the latter so tactics deployed constitute non-linear, ambiguous and yet a cognitive manipulation of the adversary population.² Of the many intriguing features of hybrid warfare, one of the most perplexing is the inherent ambiguity in its conduct. There is definitely a definitional dilemma in this form of warfare, when it comes to the delineation of Actors i.e. who wages it? Tactics i.e. what means are deployed for it? Timeframe of the engagement i.e. how long would the hostilities stretch? and most importantly the Repercussions i.e. what are its effects? It is this ambiguity in the character of hybrid warfare that adds to the challenge of defining it and eventually deterring and preventing it. The hybridization of warfare has blurred the demarcations/distinctions between the physical and virtual domain; combatants and non-combatants; and state and non-state actors. It has added to the complexity of effectively defining risk and threat to state security by broadening the basis of the perils and pitfalls in this kind of nebulous warfare.³

With a broadened risk base, hybrid tools to conduct war beyond the concrete battle spaces have come to include cyber-attacks on national databases, hostile narrative building through propaganda, misinformation and disinformation through social media. The main objective is to hurt the adversary at the psychological and cognitive level, without necessarily causing any harm within the physical space.⁴ There are limited restrictions when it comes to the use of available resources. In this connection, hybrid wars have often times been referred to as 'unrestricted warfare' as well. This unrestricted arena of warfare works with completely transformed notions of weaponry such as resorting to the use of computer viruses during combat operations. However, it must be noted that the core aim of the use of these reformed techniques, remain purely Clausewitzian, that is to cloud the adversary's judgment and decision making, compelling it to surrender to one's own planned agendas, without using any overt force.⁵

Considering factors such as unhindered access to virtual spaces and their manipulation by state parties and shadowy non-state actors all dabble in hybrid war to achieve their political ends. Often times they operate silently by remaining under the radar to escape notice till it is too late. Axiomatically, therefore, the impact of hybrid means of warfare cast on the nation now constitutes a critical

aspect of national security paradigms. Needless to say, the national will can be broken if the enemy is allowed to operate with impunity. Clearly, the planners and decision makers of modern wars must be able to comprehend, shape and reinforce national behaviours and opinions. This is only possible by creating legitimately good ‘information’.⁶ Doctored or malicious ‘information’ based on propaganda and fake news can cause terrible harm to the morale of the nation. In the recent times, some significant changes in a nation’s inherent will to resist have fallen victim to the coordinated propagation of fake news and malicious untruths to influence public opinion.

Pakistan is confronted by a wide array of multi-dimensional threats. Hostile forces are in full play to isolate it internationally. Terms like ‘irresponsible’ state and ‘sponsor of state terrorism’ are used liberally to malign it. Money and agents provocateurs are being used to weaken the national resolve. The aim is to create an image of a weak and vacillating national leadership that lacks the ability to comprehend or manage the developing situation. The strands of hybrid threats are built upon ‘credible’ psy ops themes through an offensive propaganda spread by traditional means such as print and electronic media and not traditional means such as social media campaigns; threat of cyber-attacks; looming risk of economic coercion to the risk of political isolation on the global stage.⁷

Unfortunately, despite evident risks, the national thought process to respond to hybrid threats remains archaic and outdated. There is only a limited understanding of the security threats and there is a lack of imaginative responses to this nebulous threat. The planning and execution of Pakistan’s security policies with reference to India are built up around frameworks such as the Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) or the Proactive Strategy (PAS).⁸ The response is more in military terms and the redlines are in geographical terms. The defensive strategies have been recycled from previous wars and war like experiences. There is a need for a fresh approach to respond to the hydra headed monster of hybrid warfare.

The well-defined military offensive across the international border within the overarching framework of CSD and PAS is being replaced. The Indian civil and military leadership has changed tack and is now talking about launching surgical strikes across the Line of Control (LoC). The Indian army chief Gen Bipin Rawat has claimed that his forces had carried out such strikes in 2016 in response to Pakistani backed strikes by Kashmiri freedom fighters against border outposts in places like Uri in Occupied Kashmir and Pathankot. A new movie titled *Uri: The Surgical Strike* set for release early this year emphasizes the capability of

conducting such fanciful strikes into Azad Kashmir.⁹ It is naturally blatant propaganda aimed to raise their own morale and to depict the Pakistani forces in poor light.

Noted academician and current federal minister for human rights Dr Shireen Mazari is of the opinion that the purpose of the Indian hybrid warfare is to strike at the Centre of Gravity (CoG) of Pakistan.¹⁰ The CoG is the fighting spirit of the general public. If they know that their national leadership is strong and their armed forces capable of repelling and deterring all kinds of attacks, whether these are physical, political or financial, they can survive all the propaganda and fake news being spewed out to weaken their resolve. Propaganda and intelligence gathering it may be noted were recommended tools of war enshrined in Arthashastra - ancient Indian Hindu strategist Kautliya's famous treatise on statecraft.

Social Media

In this age of hybrid warfare, it is instructive to study how social media influences the minds of the citizens of a country. Between the years 2005 and 2018, there has been a considerable increase in the number of Facebook and twitter users all over the world. With easy access to social media forums like Facebook, twitter and YouTube, there has been a staggering increase in the number of users over the said forums over the past few years. Capitalising on the outreach of the social media, it was used most effectively to support and propagate the Arab Spring to remove and replace aging dictatorships and monarchies in the Middle East. It is quite well documented that public protests in Tahrir Square in the heart of Cairo in 2011 were mobilized through Facebook.¹¹

According to the Pew Research Centre, in USA alone, the percentage engaged with social media usage has increased from a minimum low of 5 per cent in 2005 to a massive 69 per cent in 2018.¹² Among these, the number of female Facebook users outnumber the male users. The numbers have continued to rise ever since. Of the most used social media forums, Facebook has played a distinctive role in gauging public opinion during election season. In this context, facebook users actively took part in the online polls during the elections in the US, UK, Netherlands and even in Pakistan. Considering that a large segment of the potential voters are using Facebook, it is quite evident that electoral managers have used this medium to shape opinions.¹³ The perception building company

Cambridge Analytica used the Facebook to harvest data of potential voters to shape public opinion during the US national elections in 2016.

When considering the heightened role and prominence of social media in the realm of mainstream politics and governance, there are two critical dimensions that shouldn't be missed. One, these forums are not just used as means to gauge public opinion but also to significantly alter it. Two, the vital component in the entire social media theatre is 'information'. Valid or not, once a part of the electronic web, the information is shared and re-posted at lengths, to a point that a considerable chunk of the population comes to believe it. The entire exercise results in nothing but often in a blind faith in essentially constructed realities based on distorted facts and misconstrued information. Alongside Facebook, twitter and YouTube have also been used as similar means.¹⁴

However, the use of twitter and YouTube has been more prone towards dissemination of information and communication unlike Facebook which is mostly equated with the steering of public opinion. As of recently, the use of Twitter by major world leaders to express their views on global developments and most importantly to communicate their foreign policy preferences, has been a common practice. This electronic communication among the leaderships of major countries is a rather new phenomenon, but has resulted in a state of spontaneity whereby the leaders do not necessarily have to conduct meetings in designated spaces to communicate and discuss the issues of national significance. Particularly, twitter remained an important pillar of US President Trump's election campaigning. Even after the assumption of office, Trump has continued to extensively rely on Twitter as a continuum of his aggressive foreign policy rhetoric directed for countries like North Korea, Iran and at times Pakistan. Unhindered use of YouTube and the blogging culture adhered to mostly by politicians and the academic fraternity has further fuelled the dissemination of questionable and unverified information. Information on all sorts of topics is released as a part of video logs and/or private blogs has become a part of the large body of discourse, offering contesting alternative narratives on issues of grave concern for countries, yet without any substantial empirical reasoning.¹⁵

In case of Pakistan, the paradoxical dilemma of effectively defining the social media spaces, constitution of public opinion itself and the distressing inclination of the public to fall for unverified and unauthenticated news are further multiplied by a notch. In similitude to other major countries, the population in Pakistan, particularly the youth has major inclination and association with an *ad*

nauseam use of social media websites. On the political front, both twitter and facebook were used as active arenas for political deliberations and communications during the past election. Exchange of rhetoric with other political leaders has also remained a rather glaring feature of the Pakistani politics. As per the statistics collected by the Alpha Pro, a digital marketing firm, there has been an astounding increase in the number of social media users over the past many years. In this view, as of June, 2018, 44.6 million people of the 198.9 million of total Pakistani population are active internet users. And of these 44.6 million internet users, 35.0 million alone actively engage with social media websites. This actually means that of the total population in Pakistan, only 22 per cent has an active access to general internet and of this 22 per cent, 18 per cent uses social media to the extent which can be referred to an active presence on the forum. Intriguingly so, of the 35.0 million active social media users, a massive 92.06 per cent of the masses prefer facebook over a small 4.68 per cent YouTube users and a smaller 1.50 per cent of twitter users.¹⁶ In view of iteration made above, the very fact that most of the Pakistani public, primarily its youth associates more with facebook which is an information sharing forum, than with twitter and/or YouTube which primarily serve the purpose of communication, establishes the critical opening in the realm of responsible information sharing within the country. In case of Pakistan, the entire premise of irresponsible information sharing and the susceptibility to fall for fake news, without necessarily authenticating the source of it, is deeply intertwined with the intricate socio-political and cultural dynamics of the nation from a psychological perspective. The reasons behind adhering to and/or associating with a certain news shared over such forums is deeply rooted in some prior connection of the individual with the subject that the news is about or with the source that which has posted it in the first place. However, in most cases, there is always a self-serving underlying agenda and a deliberate unauthenticated sharing of the online information. As a far-fetched repercussion, this tendency of sharing unverified news has borne deep into one of the defining features of our national character. Above anything else, this tendency is rather detrimental given the fluid nature of information which is half through until the time it has been authenticated at least once. Ironically though, Pakistan stands at least a decade away from instilling among its people a culture of rational and responsible information sharing which takes into account all the long and short term consequences of their actions.¹⁷

Cyber Attacks

Cyber warfare has increased the asymmetrical threat to a nation's databases and its decision making mechanisms. The threat of cyber-attacks needs immediate attention as nations with considerable resources and more sophisticated

informational technology defenses have been compromised by this wave of hybrid warfare. For instance, the attack on over fifteen Iranian facilities and resources by the Stuxnet worm gave its creators access to crucial industrial information as well as giving them the ability to operate various machinery at the individual industrial sites. This introduced a new dimension into the perilous nature of cyber warfare and attacks.¹⁸ However, the unprecedented threats emanating from cyber warfare have led to ventures in countries consolidating more robust security frameworks and Pakistan needs to follow suit.¹⁹ In the case of Pakistan, the technological revolution has made most of digital bases vulnerable. This vulnerability is tested from time to time in the financial, commercial and banking sectors; medical and health services; communication and energy; and national security architectures etc.²⁰ Keeping in view, the nuanced uses of knowledge and information in the contemporary times, cyber-attacks and information warfare poses dangers to national security that is more profound than conventional threats. For instance, in November, 2018, data from “almost all” the banks in Pakistan was compromised in a cyber-attack and extensive amount of money was stolen from many accounts as the security system was breached.²¹ This attack came to light after a few days of another attack on the Pakistani banking security infrastructure where Bank Islami Pakistan reported that it had been a victim of theft of almost 3 million rupees.²² Repeated and consistent attacks to the national wealth of the state need to prompt a more robust policy and practical response to bolster the security systems and infrastructure of the state. It goes without saying that another precious data base of a country is the concerning armed forces in the country which are also open to attacks. There are persistent threats to breach these data bases.

Incontrovertibly, the nature of warfare has shifted from physical to online threats; the new cyber arsenal disguises itself as state sponsored attacks, disinformation and espionage. This transformed threat cannot be addressed with conventional and customary responses, but needs to be approached with accelerated development of innovative cyber and information strategies, regulatory frameworks, common standards and tangible capabilities all aimed at achieving a harmonized regime to counter cyber warfare.

Psychological Manoeuvring; Targeting the National Will

The most distressing feature of hybrid wars and the one that adds manifold to the challenge of effectively deterring them is the damage that it causes on the psychological level. As discussed earlier, a kinder form of war that it is, the impact that the strategies deployed under this stream of warfare are twice as severe in their tenacity. The information-centric component within the hybrid warfare doctrine

targets the very spirit of the adversary country. Information based wars have the potential to influence political, economic or military goals at any and all levels. They can sabotage the economy, development ventures, and/ or the sabotage or destruction of the entire information network system. It essentially includes collection of tactical information, deliberately spreading propaganda and disinformation to demoralize or manipulate the adversary.²³ Endless debates over electronic media citing the inadequacy in the policy and governance structures within lead to a state of conditioning nations into believing in the inability of their national leaders to lead their countries into the rightful direction. It must be noted that like other forms of hybrid warfare, the linchpin of psychologically tarnishing the very spirit of nations lies in 'information', its unverified release and sharing. It must also be noted that for the advancement of such an agenda, it does not necessarily have to be an external source to act as a carrier of fake news. In case of Pakistan, there is a lot that needs to be done on this front. At present, varying discourses in the electronic, print and social media regarding Pakistan's engagement with the multi-billion dollar deal CPEC is one such example. The doubts about the longevity and credibility about the engagement began on a similar note and have now grown into a daily dose of debate as to whether the alliance is a good idea or not.

Policy Options

There is an urgent need to understand and address the multi-faceted threat posed by hybrid warfare. Due to the heightened susceptibility to fall victim to these stratagems, national security paradigm needs to be overhauled.²⁴ There is a clear cut need to devise a strategy, build capacities and allocate resources. The response should be a whole of government approach and the people should be made a part of it. Operating in silos and turf rivalry can only increase the threat and not decrease it. Recommended options are as under:

- First and foremost, there is a need to create awareness among our top level policy and decision makers about the need to register and recognize hybrid warfare as the contemporary currency of war and to come up with an imaginative counter strategy. Notwithstanding the fact that there should be an integrated and holistic approach to synergise all resources (civil and military), there is no harm to make one of the ministries the lead agency. This ministry can be officially mandated to develop a national narrative to counter false claims of disunity or worse disintegration. Innovative themes can be constructed to produce a positive ambience and raise the morale of

the nation. The person responsible for this effort should be answerable to the Prime Minister and should regularly update the Parliament and where needed the nation. This person should also be provided adequate financial, material and human resources to plan and fight a meaningful battle to counter hybrid threats.

- Secondly there is a need to make a clear cut policy integrating all the civil and military agencies to come up with a sustainable model. The government can achieve this by engaging all the stakeholders within the society in the formulation of an altogether new security paradigm. In this view, practically viable means to lessen the vulnerability in the cyber realm must be made part of the country's national security doctrine. The military can be asked to revise its threat hypothesis to cover all aspects of the hybrid threat. Inputs from noted economists, academics, cyber war experts, scientists and law enforcement agents can be factored into formulating the new threat dimensions.
- Thirdly, at the foreign policy level, alliances should be sought with friendly countries to strengthen our digital defences. International best practices must be introduced with the help of partner countries and organizations to achieve the gold standard in cyber security. Universities should be encouraged to come up with policies and technologies to secure our cyber and mental frontiers.
- Fourthly, investment should be made in human resource. Young university students and fresh graduates in the market with the knack of fighting cyber warfare in the domain of not only science and technology but also in hard core information warfare should be hired. They should be trained to work in small teams to counter various facets of the hybrid threats.
- Fifthly, serious planning should be done to manufacture our own hardware and software. Currently all computers, laptops, smartphones and servers are imported. None of our data bases are running on machinery produced by our own technologists. Similarly all our operating systems are those produced by companies such as Microsoft. We do not have any digital search engine of our own. Our universities submit all their intellectual outputs to similarity index software such as Turnitin. This can only perpetuate intellectual hegemony of the West. None of our thoughts and research belongs to us. It is captured by software produced externally.
- Last but not the least, Pakistan must energize its defensive information mechanism on state and social media to spread competing narratives to fight gloom and doom stories.²⁵ This is easier said than done, it will need a

lot of imagination and foresight to develop positive themes to raise the national spirit and morale and nip the negative broadcasts in the bud.

Conclusion

Wars have always been waged with all the tools available to a nation (financial, political and diplomatic) to achieve a political goal. A weak nation remains always at the mercy of a stronger adversary. This does not only mean just having a top class military outfitted with latest weapons of war but a strong and resilient nation willing to undergo all sorts of trials and tribulations in order to survive at its own terms. This means essentially that the nation should be at peace with itself. It should believe in its leadership and the capacity and capability of the state institutions to function for its good. Common man must have two square meals a day and a roof over his/her head. The children must be in schools and not out on the streets begging. There should be access to quick and fair justice. There should be hospitals for the sick, water in the taps, gas in the pipelines and the bulbs must light up after dusk. The state should be sympathetic towards its citizens and in a position to look after the needy. The police should protect the citizens from the criminals and the army should be able to defend the borders.

In such a state of satisfaction and contentment, hybrid threats would be ineffective. Such threats can only thrive if the people are unhappy or they perceive that the government is either incapable or worse unwilling to provide them or a certain segment of society their due share as the responsible citizens of the country. If their basic human needs are fulfilled they will not fall prey to malicious propaganda and no amount of canvassing would convince that a collapse is imminent any time soon.

To prevent any worst case scenario from happening not only a positive narrative needs to be created but also all national policies should be made on the basic principles of being people friendly and welfare oriented. Physical frontiers can be defended but collapse on the mental front can lead to surrender without fighting. This must be prevented come what may and the national will and spirit must be protected at all costs.

NOTES

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NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE INDIA-PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PREDICAMENT

*Dr. Zulfqar Khan**

Abstract

It is observed that in the future war scenario between India and Pakistan, the technologically-advanced conventional weapon systems are expected to play a crucial role in determining the outcome of conflict. The hi-tech conventional weapons would act as a force multiplier. The Information Age's (IA) innovations would also pose serious challenges to deterrence stability and its sustainability. Therefore, nuclear deterrence has to be resilient enough to survive the enemy's first strike, or even pre-emptive strike in parallel with capability to retaliate and inflict unacceptable damage upon the attacker. In fact, during the 2019 military standoff, India reportedly made its nuclear assets fully operational. It was contrary to India's stated No First-Use (NFU) policy. In future, such nuclear posturing would influence Pakistan's nuclear policy vis-à-vis India.

Keywords: India-Pakistan, Nuclear Deterrence, Nuclear Weapons, Conventional Weaponry, Military Technologies, Cold Start Doctrine, Challenges.

Introduction

It is argued that in the coming years and decades, in addition to nuclear factor – the hi-tech conventional military weaponry and IA's systems would also play an influential role in determining the future outcome of conflicts. The technologically advanced weaponry systems would tend to act as a force multiplier that would qualitatively and quantitatively determine the battlefield results in South Asia. Moreover, the growing development in military and information technologies is increasing the hardware's lethality and effectiveness.¹ Consequently, these developments will pose serious challenges to deterrence sustainability.

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Fundamentally, nuclear deterrence is premised on the doctrine of threat of retaliation against the rival(s) in the case of a breakdown of deterrence. Principally, the nuclear arsenals of states are always planned on the fundamentals to ensure the reliability, credibility, and survivability of deterrence structure. Most significantly, the deterrence has to be resilient enough to survive the enemy's first or pre-emptive strike, and yet it should still be able to retaliate and to cause unacceptable damage to the attacker. After the advent of the nuclear weapons and the retaliatory forces - survivability of Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) continued to be based on the straightforward code of conduct and on crafting and integrating of both the counter-force and counter-value targeting strategies against the rival's hard core military targets and population centres. Counter-value weapons are of great deterrent value that targets enemy's major population or industrial centres; or to use the strategic nuclear forces in a pre-emptive mode with intent to disarm the enemy's conventional or nuclear forces - even against the highly dispersed arsenals, which are otherwise considered easy to hide and protect against any eventuality of a strike.² Today, the nuclear experts tend to have apprehensions regarding the nuclear threat emanating from "terrorism or accidents than the survivability of retaliatory arsenals."³

In the early 1950s, Arnold Wolfers wrote that in the nuclear age, the concept of national security would continue to remain "an ambiguous symbol,"⁴ primarily due to on-going developments in the nuclear weapons and other military-related technologies.⁵ In 1960s, for instance, the nuclear weapons and doctrines were still in an "embryonic form," and the theories of "limited war, of deterrence, of 'tactical' versus 'strategic' uses of nuclear weapons, of 'retaliatory' versus 'counterforce' strategies in all-out war,' of 'limited retaliation,' of the mechanics of threat and commitment-making, of 'internal war,' 'protracted conflict' were relevant." In Snyder's opinion, all these changes emphasizes the significance of "balance of terror," which to this day, still remains ambiguous.⁶ "Essentially, deterrence means discouraging the enemy from taking military action by posing for him a prospect of cost and risk outweighing his prospective gain." The author further dilates that deterrence "works on the enemy's *intentions*; the *deterrent value* of military forces is their effect in reducing the likelihood of enemy military moves." Snyder observed that defence "reduces the enemy's *capability* to damage or deprive us; the *defence value* of military forces is their effect in mitigating the adverse consequences for us of possible enemy moves, whether such consequences are countered as losses of territory or war damage."⁷

In the 1990s, Walter Wriston writing about the IA effects on modern warfare stated that “as in revolutions past, technology is profoundly affecting the sovereignty of governments, the world economy, and military strategy.”⁸ The proliferation of Information Technology (IT) indicates the onset of a new era of non-state actors and the consequent inability of the sovereign states to physically maintain control over IA world; and the growing importance of information in 21st century in parallel with maintaining of traditional physical-based military capabilities. The proliferation of technological developments facilitated specific dimension of strategy for an effective exploitation that would further impact the future technological developments of warfare. The air and space would determine the future contours and complicate the strategic dynamics and consequently the fate of the 21st century warfare. Moreover, it would confront the nation-states with new vulnerabilities and opportunities that would influence the future warfare. According to some experts, the transformation “in technology, however, are eroding the foundation of nuclear deterrence.”⁹ These changes are rooted in the IA’s revolutionary innovations/changes, including in the realm of computer technology that are essentially “making nuclear forces around the world far more vulnerable than before.”¹⁰ Another pillar of concealment and survivability, is also being eroded due to remote sensing technology revolution that is basically providing states with pinpoint accuracy vis-à-vis upcoming sensing technology that is increasing the vulnerabilities of the nuclear arsenals’ security against attack, and poses a challenging security dilemma for the states. Therefore, in future, the armed forces will have more ability to shoot at a distant targets with accuracy than those of today. For instance, the hypersonic munitions and weapon systems will be able to travel at more than five times the speed of sound along with space-based weapons with ability to strike targets anywhere in the world. Consequently, the future armed forces will be able to attacks both the military and strategic targets that were earlier considered safe sanctuaries, including the space and logistics networks. As a result, there will be no safe havens anymore. Most importantly, the multiple autonomous systems of the adversary will also be able to find targets everywhere in the world and to shoot them with greater accuracy. Such a lethal weapon system will give states the capability to have lethal but smaller payloads to fight a far destructive wars.¹¹

New Military Technologies, Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence Stability

Foregoing in perspective, it does not mean that nuclear arsenals of NWS are insecure or too vulnerable to the first-use or pre-emptive strikes. The developed countries possess considerable resources and technological capabilities that enable

them to sustain resilient strategic forces and deterrence. Technologically advanced rival(s) equipped with hi-tech guidance systems, sensors, satellites and space technologies, data processing, communication, including artificial intelligence capabilities along with other computer-related advancement would consistently improve the survivability and lethality of their strategic forces.¹² In 21st century, the nuclear weapons would continue to be the ultimate instrument of deterrence and security for the states, especially for those countries that are comparatively weak or are militarily at disadvantage vis-à-vis their rival(s),¹³ as is the case in South Asia. The militarily disadvantaged country like Pakistan per force would have to rely more on its strategic and tactical forces to ensure its independence and sovereignty against the militarily and geo-economically much advantaged country – India. In parallel, both countries are additionally building alliances and strategic partnerships with other much powerful countries in world system - like China and the United States (US). Apparently, the question is not only of protecting their security but also their vital geostrategic interests and relative positions in the world as well, which would tend to motivate states to engage in arms race, scramble for more relative gains with intent to sustain their control over certain geographical territories or regions. In parallel with multiple military technological developments, there is a quantum progress taking place in the biotechnology and chemical fields as well, and if such technologies are acquired or stolen by the non-state actors than it would create a difficult challenge for the states to attribute blame on the perpetrators of crimes or terrorists. According to Azar Gat, since the 1990s, research in the biotechnology field has tremendously increased; for instance, in the late 1990s the US, for instance, possessed “1,300 biotechnology companies,” which now has increased to “some 20,000 labs” the world over.¹⁴ “The ‘encapsulation’ of destructive power in WMD, particularly the nuclear and biological, creates a situation whereby one no-longer has to be big in order to deliver a devastating punch.”¹⁵ Such developments are transforming the entire geometry of warfare and deterrence that would pose more challenges in future both for the NWS and the Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS). In addition, the technological developments in the field of military weaponry would lead to restructuring of military doctrines by different countries,¹⁶ which will be impacting the “war’s grammar.”¹⁷ Moreover, the “swarm squadrons” of drones are also likely to be deployed in the future warfare, for example, the British armed forces in the coming years is expected to deploy/employ them and, on the other hand, the US has already been testing and perfecting drone technology that would be capable of performing multiple roles in future conflicts, and thereby to overwhelm the adversaries. This would definitely revolutionise future conflicts. According to one report, the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is working on a programme called Gremlins, to

develop micro-drones the “size and shape of missiles, designed to be dropped from planes and perform reconnaissance over vast areas.”¹⁸ At the end of 2018, reportedly the DARPA “announced it had done exactly that, using its Collaborative Operations in Denied Environment (CODE) project to equip a squad of drones with the ability to ‘adapt and respond to unexpected threats’ high above the Arizona desert, even after human communication was knocked out.” Obviously, the employment of “swarm military technology is inevitable.”¹⁹ These technologies would become a potent instrument of war thereby directly impacting the outcome of conflicts.

South Asian Strategic Caveat

John Mearsheimer writes that even the NWS would have rationale to engage in competition with the rival state(s), even if their own strategic arsenals were considered secure. He further elaborates that “because military technology tends to develop rapidly and in unforeseen ways;”²⁰ therefore, the NWS would surely endeavour to keep pace with the technological advancements in order to sustain effective deterrence. In spite of development in IA’s technologies, the nuclear weapons are still considered as the best and the most effective instrument of deterrence.²¹ However, the prospects of acquisition of disarming first-strike capabilities and the threat that the adversary might follow the same – would tend to motivate even the NWS to consistently improve their strategic forces. In the twentieth century, the technological development made strategists to integrate them into modern warfare. For instance, the theory of geopolitics rested on the rationale that technology can help shape the geostrategic contours of the world politics. In this context, Sir Halford Mackinder considered the railways development as the key to further unlock the “heartland” indicated that the future rise of continental powers would depend on it as was the case in their earlier dependence on maritime capabilities.²² Later in the twentieth century, different strategists and theorists tend to emphasize upon the growing significance of new technologies in military strategy. It commenced with the onset of rising role of air power during the interwar period (1919 to 1939). In this regards, the pioneering air theorist Giulio Douhet was in the forefront, who highlighted the growing importance of air power in future warfare in determining victory.²³ Coming to South Asian nuclear geometry, here the principles of significance of IA’s and military technologies would too influence the future direction of war between the South Asian nuclear rivals. “With reference to IT, the fifth dimension is likely to become even more significant in the practice of strategy. But it would be a mistake to overlook the continued importance of physical geography and the military forces which operate in the traditional physical environment,” writes David Lonsdale.²⁴

The author further explains his concept of fifth dimension:

The other forms of strategic power: sea, land, air, and space, all have their own physical environments which have unique characteristics. The nature of each environment determines to a degree how the corresponding power can be utilized. Information power operates within an environment which is best defined as the 'infosphere'....In fact the infosphere is best thought of as a polymorphous entity where information exists and flows. Although clearly not a physical medium in the same vein as the other dimensions of strategy, an information dimension can be identified. Weapons, in the form of malicious software, can flow through the infosphere, and in this sense the fifth dimension acts as a medium for strategic power.²⁵

In his viewpoint, the function of the infosphere "is to act as a highway, through which information and weapons can flow." Whereas in the context of sea it also facilitates in locating the large deposits of natural resources. Lonsdale observes that similarly the information resides within the infosphere.²⁶ In future, the "information power" would enable the states to achieve their policy objectives.²⁷ According to other experts, the revolution of information would qualitatively and quantitatively increase the power of states – both the conventional and strategic military forces' power.²⁸ In the 20th century, three "C" were of cardinal significance for sustainability of a stable deterrence: capability, communication, and credibility; but, in the 21st century, another "C" has also become a potent factor - that is training and leadership's experience and senior military leaderships experience gained through war games. Additionally, the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power, would also greatly influence the future outcome of deterrence through the application of 'carrot-and-stick' policies.²⁹

Now let us analyse India-Pakistan's deterrence structure. Since 1945, the concept of deterrence has been effectively sustained by influencing the adversary's cost-benefit calculations and the associated risks with the nuclear weapons usage in the event of deterrence failure. In nuclear jargon it is called deterrence through denial. The second concept is to convince the adversary that defeating a NWS would be so costly - that is deterrence through punishment. Actually, in IA to deter aggression would increasingly become a challenging affair due to technological capabilities and the on-going geostrategic transformation that is changing the entire trajectory of world politics from unipolar to multipolar. In this context, Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. writes that:

The era of unprecedented U.S. military dominance that followed the Cold War has ended, leading to renewed competition between the United States and two great revisionist powers, China and Russia. Military competition is expanding to several new domains, from space and cyberspace to the

*seabed, and new capabilities are making it harder to accurately gauge the military balance of power.*³⁰

In addition, military competition and technology is expanding to other avenues/domains, including from space and cyberspace to the seabed, which makes it difficult to accurately determine the military balance of power in 21st century. Weapons in space could be manipulated by states possessing space capability to “prevent arms race through some form of ‘space hegemony’.”³¹ Another expert writes that the “development of space technology was closely linked to nuclear strategy. Throughout the history of Space Age they remained inseparable.”³² John Klein observes that “placing satellites or weapons in space” can accord state(s) multiple benefits, including “intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance satellites” capabilities that will provide them ability to “see within the boundaries of other nation states, space systems.”³³ Presently, in space strategy there are four schools of thought: Sanctuary; Survivability; High Ground; and Control.³⁴ The “understanding of the use and utility of celestial lines of communication is most important when considering military strategy in space” observes Klein.³⁵ Moreover, the modern era’s cyber weapon-related technologies would also tremendously undermine rival state’s early warning and command and control systems, which would influence deterrence stability. For example, in 2007 Israel destroyed the Syrian nuclear reactor. Before the strike, Israel had launched a cyber-attack which literally *blinded* the Syrian air defense system.

Foregoing in view, it is pertinent to note that the future conflicts between India and Pakistan would also greatly influence the entire grammar of South Asian warfare. The contemporary technological development is likely to compromise both states’ early warning and command and control systems, which would tremendously impact deterrence architecture and would motivate a stronger player (in this case India) to operationalize its highly risky “Cold Start Doctrine” (CSD), which the Indian policymakers had crafted in 2004 seemingly to launch a conventional military strike against Pakistan.³⁶ This highly aggressive Indian military posturing is expected to influence “the balancing acts of states”³⁷ that in the case of Pakistan (which is conventionally at a considerable military disadvantage vis-à-vis India) would constantly remain in search of security that could enable it to hold India’s aggressive military posturing in check. Therefore, Pakistan would be constrained to deploy an effective counter-force capability against CSD so as to build a rational nuclear defence and a credible nuclear deterrence against Indian ground attack, as it has been conceived under its CSD plan. Secondly, it can also work as a deterrence of direct nuclear attack on Pakistan as well.³⁸ For example, in the Cold War scenario the “tactical nuclear weapons in the hands of NATO forces

in Europe have considerable deterrent value because they increase the enemy's cost expectation beyond what it would be if these forces were equipped only with conventional weapons.”³⁹ Similarly, in the case of South Asia, for instance, the same strategic plan can also be employed by Pakistan to make its nuclear deterrent credible. The tactical nuclear response to the Indian CSD – conventional attack, like NATO's strategy in the 1950s, has to “be made semi-automatic.”⁴⁰ In fact, deterrence in war has to be based on a strategy of limited retaliation to deter the rival from further aggression.⁴¹ Obviously, this would influence both states' behaviour against each other. Kenneth Waltz writes that there is a close correlation between power and security as the extreme “weakness may invite an attack that greater strength would have dissuaded an adversary from launching.” Excessive power may also prompt other states to indulge in the arms race and to pool up their resources against the opponent state(s).⁴² For instance, another writer – Davide Fiammenghi states that there is a “parabolic relationship between power and security.” This indicates that “increase in a state's power” tantamount to enhancement of its security, whereas the “power begins to diminish the state's security, because the on-going accumulation of capabilities causes allies to defect and opponents to mobilize.”⁴³ The prevalent security environment would tend to compel the rival states to bandwagon with the stronger state(s) – for instance, in the case of Pakistan and India – with China and the US respectively. After the Cold War, the traditional “state-centric” concept of security was transformed into “other sectors than the military, giving equal emphasis to domestic and trans-border” and other transnational threats.⁴⁴ Ostensibly, all these aggressive military posturing of India were with intent to impose its domination over South Asia, if not over the entire Indian Ocean Region (IOR), as US ally to curtail China's growing geo-economic and military influence, especially after Beijing's launching of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to establish a strategic and economic connectivity with over seventy countries stretching from the Far East to Africa, and from Central Asia to Europe. The BRI is perceived by US policymakers as a serious threat to its traditional military domination over the Pacific and Indian Ocean.

It is generally assumed that in 21st century, whosoever controls the straits of Hormuz, Bab-el-Mandeb to Malacca is expected to dominate the geostrategic trajectory of Asia-Pacific, including that of IOR. The “sea power” has close links with strategic deterrence as it provides major naval powers ability to control, to project their power ashore, and to sustain naval presence in different geographical regions.⁴⁵ According to some experts, “Space control is very much like past and present concepts of sea control.”⁴⁶ Incidentally, till 2030, there is expectation of increase in world's energy needs out of which India and China will be consuming

approximately half of it. Simultaneously both China and India are shifting their focus on acquiring more sea capabilities - blue water navies, not only for the energy security, but also to enlarge their seaborne strategic outreach supposedly to acquire a great power status. In this regards, the Indo-US strategic partnership has been established to contain the rise of China. In essence, the present century is expected to witness further intensify rivalry amongst China and the US-India in the IOR, and the US-allies and China in the Pacific.

2019 Military Crises

The February 2019 military crisis between Pakistan and India was followed by Pulwama incident in which reportedly 40 Indian military personnel were killed in Indian occupied Kashmir. Subsequently India threatened to launch missile attacks against Pakistan and, on the other hand, Pakistan too was reportedly determined to respond with missile strikes “three times over.”⁴⁷ According to Hindustan Times’ correspondents – they “spoke to a key Cabinet Committee of Security (CCS) member, Indian and Pakistani diplomats, office of the US National Security Advisor (NSA), and intelligence officials to piece together some of the events on the day -- the fragile and uneasy relationship between the two neighbours almost reached breaking point.”⁴⁸ If this story is true than it indicates extremely low level of both countries redlines, which simply with a single event could climb to escalation. Dinshaw Mistry writing about South Asian nuclear conundrum states that India in spite of its conventional military edge, still lacks capability to strike first against Pakistan’s strategic assets. The author further observes that if India decides to launch a conventional first-strike, which as a consequent would erode Pakistan’s deterrent, and would push it to deploy its missiles to ensure the survivability of its nuclear deterrence in case crisis deepens or results in “a pre-emptive strike.”⁴⁹ To use the strategic weapons, the cardinal principle is that the political leadership have to be determined to protect country’s existence, particularly against the stronger rivals’ threatening behaviour. However, 2019 crisis has demonstrated Pakistan’s determination to protect its sovereignty against all forms of Indian threats of aggression. Strangely during the 2019 crisis, India notwithstanding its military edge, reportedly deployed and fully operationalized its nuclear powered ballistic missile-armed submarine INS Arihant and another nuclear submarine. It was in fact contrary to India’s NFU policy. In fact, Indian navy stated that its naval nuclear assets could be quickly transitioned to full operational readiness against the Pakistani forces.⁵⁰ It clearly indicates India’s apparent nuclear shift from its stated policy NFU to first-use, and that India in spite of possessing comfortable conventional military edge over Pakistan has no logical rationale to move its strategic naval assets in aggressive deployment mode despite a

limited conventional aggression by Indian air force across the Line of Control (LoC) into Pakistan. India's limited aggression was very effectively countered by Pakistan, however, India's nuclear assets deployment was a ninety degree diversion from New Delhi's NFU policy. Pakistan demonstrated its determination to effectively counter and safeguard its sovereignty against Indian aggressive intrusion into its territory with all might with conventional weapons. Incidentally, since last couple of years, a debate has been going on amongst the Indian policymakers, political, and military elites to restructure India's nuclear doctrine.⁵¹ This is obviously a source of serious concern for Pakistan which is already at military disadvantage vis-à-vis India.

In fact, the dramatic transformation of world politics' trajectory after 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US had pushed Pakistan to tilt toward China. Subsequently, US established multiple cooperative security and technology transfer arrangements with New Delhi with intent to enable the latter to play an offshore balancing role in the Indo-Pacific with apparent geopolitical objective to contain the rise of China. Pakistan's closeness with China and India's with the US - markedly influenced the Indian leaderships' behaviour toward Pakistan. While after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Pakistan constantly faced a formidable security challenge in the shape of terrorism particularly in the aftermath of US occupation of Afghanistan that pushed multiple non-state actor's outfits into Pakistan's tribal belt. This created a daunting security challenge for Pakistan. This posed a two front security dilemma for Pakistan - from Afghanistan in the West and India in the East. This dramatically transformed geopolitical landscape and further hardened India's attitude - rather it made New Delhi more aggressive and resulted in frequent eruption of military crises and threats, including that of 2001-2002, and 2019 with more aggressive posturing to impose escalation domination over Pakistan. As indicated in 2019 crisis, Pakistan was not prepared to escalate tension and instead it emphasised need to resolve all contentious issues peacefully, including that of Kashmir that incessantly impacted their bilateral relations since 1947.

In today's technological-centric world, it would be pragmatic to analyse other contemporary dynamics that influence states' behaviour and motivate them to possess additional power with intent to increase their security. In the contemporary world politics, there is an absence of international authority or code of conduct, to regulate and control the prevailing anarchy that subsequently encourages states to venture for domination, power, and security.⁵² This accords added importance to rationality - and urge states to calibrate state-centric policies while pursuing their diplomatic relations with other states.⁵³ The concept of power is a highly contested concept, and invariably different countries are likely to

delineate it by considering their own distinct or rather narrow “interests and values.”⁵⁴ The power is determined on the index of resources – technological and industrial development, human, capital, physical and natural resources harnessing in spite of external constraints, infrastructure, ideas; and the way it impacts states military power and combat proficiency.⁵⁵ In today’s world, the commonly used terminology like “military power” or “economic power” basically comprises of a hybrid mix of “both resources and behaviours,” inclusive of resources, abundance of raw materials, thereby indoctrinating behaviour to produce preferred outcomes. In essence, it is a mix of “hard and soft power resources” that enable countries to achieve “smart power” so as to face the challenges of IA’ technological-centric world.⁵⁶

The South Asian nuclear equation has enhanced the prospects of instability and miscalculations in view of both countries’ divergent offensive and defensive doctrines – India’s CSD and Pakistan’s “full-spectrum” nuclear deterrence strategy to hold former’s conventional military in check. It is putting the existing fragile stability-instability paradox under considerable stress, which is thereby creating more uncertainties, instabilities and impacting the behaviour of both countries’ leaderships. Obviously, it is expected to undermine the stability of both countries. Since the overt nuclearization of South Asia in 1998, India and Pakistan moved on opposing strategic trajectories in order to achieve their conflicting strategic objectives. Apparently, the policymakers of India consistently showed propensity to reaffirm its credibility of nuclear deterrence by exploiting its conventional military superiority by crafting CSD in 2004. Clearly, it indicates existence of offensive military mind set/inclination of Indian leadership against Pakistan.⁵⁷ Another analyst writes that “India...has a declared policy of NFU of nuclear weapons; nonetheless India may consider Launch On Warning (LOW) strategy,” encouraged “by its acquisition of” state-of-the-art Israeli Elta Green Pine early-warning and fire-control radar, and Russian airborne early-warning and Russia’s S-400 missile systems, and the development of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) with the collaboration of US.⁵⁸ India since 1998 is indigenously developing BMD systems to cope with multi-dimensional threats.⁵⁹ India intends to establish multi-layered defence contingencies against all dimensions of threat of ballistic missiles – including with its Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) system in order to intercept a high-altitude target at the distance of 50-80 kilometres and along with its Advanced Air Defence (AAD) missile system that is proficient of targeting the low-altitude targets at 15-30 kilometres. Interestingly, in August 1999 India’s the then prime minister, policymakers and other experts crafted the Draft Nuclear Doctrine (DND) that embedded a policy of NFU nuclear policy fundamentally against the NNWS.

However, in November 1999, the then former Foreign Minister of India Jaswant Singh indicated that DND was “not a policy document of...India;” therefore it is liable to further amendments. In this sequence, in 2003 India modified its NFU policy by saying that it would retaliate with nuclear weapons against any chemical or biological attack against its armed forces personnel anywhere in the world. Furthermore, in October 2010, Shivshankar Menon, India’s then National Security Adviser revealed that India’s NFU was only valid for the NNWS. Such revelations by high level Indian policymakers further created ambiguity regarding India’s quasi NFU policy. This according to some Pakistani experts - India’s NFU is still under restructuring process by its policymakers, which apparently are contemplating a policy of first-use or even pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons in the event of a crisis.⁶⁰ Anthony Clark Arend writes that albeit the traditional international law required there to be “an imminent danger of attack” before pre-emptive strike is executed; however, in 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) of the US underlined that it “must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries.” The author further explains that the United Nations Charter in the context of pre-emptive use of force underscores that the employment of unilateral pre-emptive force without an imminent threat is clearly unlawful act. He opines that “the charter framework no longer accurately reflects existing international law, then the Bush doctrine of pre-emption may, in fact, be lawful—even if it is politically unwise.” He further observed that the “brief examination of some important indicators of state practice in the post-UN Charter period, it would be difficult to conclude that there is an established rule of customary international law prohibiting the pre-emptive use of force when undertaken in anticipatory self-defence.” That United States might prefer that the law be left “in a fog.”⁶¹ All these factors are furthermore complicating the deterrence matrix, including that of South Asia. As argued in the preceding sections, it is likely to put deterrence under considerable stress particularly with the induction of new hi-tech military technologies, which will put militarily, economically, and industrially disadvantaged actor – Pakistan at further disadvantage.

Crafting of conflicting military doctrines by both rivals would compel them to further conceptualize new doctrines/strategies - both for the conventional, battlefield, and strategic nuclear forces employment.⁶² After acquiring nuclear capability, Pakistan was able to sustain a rough strategic parity against India that enabled the former to hold latter’s conventional might at bay. In South Asian theatre, nuclear weapons have created a serious strategic impasse between the two. Incidentally, India and Pakistan since 1998 has steadily integrated their conventional and nuclear forces into their strategic doctrines. In spite of

integration of conventional and nuclear forces, both countries have failed to prevent eruption of crises, including that of 1999 Kargil War over Kashmir, 2001-2002 twin-peak, and 2019 crises. In spite of Pakistan's comparative military disadvantage vis-a-vis India, it still has managed to pursue an assertive foreign and security policy and prevented India from operationalizing its risky CSD. However, the existing disproportionate economic, industrial, military, technological, and diplomatic advantage of India is impelling Islamabad to further craft proportionately calibrated conventional and strategic strategies, and to establish a vibrant command and control architecture to boost its nuclear posturing vis-à-vis India.⁶³ However, both countries need to understand that, "Poor strategy is expensive," but "bad strategy can be lethal, while when the stakes include survival, very bad strategy is almost always fatal" writes Colin Gray. He further explains that appropriate strategy makes "theory and practice of the use, and threat of use, of organized force for political purposes." As observed in the preceding sections of the paper that on account of "growing complexity of modern war, a general theory of war and strategy" need to be "properly formulated" and integrated in order to ensure a viable deterrence.⁶⁴

Future of Deterrence in Technological-Centric World

In today's world, there is a "growing complexity" of modern warfare, which impacts the traditional and "general theory of war and strategy" that motivate states to craft a stable and viable deterrence.⁶⁵ The wobbly nature of South Asian security environment makes it imperative to realistically utilize strategy with a view to avoid stumbling into pitfalls, and to remove any illusion of misconceptions to achieve an escalation dominance under the nuclear overhang. India's CSD and Pakistan's "full-spectrum" nuclear strategy – the former to initiate a limited war, while the latter to prevent and counter India's CSD, possess seeds to lead both rivals toward a nuclear catastrophe. Therefore, as Ryan French writes that, "Cold Start envisions a shallow but high-intensity ground offensive into Pakistan with a handful of division or brigade sized strike formations, calibrated in such a way that avoids crossing Islamabad's nuclear redlines." The author explains that this "doctrine is premised on the assumption that India will be able to assert escalation control and prevent the ensuing conflict from spiralling out of hand." As observed in the previous sections that war has its own dynamics and grammar, therefore, "the reality is the very opposite. If a limited ground incursion is authorized, military necessity and miscalculation could very well precipitate all-out conventional war, bringing South Asia to the brink of nuclear calamity."⁶⁶

Asymmetrical security situation of South Asia, where the new IA's technologies and the Indo-United States' Research and Development (R&D) and strategic cooperation programme in the field of emerging military technologies - is expected to qualitatively influence the future outcome of conflict between the two. The technological revolution and the expanding orbit of Indo-US strategic, scientific R&D cooperation architecture is also expected to further increase the complexity of South Asian warfare dynamics that would make the sustainability of deterrence difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. In such a security environment, Pakistan has to invest more into military technology related R&D or to initiate hi-tech weaponry procurement programme in order to balance power equation, if not to catch up, with India's growing military potentials that would pose serious challenges to its security, and could make sustaining of an effective deterrence against India's military and economic rise much more difficult. Therefore, both countries have to judiciously carry out cost and benefit analysis with a view to prevent the inadvertent escalation of a crisis or war. To tackle the existential challenges, Pakistan requires a determined and comprehensive national security plan to deal with the emerging internal/external security challenges. Pakistan's *mere* nuclear capability probably would not be sufficient to dissuade India from military misadventures. With every passing year the regional security and deterrence matrix is becoming more *complex*, which could put Pakistan's credible minimum nuclear deterrent posture under a considerable pressure. Therefore, Pakistan has to effectively strategize its robust deterrence plan to prevent India's perceived "coercive strategy"⁶⁷ and to neutralize the threat of the use of force by India. India's asymmetrical rise vis-à-vis Pakistan is considered by the latter's policymakers as dangerous and offensive development that could confront Pakistan with existential threats.

Pakistan and CSD

India's power accumulation drive has encouraged it to evolve a highly destabilizing military plan of CSD - to launch limited strikes into Pakistan. Pakistan is in a constant process to maximize its security, in contrast to the "power maximizing"⁶⁸ country - India. Pakistan's primary concern is to preserve its security and to effectively face the security challenges. In realist world, it is the state's interests, instead of power or threats that provide awareness about state(s) behaviour.⁶⁹ Therefore, Pakistan has to make continuous efforts in the realm of R&D related to military and infosphere technologies, improve its economy, and to further fine-tune its proportionate strategy to make deterrence robust so as to prevent India from coercing or using force. Pakistan perceives India's growing military and geo-economic rise, and the technological advancement projects with

the US and Israel - as dangerous and offensive that would pose existential threat to its sovereignty. Furthermore, Pakistan considers India's limited war plan fundamentally escalatory and destabilizing. Therefore, Pakistani policymakers would be constrained to develop or to procure new military and infosphere technologies to make nuclear deterrence robust and effective against India, and to prevent it from resorting to coercive tactics vis-à-vis Pakistan.

India's dangerous escalation strategy is likely to exert great pressure on the viability of deterrence, which could consequently push Islamabad to conceptualize a more robust counter-CSD strategy to neutralize New Delhi's blitzkrieg plan against Pakistan. In fact, CSD has envisaged a short duration military operation into Pakistani territories or to launch "surgical strikes" to achieve its politico-military goals. The pivotal pillar of CSD is structured on premise to take advantage of a space to launch a limited war against Pakistan. The CSD intends to deploy and employ, if need be, the Indian Army's Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs) in the vicinity or even into the Pakistani territories. India's aggressive military posturing indicates an existence of first-attack strategy under CSD by adequately minimizing the possibility of mediation by other countries, including through diplomatic channels to defuse the crisis. Such an alarming and destabilizing strategy of India would subtly increase the probability of misperceptions and create prospects for strategic miscalculations, which could lead both countries either to an accidental or inadvertent conventional, or even to a nuclear war. Moreover, India's ambitious weapons procurement and military technology development/acquisition programme would further put Pakistan's nuclear deterrent posture in jeopardy. These are some of the inherent grey areas that India quite conveniently exploit to its advantage – especially at a juncture when Indo-US strategic collaboration programme is flourishing and they have strategic convergence architecture covering right from the IOR to Pacific. In this context, US and India are massively investing to enhance their blue water navies and power potentials to expand their strategic outreach, which appears to be in perfect harmony with Washington's Indo-Pacific naval command's objectives that – 1) to contain the rise of China; 2) to maintain US supremacy in the Indo-Pacific region which it had maintained since 1945; and 3) to weave an effective offshore balancing web against China. It is taking shape in the back drop of Indo-United States' fear of economically and militarily assertive posturing of China. This is both countries' major area of strategic convergence.

Conclusion

The paper argued that in future conflict between India and Pakistan - the technologically-advanced conventional weapons and IA's technologies would remain crucial in determining the outcome of conflicting scenarios, and put deterrence under considerable stress. The hi-tech weaponry systems would act as a force multiplier and influence battlefield's outcome. These developments would pose serious challenges to deterrence stability and sustainability. Basically, nuclear deterrence rests upon the principles of threat of retaliation against the rival(s) in case of a breakdown of deterrence. In essence, the NWS has to ensure the reliability, credibility, and the survivability of their deterrence structure against any probability of breakdown of deterrence. Essentially, nuclear deterrence has to be resilient enough to survive the enemy's first-strike, including pre-emptive strike, and yet it should be able to retaliate and inflict unacceptable damage on the attacker. Furthermore, the IA revolution in computers and information technologies would also empower the small states, including the non-state actors; and create inability for the nation-states to physically maintain control over IA's advancement or physical-based military capabilities over them.

The technologically advanced states equipped with hi-tech guidance systems, sensors, satellites and space technologies, data processing, communication, including artificial intelligence capabilities along with other computer-related advancement would reliably improve the scope of survivability and lethality of their strategic forces. On the other hand, if state does not possess a similar capability against state B, then militarily disadvantaged country like Pakistan, for instance, per force will be constrained to rely more on its strategic forces to ensure its independence and sovereignty against the militarily and geo-economically much advantaged country - India. But contrary to this logic, India during the 2019 standoff reportedly made its nuclear assets fully operational by moving its nuclear ballistic missile-armed submarines, including INS Arihant near Pakistan's exclusive economic zone. It was contrary to India's stated NFU policy.

The paper concludes that future conflicts between India and Pakistan would greatly influence the entire grammar of South Asian warfare. The contemporary technological development is likely to compromise both states' early warning and command and control systems, which would greatly impact deterrence architecture - both denial and punishment strategies that could motivate a stronger player (in this case India) to operationalize its highly risky "Cold Start Doctrine." India-Pakistan's security and nuclear equation has created lot of prospects to generate instability and miscalculations in view of both rivals'

divergent offensive and defensive doctrines – India’s CSD and Pakistan’s “full-spectrum” nuclear deterrence strategy. The Indian strategy could “risks triggering an outsized Pakistani reaction and an escalation spiral that neither side could control.”⁷⁰ In future, it could put the existing fragile stability-instability paradox under considerable stress that is liable to create more uncertainties, instabilities, and impel both countries’ leaderships to formulate hasty decisions which could irreparably jeopardize the entire strategic stability structure of South Asia.

NOTES

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NATION BUILDING THROUGH CPEC

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Abstract

Pakistan today confronts mega problems. It has been a victim of hybrid warfare for decades. Pakistan has been a hostage of International Financial Institutions (IFI). Even if we question, we question consequences and not the root causes. It is time to adopt a new 'development paradigm' that may meet our future needs. Pakistan does not lack in talented people but the local aristocratic power elites have become the protagonists, facilitators and handlers of hybrid war by making it sure that critical policy making and governance institutions are headed by incompetent and irrelevant people. That is how the western powers' hybrid war strategy ignited an 'implosion' in the former Soviet Union in 1991. This template was repeated in the Middle East and North Africa to precipitate 'colour spring' revolutions, destabilizing the entire region. The 21st century has catapulted Pakistan once again to a new level of geo-political and geo-economic importance. The Chinese knew that 'if China is the future, Pakistan holds the key'. China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a mean to an end i.e. economic take off of Pakistan. If official business continues as usual, CPEC is likely to be a 'missed opportunity'.

Keywords: Nation Building, CPEC, Hybrid Warfare, Western Powers, North Africa.


Introduction

Pakistan since its inception is facing problems. It has been a victim of hybrid warfare for decades. All nations make mistakes, irrespective of the economic model i.e. political economy, structural, classical, neo classical, liberal, neo liberal, socialist, or those following Washington consensus. The truth is that only nations which learn from the mistakes of others and more importantly their own, break the vicious cycle of poverty and enter into 'prosperity' zone. For 60 years Pakistan's economy has been a hostage of IFI Hit men and remained dependent on donors. Even if we question, we question consequences and not the root causes. The time to adopt a new 'development paradigm' that meets our future needs, addresses

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current failures and learns from the past mistakes, is “**now** or **never**”. Pakistan sits at the ‘cusp’ of historic transition in its nation building, with both vulnerabilities and in-built strengths, as we race to second quarter of the 21st century. The vulnerabilities are all too well known. But no vulnerability is stronger than sustained external interference by the western powers and institutions in our internal matters and inability of our so-called feudal and tribal elite dominated parliament and governance entities to undertake necessary reforms to thwart the hybrid war (known as the fifth generation hybrid war).

Pakistan does not lack in talented people but the local aristocratic power elites have become the protagonists, facilitators and handlers of hybrid war by making it sure that critical Policy making and governance institutions are headed by incompetent and irrelevant people. The IFIs have been ‘partners in crime’ in perpetrating economic despondency. Every IMF program of stabilization was meant to destabilize the country and make next IMF program has been signed and is in progress. Before IMF Hit men became hyper active with dual nationality and long term multiple entry visas for the western destinations to lobby for an IMF package for Pakistan in 1989, Pakistan was doing reasonably well ahead of India and Bangladesh. Since then, one IMF package has only ensured the next one. In 1991, India had to actually mortgage its gold reserves with the Bank of England to settle its debt obligations after witnessing what is known as the four decades of ‘Hindu rate of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth of 2 to 3 percent.



Source: Vision 2025, Ministry of Planning, Development and Reform Islamabad.

The power elite use their position for self-indulgence, self-gratification, self-protection and promotion. Over the past fifty years, elections after elections have been held without any change in complexion, composition, attitude or delivery. The unfortunate outcome has been Pakistan's sustained downslide in the comity of Nations. The IFI henchmen and hit men are all well placed in Pakistan's top policy making institutions such as the State Bank, Federal Board of Revenue, Finance, Commerce and Planning Ministries who help achieve their mentor's objectives for the sake of personal benefits. Wages for such services include dual citizenship, green card, multiple entry visas, scholarships and jobs for their off springs etc. There is marked interference by foreign powers and intelligence agencies in the internal affairs of Pakistan. The various forms and manifestations of the fifth generation hybrid war has been implemented with denial of economic space/market access, protracted sanctions, discriminatory tariffs, quotas, so-called business advisories, adverse ratings/rankings and media hostility. The IMF and IFI Hit men with 5 year multiple visa of western destinations, dominate the policy making institutions. Pakistan has in-built strengths too.

Pakistan was among 14 nations which gave loan of Rs.120 million for German reconstruction in 1950s. Comparison between Germany and Pakistan (All figures in US \$) 2015-2016		
	Germany	Pakistan
Causalities 1945 World War-II	7.5 million	1 million (1947)
Refugees	15 million	10 million
Area	357168 Square Kilometers	796096 Square Kilometers
Population	82 million	201 million
Size of Economy (Global)	4 th	27 th
GDP	3.8 trillion	304 billion
GDP (PPP)	3.842 billion (4 th)	1.060 billion (24 th)
Exports	1.28 trillion	21 billion
Per Capita Income	41,267	1468
HDI Score	0.926 (4 th)	0.550 (147 th)

Source: Wikipedia

An ancient Chinese metaphor says: “where there is stairway, it should be used”. Pakistan is ideally placed at strategic geographical location which is ‘gate way for interlocking regions’ of South Asia, Central Asia, West Asia, Gulf and Africa complements its demographic advantages; global connectivity; English language proficiency; civil/military institutions; rich natural and mineral resources endowments; expatriate community, social capital, soft power values and active

diplomatic presence at the international level. These are more than adequate assets to attract the great powers, including the Chinese with an eye on future, to bet on Pakistan. Pakistan's people have demonstrated repeatedly their unprecedented resilience to overwhelming odds and proved their ability to stage a 'comeback after every crisis'.

In 1950, Pakistan Exported 111 Percent more than China <u>Comparative Export Growth of Asian States</u> (in million US dollar)			
States / Year	1950	1973	2006
Pakistan	633	955	16,930
India	1,145	2,917	120,254
China	550	5,876	986,936
Japan	855	37,107	649,931
Republic of Korea	23	3,225	325,465

Source: Angus Madison. The World Economy, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Paris and World Trade Organization (WTO) International Trade Statistics 2007, Geneva.

Today Pakistan's GDP is one and a half times larger than China's GDP in 1978 but Pakistan stands in 2019 where China stood in 1979, when it began its comprehensive policy of reforms and open door to the outside world. Pakistan's history of nation building is however, a long list of 'missed opportunities'. It is of no use to indulge in blame game, complaints and ungratefulness. Our airports and markets do not have tourists despite rich historical heritage sites, tourist attractions and hospitality of the local population. Due to systemic failures in the absence of rule of law, merit and inclusiveness, Pakistan's narrative is missing globally. Pakistan can and should reverse its sustained downslide. It is among the best blessed and geographically well placed nation. Its rich natural resource, mineral resource, human resource, diverse climate, demography, social capital, cultural values and civil-military institutions, provide formidable inbuilt strengths.

Nation Building Paradoxes of Pakistan

Pakistan has a heavy baggage or burden in view of the peculiar circumstances of its history, economy and society which is preventing achievement of its destined role in the world, as per dreams of its founding fathers and millions of men, women and children who laid down their lives and continue to serve the nation under challenging circumstances. Some of these are self-inflicted injuries,

while others have been courtesy of Pakistan's western friends with whom Pakistan became the 'most allied ally' and yet remained the 'most sanctioned ally'. A 'security state paradigm', exists due to Jammu and Kashmir dispute, Afghanistan situation, security threats and wars imposed by India. Pakistan has however weathered all the challenges to its existence over the past seven decades and came out as the 'partial winner' in the great game of the 20th century. If only, it can launch home grown comprehensive reforms to ignite economic take off and unleash the energy of its 210 million population, it can be assured a place in the high table in the 21st century.

The 21st century has now catapulted Pakistan once again to a new level of geo-political and geo-economic importance. The Chinese know that 'if China is the future, Pakistan holds the key'. Fifty states are interested to be part of CPEC¹ – the new Suez Canal of the 21st century. The route to peace and prosperity in South Asia, West Asia, Central Asia and the Gulf region all goes through Pakistan. Pakistan has been held as a hostage by IFIs development model based on imported fuel. The civil service needs far reaching reforms to improve the quality of governance. The quota system, like the construction of water reservoirs needs urgent review and action. The domination of narrow interests in politics has promoted emotionalism, cynicism and nihilism in population. For instance, innovative policies have not been undertaken for the full utilization of overseas Pakistanis. If the Pakistanis can succeed in creating wealth in the Silicon Valley USA and elsewhere in the world, why cannot they do in their own country. The critical reason is the absence of an 'enabling environment'. No effort has been made to attract expatriate Pakistanis to develop 'Silicon Valleys' in Pakistan. A number of developing countries including China, India, Vietnam, Philippines have adopted and succeeded in harnessing their expatriate population to create wealth. Here in Pakistan, we have exposed our overseas compatriots to the wolves of qabza mafia and the incompetent and corrupt governance machinery.

The taxation system has failed to promote revenue generation due to failures to undertake reforms of rules and procedures. The submission of income tax has been deliberately made complex and vague to keep away honest and law abiding citizens from contributing in revenue generation. The failure to undertake full documentation of the economy with defective national income accounts computing and taxation system dims the prospects of Pakistani economy. The taxation officials cannot even fill their own forms in a country, where only ten percent have been to universities. In fact, literacy level has declined to 58 percent from 60 per cent last year. There exists a negative mindset of the privileged elite to

development, with an indulgent culture, irrational thinking and tunnel vision. Our exporters have failed to move beyond family businesses in economy, with lack of coordination between private and public sector. There is negative role of religion, caste, ethnicity and media in national, provincial and local politics. Pakistan's exports lack value addition, connectivity, market survey, research, and innovation/creativity. There does not exist implementation machinery for foreign MoUs, deals, contracts and agreements leading to failure in attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The iron frame of the state i.e. federal ministries, departments and autonomous bodies has been destroyed by decades of nepotism, cronyism and corruption.

Due to major policy missteps, the rural industrialization and cottage industry have been destroyed in the absence of rural credit market and banking coverage to the rural areas. The education does not meet beyond the needs of 2 percent elite class. There exists class based discriminatory system of three tier education system with O and A level, matriculation/intermediate and deeni madaris are further perpetuating class differences. There exists a culture of mediocrity in higher education, with no attention to investment in Research and Development (R&D) or training in modern professional values at every level little or no attention is devoted by education and media institutions to grooming of younger generation in social values for nation building process. There exists unbridled consumerism and a culture of living beyond means, snobbery, ostentatious life style. The absence of the rule of law results in loss of credibility and trust in state policies and institutions. Pakistani decision makers require to adopt modernization promote knowledge culture; acknowledge and rectify past mistakes, learn from global best practices and change their mindset.

Pakistan civil service is high in governance, but low in service; high in spending and low in revenue; high in protocol rituals and low in performance, high in vision and low in delivery; high in verbosity and low in implementation. There is prevalence of corruption at all levels of government due to lax monitoring, institutional weakness, and decay in social values, leading to cronyism, nepotism and bad governance. The legal system and judiciary need comprehensive reforms to make justice timely, cheap and accessible. The crowding of cases at the higher courts need to be checked by establishing 'intermediate mediation courts'. Only extremely important issues of constitutional nature, criminal or civil jurisdiction should be taken up in the higher courts. There is a need to learn lessons from the past and acknowledge mistakes and adopt nation building reform and revival program. Pakistan does not only have twin deficits i.e. trade deficit and fiscal

deficit. It has leadership deficit, trust deficit, governance deficit, intellectual deficit, common sense deficit. Disastrous decisions in nation building include many, but a few only compare to the fateful decision to seek IMF bailout in 1989 and regularly thereafter. Pakistan economy was doing far better than Bangladesh and India, before it adopted the IMF program.

CPEC: A 'Pakistan Dream'

The rise of Pakistan's trusted strategic partner China as the economic superpower, the respect Pakistan enjoys in the Islamic world and the quality of its military and strategic resources, make it a category in itself. The demographic dividend of having almost 67 percent of population below 30 years of age enables Pakistan to groom at least a million high quality professionals and triple of this number of vocational trained manpower annually from 2020 onwards to sustain the growth trajectory being ignited by CPEC. China is willing to help. For all these to materialize where Pakistan's demographic plays out to its advantage, the governance paradigm has to move away from its pro-West bias, feudal tribalism, defunct elitism, class divisions, parochialism, and nepotism. Pakistan needs to align its policies and practices to serve its own national interests.

China is confronting a shortage of 85 million skilled and professional manpower until 2050 AD, to sustain its high economic growth trajectory. Most of this talent and skills gap will be met by the rapid process of automation and relocation of in-competitive sectors of economy to the developing countries. However even then, according to credible estimates, China will need to meet a third of its total shortage in manpower from foreign professional and skilled talent. China has already begun attracting foreign talents. A corporate, engineering or social science degree holder from China now has an assured job opening, as China moves ahead. Pakistani universities are however, handicapped seriously by the shortage of China experts who could impart courses in Chinese studies and disciplines. Most Pakistani students who proceed to China for higher education undertake it in English language without bothering to learn the Chinese language, thus remaining sadly handicapped to understand the society, institutions and its way of working. For example, preparing our future generation for the job opportunities in the emerging multinational conglomerates of China (who as of July 2018 number 120 of fortune 500 companies) is a real possibility.

The main objectives of China's One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative are to build a community of shared destiny by investing US \$ 1.3 trillion (gross US \$ 4

trillion) by 2030 AD in projects of connectivity such as roads, railways, power, ports, pipelines and human resources. The US \$ 62 billion China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is the flagship project of the OBOR. The CPEC is meant to enable Pakistan's long moribund economy to take off by removing its supply side constraints in sectors such as infrastructure, energy and port handling capacities. While one third projects worth US \$ 22 billion under CPEC have been completed, work is ongoing on the second phase while the remaining third phase is under planning phase. The implementation of CPEC projects has been made possible by the unprecedented solidarity between various organs of state power and population. The success of these efforts have shocked the detractors and their powerful foreign backers. It is obvious that despite the many challenges, Pakistanis are determined to make CPEC a success. There is full agreement among the power brokers in Pakistan to see CPEC implemented to the full. The solidarity shown by our Chinese friends to our economic progress has very few parallels in diplomatic history.

China's medium to long term objectives include outsourcing its excess industrial capacity, developing new growth points, relocation of industrial zones, diversifying transit and transportation routes and supplies and to develop the western regions for closer integration with the Euro Asian markets. Pakistan has hundreds of 'shovel ready projects' in energy, motorways, railways, pipelines, industrial zones which given the 'trust' between the two countries, are already going through the various stages of full implementation. The Chinese initiative historically speaking resembles the economic dimensions of 'American Marshall Plan' after the World War-II for the Western Europe, but only ten times larger. The CPEC investment can generate 'multiplier effect' and 'spin offs' for the economy of Pakistan. There is a growing middle class, consumer culture and strong prospects for industrial revival, provided an enabling environment is established for 'wealth creation' by way of home grown comprehensive reforms in every sector of life. The projects of Gwadar's expansion plans, like the energy and infrastructure projects are all in full swing. The availability of multiple routes for transit corridors and the plans to build underground railway from Kashgar to Havelian will prove to be a real 'game changer' for the entire region contributing to peace, prosperity, security and stability for half of world's populations.

With CPEC entering the second or the middle phase of its implementation, it poses very different set of challenges and requires mobilizing different kinds of professional capacities. For example, attention is needed to the distribution system for dispersal of electricity from the grids, greening of environment with massive

plantations, dredging of canals, lakes and building up of water reservoirs, reforms in the civil service, local government, taxation, ease of doing business, banking and financial system, energy conservation, higher education, maritime, mining and tourism, etc. But the most important of these new policy initiatives are needed in the domain of poverty alleviation programs, through agriculture reforms, development of rural credit market, rural industrialization, township village enterprises, special economic zones and promotion of export culture. Again China is willing to help as 5000 Chinese small and medium enterprises are ready to relocate their factories to Pakistan to manufacture products for the Chinese market as well as abroad utilizing Pakistan's abundant raw material, cheap labour resources and location advantages.

The biggest challenge however is the 'disconnect' between Pakistani Small to Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and their Chinese counterparts in the absence of mutual awareness of culture, systemic and business ethics. The second challenge is the size of the companies. Some of the Chinese SMEs are indeed equal to Pakistan's Large Scale Enterprises (LSEs). Although Pakistan led the developing world during the decade of the 1960s and 1970s, the rules and procedure has also not kept pace with modernity. The third challenge is the slow decision making, low quality of governance with endemic corruption in all departments and all levels. In the absence of hard decisions for comprehensive policy reforms, the opportunities being opened up by CPEC, are not likely to be harnessed just by repeating the mantra of 'game changer' and a culture of ribbon cutting and China cutting. Pakistan needs to attract Chinese private sector investors with additional incentives package. Their investment in small and medium enterprises by way of joint ventures will bring in 90 percent of the investment envisaged under CPEC's medium and long term programs. The existing policies are inadequate. Pakistan has also unfortunately become a captive market for existing monopoly investors, who blackmail the government. CPEC is means to an end i.e. economic take off of Pakistan.

Pakistan is however, only 'cherry picking' from China's development experience. Any progress without 'comprehensive policy reforms' is unsustainable. Building 'knowledge corridor' could be worth many times more than multi track motorways. It will respond to demands of society and usher sustainable prosperity. When we build motorways, we deny higher education opportunities to thousands of promising and talented youth. There is what the economists prefer to call an 'opportunity cost' for every CPEC or non-CPEC project. Pakistan appears losing out on the future. 50 percent scholarships offered by Chinese universities are unutilized

due to lack of awareness and pro-West bias in our education system in particular and society in general. It is hence important for HEC to develop a futuristic vision of tapping the emerging opportunities of the rise of China, not only limited to CPEC but in China and the broader region of OBOR of Euro-Asiatic connectivity. This is necessary for riding on the 'China wave' or the 'Euro Asian Wave' of the next phase of globalization under a win-win template (Shuang Yin). There is the need to introduce well considered comprehensive policy reforms in the higher education sector.

Policy Initiatives for the New Government on CPEC

A strong CPEC narrative is a must for CPEC's full implementation. This is necessary because of the campaign of disinformation being carried out by India and certain western countries both in Pakistan, China and globally. The government may launch the three Special Economic Zones (SEZ's) and remove all the hurdles in the way of nine prioritized SEZ's. The government may announce additional incentives for attracting foreign investment from China. No country gets FDI, with 'level playing field'. China itself had from 1994-2007 subjected firms with FDI at 15% income tax, as against 33% for domestic companies. Economic growth and industrialization come at a price. Only hard decisions by its visionary leadership enabled China to break the vicious cycle of poverty. The government may establish 'China investor facilitation cells' in federal, provincial ministries and departments, manned by Chinese knowing officials/experts. CPEC will become only 'supply side economics', without comprehensive policy reforms, unable to trigger 'economic take off'. The IMF policies followed by successive regimes never encouraged them to undertake serious 'structural reforms', all the public commitments being nothing but eyewash. For instance, over the past seven decades in the rural sector, there is lack of rural industrialization, rural credit market and banking coverage, widespread destruction of the cottage industry and insignificant attention to the SMEs. The resultant consequences have been low rate of domestic savings, tax collection, FDI and low fixed capital investment, low factor productivity, poor innovation, backward vocational & technical skills. There is absence of 'soft infrastructure', which increases the cost of doing business.

Now Pakistani economy is undergoing 'creative destruction'. Firms without value addition, global market connectivity and Innovation are dying a 'peaceful death' or relocating. Unemployment level remains high. The official data are not credible. There is lack of implementation machinery, for facilitating Chinese private sector's MoUs, deals, contracts and agreements. Only the big ticket projects are being monitored by the officials. The Board of Investment (BoI) mandarins lack

corporate capacity, knowledge of global best practices, legal and marketing professionalism having only English speaking and drafting skills. Pakistan needs to attract new foreign investors with additional incentives package. The existing policies are inadequate. Pakistan has unfortunately become a captive market for existing monopoly investors. The government may launch reforms in the higher education sector to prepare human resources for the nation building needs of Pakistan and CPEC Projects. The government may simplify rules and regulations for ease of doing business to facilitate domestic and Chinese investment. The government may launch a comprehensive program for training of vocational and technical skills for CPEC projects, job placements and manpower requirements of global Chinese firms. The government may establish a data bank of CPEC related research at PIDE. The government may establish a centre for transfer of civilian technology and purchase of prototype equipment and machines for kick starting rural industrial enterprises and SMEs in Pakistan. The government may announce a new national policy for overseas Pakistanis to attract their investment in CPEC related projects and industrial zones. The government may establish an overseas Pakistani bank (like China) to mobilize their investments through banking channels.

The Prime Minister may hold monthly meeting of CPEC experts, Chinese companies representatives and Pakistani counterparts to know their views on hurdles in attracting investment from China. The private sector feels left out and has developed serious misgivings regarding CPEC and Chinese investment. It is hence important to create awareness and involve all stakeholders in nation building. Poverty alleviation, industrialization, greening of Pakistan, climate change issues and water scarcity need to be looked as 'priority areas of development', learning lessons from China. Study teams and planning experts of Pakistan may be sent to China's national development and reforms commission for short and medium term courses in China's reforms and open door policy.

Stabilization Policies for the Economy

The recommended policy initiatives for urgent implementation are: withholding tax on bank transfer may be abolished for attracting enhanced remittances of overseas Pakistanis. Overseas Pakistanis bonds, Sukuk bonds and Euro bonds may be launched to add cushion to depleting foreign exchange reserves. Deferred payment for oil imports may be considered with friendly countries, to avoid pressure on foreign exchange reserves. Import curbs may be imposed on consumer and luxury goods items. Austerity measures and reduction in non-development expenditure may be carried by restructuring of federal ministries,

departments state owned entities. Reforms may be introduced in public sector entities such as WAPDA, PIA and Pakistan Steel etc. to make them viable and profitable without the subsidies. Exchange controls may be introduced to check illegal transfer of money. Efforts may be doubled to bring back looted wealth and corruption proceeds of prominent Pakistanis in foreign banks. Foreign liquid and property assets of Pakistanis abroad may be investigated and their sale proceeds be brought back through international cooperation.

Short term bilateral maturing loans may be re-scheduled with friendly countries, but every effort may be made for not approaching IMF. Relevant ministries may promote research to identify new areas of investment for CPEC investors, impact on domestic players, study of labour market, development mercantilist eco-system, learning from global best practices. Challenges and solutions. No excuse or hurdle may be allowed in the way of launching SEZs, identification of hurdles and solutions, development of industrial clusters, sectors, producers, supply chains and service providers. Reviving the small and medium enterprises, identification of hurdles and solutions, credit crunch, cumbersome rules, paucity of talent, institutional disconnects, inadequate database, etc. The lack of suitable comprehensive policy reforms to rectify the malaise affecting governance in all sectors of the society is greatly felt. Large size of administrative units is giving rise to feelings of alienation, deprivation, disenchantment, parochialism, provincialism and absence of grass root development for the sustained development of democracy i.e. local government. Complex and archaic rules, laws and procedures are leading to loss in productive work hours, legal wrangling and criminal wastage. The relevant institutions have failed to develop a narrative to promote soft image and Pakistan's position on issues of national interest at the global level.

Public policies may focus on empirical based research instead of the so-called vision, verbosity narrative, emotional mindset, narrow interests etc. which have played havoc with the national economy. The resultant consequences have been low rate of domestic savings, tax collection, FDI and low fixed capital investment, low factor productivity, poor innovation, backward vocational & technical skills. Introduction of reforms in vocational training and higher education to develop human resources for CPEC and global market. Structural reforms may be initiated without delay in FBR, civil services agriculture, education, legal system, industrial policy trade, energy, finance and banking, labour market, mining, water, environment, foreign direct investment, Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), Maritime economy, ease of doing business, procurements, wastage, corruption,

culture, media, social capital and foreign relations etc. There is an urgent need for visionary transformation from the paradigm of security state to economy state, jihad militancy to start up economy, from import addicted to export economy. The relevant ministries may address the lack of transparency, the absence of clarity, terms and conditions, tax concessions, revenue lost projection, terms of repayment, cost benefit analysis, rates of return, employment generation of CPEC projects. Work needs to be initiated under CPEC long term plan i.e. agriculture, tourism, finance and securities sector, mining, vocational and higher education, urbanization, environment, water resources etc.

Conclusion

The summary of Pakistan's nation building paradoxes are: leadership crisis, bad governance, self-serving elite, politics of patronage, big size of administrative units, ethno centrism, poor work ethics, lack of professionalism, blame game, conspiracy theory, culture of negativism, benami accounts, a culture of extremist thinking and intolerance, emotionalism promoted by media, gender gaps, decentralization minus power to local bodies, obsession with English language, game of cricket, biryani, bar-b-queue, religion, poetry, America, great game etc. Pakistan needs to establish urgently to move away from the IMF and its designed policies, followed by the successive regimes. The relevant institutions should examine policy blunders, mistakes and missteps that cost the nation. Pakistan cannot continue doing the same thing with the same mindset again and again, ensuring its sustained downslide. The Western powers yearn for 'colour revolution' in Pakistan to benefit from the chaos and anarchy, as was visible in the Middle East, West Asia and Africa.

CPEC is means to an end i.e. economic take off of Pakistan. With CPEC now entering into second phase, timely wide ranging comprehensive policy reforms are needed. Time is of essence. Precious time has been lost and there now exist a narrow time space between 2019-2020 to conceptualize, enact Presidential Ordinances or Parliamentary Acts and implement these Initiatives in order to release the full potential of the economy. Bureaucracy cannot do it. The system of governance in Pakistan is in urgent need of corrective measures. All solutions emerge with 'mindset' change. This is why the famous British economist John Maynard Keynes had in mind when he had observed that the 'problem was not of generating new ideas but remaining with the old mindset.' Deng Xiaoping China's paramount leader and the father of reforms and open door policy that has transformed China since 1978, like never before, had stated that the most difficult challenge he faced in his mission to change China from its old centralized

subsistence in ward looking economy to a modern market driven society, was the 'mindset of the people' who were neither ready for change nor believed it could happen. The expatriate Pakistanis and our entrepreneurial community are all waiting to see 'change' happen in governance to restore their trust in public policies. Until that happens all talk of 'change' by those who have long term multiple visa and dual nationality, will amount to 'hot air'.

For the first time in many decades, Pakistan is ready for a 'paradigm change' in development planning. The existing institutions however lack the professional capacities if not the political will, to make it happen. The parliament, business and academia need to synergize their wisdom. The parliament has to deliver by undertaking legislative business. Precious time has already been lost. There appears to be no sense of urgency to reform the way things have been done. We fail to comprehend that it is our current ways of thinking and doing, which have brought us to this sorry and tragic state of affairs. In my view, there only remains the narrow span of 365 days of 2019, to make the 'comprehensive policy reforms' to happen. The establishment of obscure task forces with neither the professional capacity nor the will to prepare Recommendations for new policy initiatives has been a gross wastage. Time is fast running out. If official business continues as usual, CPEC is likely to be a 'missed opportunity'. Ancient Chinese military strategist 'Sun Tzu' whose writings are now popular globally, among the entrepreneurs, as much as policy makers and military strategists had observed: 'An opportunity seized, only multiplies'. Let Pakistan's leadership and decision makers listen, before it is too late!

NOTES

1. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a collection of infrastructure projects that are currently under construction throughout Pakistan. Originally valued at \$ 46 billion, the value of CPEC projects is worth \$ 62 billion as of 2017. CPEC is intended to rapidly modernize Pakistani infrastructure and strengthen its economy by the construction of modern transportation networks, numerous energy projects, and special economic zones. On 13 November 2016, CPEC became partly operational when Chinese cargo was transported overland to Gwadar Port for onward maritime shipment to Africa and West Asia, while some major power projects were commissioned by late 2017. A vast network of highways and railways are to be built under the aegis of CPEC that will span the length and breadth of Pakistan. Inefficiencies stemming from Pakistan's mostly dilapidated transportation network are estimated by the government to cause a loss of 3.55% of the country's annual GDP. Modern transportation networks built under CPEC will link seaports in Gwadar and Karachi with northern Pakistan, as well as points further north in western China and Central Asia. A 1,100 kilometre long motorway will be built between the cities of Karachi and Lahore as part of CPEC, while the Karakoram Highway from Hasan Abdal to the Chinese border will be completely reconstructed and overhauled. The Karachi-Peshawar main railway line will also be upgraded to allow for train travel at up to 160 km per hour by December 2019. Pakistan's railway network will also be extended to eventually connect to China's Southern Xinjiang Railway in Kashgar. The estimated \$11 billion required to modernise transportation networks will be financed by subsidized concessionary loans. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China%E2%80%93Pakistan_Economic_Corridor.

BOOK REVIEW

SHAKING HANDS WITH CLENCHED FISTS: THE GRAND TRUNK ROAD TO CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND INDIA

*Major General Asif Ali, HI(M)**

<i>Subject</i>	<i>Pakistan India Relations</i>
<i>Author</i>	<i>Dr. Asma Shakir Khawaja</i>
<i>Publisher</i>	<i>National Defence University, Islamabad Pakistan</i>
<i>Year of Publication</i>	<i>2018</i>

The book under review presents an unparalleled account of the nature and magnitude of CBM's in the context of divergent relations between India and Pakistan. It is one of the best historic narrations on the genesis, perspectives and analysis of CBM's and foreign policy frameworks. Dr. Khawaja argues that Pakistan and India still need each other because no one can sideline its geographical neighbour completely. This fact is transcribed by the long list of CBM's which are crying on a brittle milestone of grand trunk road between India and Pakistan. "Shaking Hands with Clenched Fists" is a unique study on the decades old ignored CBM's between two politically and socially hostile nations in South Asia. The book, very scientifically, cross examines the military, economic, defense, communication, political, social, religious, maritime, geopolitical CBM's between India. It has argued that there still remains a capacity to incorporate engagement for goodwill, and bilateralism, to bring coherence in the mutualism between Pakistan and India.

"Shaking Hands with Clenched Fists" is divided in ten chapters. First chapter discusses theoretical framework of CBM processes between Pakistan and

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India. Second chapter provides a historical review of CBM initiatives between the two countries, along with highlighting the double game and broken promises by Indian policy makers. Third chapter focuses on the central position of Kashmir issue and relevant attempts to initiate conflict resolution on Pakistan's part. Fourth chapter is on Water issues. It analyzes how politicization of water distribution is hampering the CBMs process. Military and nuclear CBMs are analyzed in fifth chapter. The sixth chapter discusses economic CBMs between the two states and the probabilities of economic interdependency as economic peace dividends. The seventh chapter emphasizes on the pertinent role of civil society and highlights the steps taken to ensure peace between the two countries. Chapter eight analyzes the media's influence on perception building and their role to create appetite for peace. It is hard to deny the fact that Pakistan-India CBM initiatives are hostage to peace spoilers. The ninth chapter identifies various spoilers in CBM initiatives; this approach paves the way for their containment and realization of peace and stability. The inability to mitigate and manage the machinations and schemes of the spoilers of Pakistan-India bilateral relations remains a major irritant in the peace process. The tenth chapter concludes the debate by emphasizing on the strategic and political pre-eminence of CBMs in the case of Pakistan-India relations. It states that as a status-quo power, Pakistan seeks peaceful coexistence, resolution of core disputes, and a military balance with India. Conversely, as a revisionist state, India wants to alter the global and regional order in its own favour. Pakistan perceives CBMs as an opportunity to resolve long standing conflicts. India aims at changing the status quo through maximisation of power, thus eschewing CBMs. As against Pakistan's principled and flexible stance to build peace, India has shifted the goal posts towards conflict escalation.

The author has proposed policy guidelines not only to the decision makers but also to the scholars of foreign policy in South Asia. She has put the intellectuals of social sciences on the new path of philosophical intellectual transformation. This scientific and objective research work has stimulated the minds of experts to discover new avenues for conflict resolution through detecting and filling vacuums in CBM processes. The major question to the statesmen of the world is how to make peace between India and Pakistan as South Asia is a nuclear flash point. The topic chosen by Dr. Khawaja is unique and timely as no such par excellent work exists in the realm of research. For the first time in recent history of South Asia, a scholar familiar with methods of inquiry and research has scientifically analyzed the Indian bent of mind and the idiosyncratic barriers particularly in decision making process. The Indian leadership is prisoner of its past history. The author is of the view that prevailing Indian mindset and idiosyncrasy can be punctured for

resolution of disputes by developing alternate model of change by the scholars. Dr. Khawaja in an articulate manner has considered all perspectives ranging from history, economy, culture, anthology and religion to draw conclusions. This background knowledge and expertise provided the required academic excellence. Apart from discussing CBMs, she has provided insight into the challenges and opportunities in this regard.

Historically, the bone of contention between two countries is the Kashmir dispute, which is unfinished agenda of division of the sub-continent. The book, "Shaking Hands with Clenched Fists" discusses how most of the CBM's on Kashmir were derailed to maintain the territorial control while completely ignoring the legal and human aspect of the conflict. Furthermore, this book provides an insight to the contributions and lapses of CBMs on Kashmir. In this contextual imperative, Dr. Khawaja emphasizes that continued refusal of Indian leadership to discuss Kashmir, is a clear manifestation of their expansionist designs. While narrating a historical incident in her book, she wrote that the first Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan, Sri Prakasa, suggested that "for the sake of peace all around, the best thing India could do was to hand over Kashmir to Pakistan." Nehru wrote in response: "Kashmir is going to be a drain on our resources, but it is going to be a greater drain on Pakistan." In stating this position, Nehru may well have outlined the future strategy for Indian policymakers, thus giving a grave blow to the prospects of peace when the conflict was just in its infancy.

Peace between Pakistan and India is hostage to such myopic and shortsighted vision of the Indian leadership. The angles of discussions raised and examples cited in the book, draw the policy formulators to honour and interpret and reinterpret the pacts between two countries. CBM's and foreign policy is a very difficult and complex subject but the author objective historic account and deep analysis is a great service to the people of South Asia. Confidence Building Measures are the veritable means to achieve an end – a sustainable stable peace. We need to understand that CBMs are a process, not the product and will have successes and reverses. The primary objective of CBMs is to create an appetite for peace among the opposing states. However, CBMs in Pakistan-India context cannot bring desired results without an in-depth analysis of divergent national security paradigms.

Dr. Khawaja wrote that the onus of creating peace in South Asia lies on its two key players – Pakistan and India. Both countries appear unable to design CBMs, which can address the asymmetrical relationship between the two, as

compromising power either horizontally or vertically challenges their security calculus. They need to address this aspect as well. It is therefore essential that they defeat their trust deficit through focused attempts of cooperation and organize a conducive environment for the region's transition from hostility to mutually beneficial collaboration. Strong, well-planned, and pragmatic bilateral confidence building measures are need of the hour to make the dream of peace come true.

CBMs can be agents of constructive change if both nations are able to create convergence of interests. Both countries need to take smaller steps to move forward. They should not halt CBMs for lack of immediate dividends but allow slow and gradual increase of political, economic, emotional and rational investment in peace.

In a nutshell, *Shaking Hands with Clenched Fists* suggests that Pakistan-India must offer workable proposals, and not words alone, to reflect complete support for such measures to have lasting impact. It emphasizes that Pakistan and India need to realize that CBMs should not be time or situation bound. Most importantly, India must comprehend that CBMs are not bargaining tools to bully or pressurize the opponent.

BOOK REVIEW

WAR IN 140 CHARACTERS: HOW SOCIAL MEDIA IS RESHAPING CONFLICT IN THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY

*Major General Muhammad Samrez Salik, HI(M)**

<i>Subject</i>	<i>Propaganda</i>
<i>Author</i>	<i>David Patrikarakos</i>
<i>Publisher</i>	<i>Basic Books USA</i>
<i>Year of Publication</i>	<i>2017</i>

The book titled 'War in 140 Characters' is permeated with the theme: How Social Media is reshaping any Conflict in the Twenty-First Century. The book has been authored by Mr. David Patrikarakos. The book has been published in the US in 2017 by the publishers 'Basic Books' a subsidiary of Hachette Books Group, Inc. A hard-bound book of 301 pages has got a high standard of printing, quality paper and fine binding.

Innovative solutions to contemporary problems of war demand interdisciplinary approaches with distinctive multi-format plans. The book under review frames logical opinion of scholars whose writings advance the debates on war studies. David Patrikarakos is London based journalist and alumni of Oxford University. He is author of *Nuclear Iran; The Birth of an Atomic State*. He is also contributing editor at *The Daily Beast* and *Politico*. He has also written for *The New York Times*, *Financial Times*, and *Wall Street Journal* besides many other publications. His media background coupled with his insightful coverage of war zones from Congo to Ukraine garnered his prowess for evaluating impact of social media on modern conflict. The book reaffirms David Patrikarakos credentials for writing on this momentous subject. It is an authoritative account that provides an

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excellent overview of 'War in 140 Characters'. The author is well conversant with the contemporary methods of inquiry and research and has pedagogic approach. The author's innovative employment of empirical and operative analysis to cross examine the 'War in 140 Characters' is a major contribution in the realm of war studies. The book is divided into eleven chapters. Introduction of the book as well as conclusion covers conceptual aspects. The book is highly useful for war strategists, war practitioners, media managers, narrative builders as well as for academicians and planners. Owing to its factual, easy and non-technical parlance, it is palatable for also a layman.

Evolution of warfare has been an ongoing process. Nature of war being constant, the character of war adapts itself to the zeitgeist of the time. The drivers of conflict include economy, technology, tactics and grievances. Advent of mass media in last few decades in general and recent phenomenon of social media in particular is influencing all dimensions of human life. There is a consensus among the experts that how and why social media is transforming human behaviour attitudes and perceptions. Many students of conflicts and wars have been keenly observing the impact of social media. In this context the book has been found the first authentic, comprehensive and palatable material on the subject. The book is about the study of changed conduct of war. It is also about stories, the narratives of conflicts and conflict of narratives. The modern means of conflict are taking us closer to Sun Tzu dictum, "To subdue the enemy without fighting is acme of skill". Social media has provided means to build narratives, perceptions, sapping of will thereby enabling us to subdue enemy without fighting.

The Clausewitz's Trinity of Military, Government and People, is also changing its complexion. While, Military is the primary tool of fighting, the Government controls it and people support it. In conflicts prior to advent of social media, Military used to operate in a confined space of governmental control and with people's support. The mass-media in general started eroding control of governments since the decade of 80s. Advent of social media has further eroded this control. As regards people's support, it is now transcending the borders of states and even regions. People of entire world have started affecting the conflict rather than those of belligerent states. Media and social media, has occupied a major space in this Trinity.

The author argues that social media has fundamentally changed the character of war and blurred the line between the battle field and political discourse. Facebook posts and tweets are increasingly emerging as source of

information and determine who wins the narrative. In today's world, the narrative is what largely determines victory. Military muscle alone does not suffice, wars are evolving every day, but today a new element has entered them: first-hand information sent by people to inform the world and sometimes change the narration of events. The author understands how social media is driving operations in today's undeclared grey zones of conflict; sets the conditions for the reader's understanding of the modern operational environment. Key conceptual aspects are:

- Ñ Social media has opened vital spaces of communication for individuals once controlled exclusively by the state.
- Ñ Within ambit of Hybrid War, social media has gained extraordinary ability to endow ordinary individuals, frequently non-combatants, with the power to change the course of both the physical battlefield and the discourse around it.
- Ñ Power has shifted from hierarchies or institutions to individual citizens and networks of citizens.
- Ñ The narrative dimensions of war are arguably becoming more important than its physical dimensions.
- Ñ Instead of Clausewitz's concept of "war is a continuation of politics by other means", now conflict is the practice of politics itself.
- Ñ War as military fight distinct from peace, still exists. However, the general tendency, driven by the information revolution, is away from that paradigm and towards open-ended networked conflicts that occupy a grey zone between war and peace.
- Ñ Homo digitalis are a new type of hyper-empowered individuals, networked, globally connected, and more potent than ever before as enumerated below:
 - They can actively produce content on social media platforms with almost no barrier to entry.
 - Through use of various forums they can form transnational networks.
 - They are especially dangerous for authoritarian states.
- Ñ If you don't understand how to effectively deploy the power of new media, you may win the odd battle, but you will lose a twenty-first century war.

- Ñ Social media platforms now spawn a political reversal: a regression from centralized communicative modes to the more chaotic network's effect of an earlier age.
- Ñ Social media is both centripetal and centrifugal.
- Ñ Social media shatters unity and divides people in two overarching ways. The first is obvious, it sets them at loggerheads with one another as direct engagement between opposing camps gets far easier. The second is more insidious, the majority of populace gets news from social media.
- Ñ Social media platforms are not impartial; they are capitalist enterprises designed to make money off their users.
- Ñ It is both a force for good, in that it brings greater transparency and a force for evil, in that it is destabilizing.
- Ñ It has brought 'Post Truth Era' which relates to denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief.
- Ñ Metal bullets are being replaced by tweets.

In order to substantiate these conceptual aspects, the author cites few case studies. Tweets of Farah Baker, a Palestinian teenager, sparked international outrage against Israel. Her story illustrates that 'a lone teenage girl can now battle—and threaten—the institutional power of one of the world's most powerful armies'. In an asymmetric conflict like that between Palestine and Israel, author argues, Palestine could not hope to win the military battle. But 'Homo digitals' like Farah won the discursive political battle.

Anna Sandalova, the 'Facebook warrior', is another prime example. She raised over a million dollars via Facebook for uniforms and equipment for the under-resourced Ukrainian army during the 2014 crisis. Able to mobilise resources in ways Ukraine's corrupt state apparatus never could, Sandalova was living proof of the ongoing power transfer. Patrikarakos describes: 'As the state fails, homo digitalis rises to take its place'. Nowhere is this transfer of power more evident than in the story of Eliot Higgins, the obsessive online gamer whose social media investigation challenged a global superpower. With just an internet connection, Higgins and a small group of individuals conducted an open-source investigation into the downing of MH17 more effectively than the world's most powerful intelligence agencies.

While individuals like Sandalova and Higgins quickly assume roles traditionally filled by nation states, how are governments responding? Not fast enough, argues Patrikarakos. Most world leaders 'govern like twentieth-century officials in a twenty-first-century world', unable to come to grips with the cultural, social and technological transformations of the past few decades. But Patrikarakos identifies at least one exception, a leader he calls the 'master practitioner' of contemporary warfare: Vladimir Putin. Russia's 'twenty-first century 'military doctrine' relies on mass-produced memes to reinvent reality. The state may be losing its power to control narratives, but Russia is striking back. The book is worth reading for anyone trying to comprehend Russia's orchestrated campaigns and to help us anticipate the social media challenges of future wars. Even the so called Islamic State is trying to establish Digital Caliphate. There is a full chapter on how Sophie (living in France) was recruited for ISIS in Syria.

Finally, the author concludes that new information technology is reshaping almost all the practices of war from battlefield to cyberspace. The transformation has empowered people to a degree previously unthinkable: a simple smart phone now opens up a world of information. This empowerment has created Homo digitalis- a hyper-networked individual above all Manichean, responsible for both good and evil. The boundary between war and peace is also blurring and social media disrupts the older order in three ways: time, space and method. Military operations can now become a form of information operation and seek political rather than specifically military outcomes. Clausewitzian war is becoming displaced by what Simpson calls coercive communication. The shift from hierarchies to individuals and networks of individuals is clear. Everyone can now be a broadcaster, but not everyone can be a journalist. Populists are once more dominating international politics. Global environment is more conducive to wide-scale conflict than at any time since 1945.

These aspects are equally applicable to our situation in Pakistan. Extremists, recently in and around Pakistan, used a mix of ideological, political, religious, social and economic narratives, based on a range of real or imagined grievances. Social media has been widely used to spread images, pictures and memes to further the cause. This clearly shows the impact of social media which is even being used in Pakistan for political ends as well as by our enemies as part of hybrid war. We definitely need to adapt to these transformations. The author has ploughed this book in the frameworks of great strategies which have global recognition and strategic value. Policymakers irrespective of their class or profession alike will find that the 'War in 140 Characters' consistently captures the

essence of the debates on wars that define their era and will put them on an unparalleled journey of intellectual transformation.