SIGNIFICANCE OF NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCES AND CHALLENGES FOR NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME: CASE STUDY OF UKRAINE

Abstract

Nuclear weapons remain central to states’ security in the contemporary strategic environment, as they deter major-power conflict while also influencing the evolution of both conventional and hybrid warfare. In this context, this paper examines Ukraine’s experience under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. It highlights how weak and non-binding security assurances, particularly in the absence of enforceable mechanisms, reinforce perceptions that nuclear weapons remain essential for national survival and strategic autonomy. The Budapest Memorandum’s lack of legally binding obligations and effective enforcement mechanisms strengthens the strategic logic of hedging, latency, and potential nuclear acquisition among vulnerable states. The paper examines the evolution of Negative Security Assurances (NSAs) across the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the Conference on Disarmament (CD), and the Treaty of Tlatelolco to identify a persistent gap in the international security framework.  It also analyses Pakistan’s long-standing position at CD and concludes that negotiating a legally binding NSA under CD is a priority for strengthening global nuclear governance for states without nuclear weapons.

Bibliography Entry

Malik, Mehvish. 2026. "Significance of Negative Security Assurances and Challenges for Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: Case Study of Ukraine." Strategic Thought (7): 57-80.