NUCLEAR WEAPONS EFFICACY FOR DETERRENCE & COMPELLENCE: POST PULWAMA APPRAISAL

Abstract

The scholars of strategic studies have devoted significant attention to nuclear deterrence
between India and Pakistan. However, they overlooked India's compellence strategy in a
nuclearized strategic environment. This study argues that, despite India's extraordinary
military power, it failed to compel Pakistan during the post-Pulwama military standoff.
The Modi government's nuclear compellence strategy is equally an imperfect instrument
of compellence because Pakistan is confident with its nuclear deterrent. Nuclear weapons
are effective instruments of deterrence, and therefore they cannot be used for compellence.
Moreover, PAF retaliation on February 27 and Pakistan's refrain from the tit-for-tat
deployment of nuclear weapons to balance India's nuclear assets deployment at sea
reveals Islamabad's confidence in its conventional war fighting capability and Full
Spectrum Deterrence. Indeed, post-Pulwama military standoff and continuity of nuclear
deterrence stability between India and Pakistan necessitates the scholarly revisit of
nuclear weapons efficacy for deterrence and compellence discourse in South Asia.